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Abstract  
 
Faith healing deaths occur infrequently in Canada, but when they do they 
pose a considerable challenge for criminal justice. Similar to caregivers who absent-
mindedly and fatally forget a child in a hot vehicle, faith healers do not intentionally 
harm their children. It can seem legally excessive and unjust to prosecute achingly 
bereaved parents. But unlike ‘hot-car’ deaths, faith healing parents are not absent 
minded in the deaths they cause. Rather, significant deliberation and strength of will 
is necessary to treat their child’s ailment with faith alone. Two different Criminal 
Code provisions can be brought to bear upon these deaths, namely, s. 215 ‘Failing to 
provide the necessaries of life’ and s. 219 ‘Criminal negligence’. From a public, 
medical, and scientific perspective treating potentially fatal ailments with ‘faith’ and 
‘prayer’ seems like reckless endangerment, giving apparent justification to the more 
serious criminal negligence charge. But, the fault element in the criminal negligence 
offence continues to be a vexing issue in Canadian jurisprudence. People accused of 
negligence-based offences are commonly held to the standard of what a reasonable 
person might predictably have done in similar circumstances. While it is 
unnecessary for the impartial trier of fact to conceive of faith healing as ‘reasonable’, 
it is an open question whether faith healers are sufficiently unreasonable to warrant 
serious criminal condemnation and possible incarceration when their course of 
action causes death. Is it justifiable to think of faith healers who cause death as 
criminally unreasonable? That is, do they depart markedly enough from the 
standard that criminal negligence is rightly attributed to them? Public attitudes 
toward religion, religious fundamentalism, and healthcare must be considered when 
trying to discern what a reasonable person does when treating an ailing child at risk 
of death.  
 
 
Key Words: faith healing, criminal negligence, objective standard, reasonable 
person, fault, mens rea, unreasonable belief 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Preamble  
 
In April, 1979 Arthur and Carol Tutton learned that their three-year-old son, 
Christopher, suffered from diabetes.1 Apprised of their son’s condition by the 
attending family physician, the Tuttons immediately began a regimen of insulin 
injections. In July of that year, Carol took part in a juvenile diabetes clinic hoping to 
acquire competence to deal with and better understand her son’s disorder. As 
devout Christians believing in the healing power of God, the couple was confident of 
a “spiritual cure” and they expressed this hope to the doctors. In November,1979, a 
diabetic specialist from Sick Children’s Hospital in Toronto reminded the Tuttons 
that Christopher’s condition was permanent and that they should never discontinue 
insulin treatments. Less than a year later on October 2, 1980, the Tuttons stopped 
administering insulin and within two days they rushed Christopher to a hospital 
emergency ward where physicians treated him for severe diabetic acidosis, a 
serious and often fatal condition resulting from a lack of insulin. The Tuttons were 
clearly told again that diabetes has no known cure, is a permanent condition, but is 
easily treatable. Again they were admonished not to suspend insulin injections. The 
Tuttons assured the physicians that they understood and would be compliant.   
                                                        
 
1 The following narrative is constructed from the facts reported in R. v Tutton  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392. 
[Hereafter Tutton] 
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In October,1981, Carol believed that she received a revelation from God.  In a 
written statement provided to police shortly after Christopher’s death, Carol Tutton 
claimed:  
Complete faith in Jesus and obedience to the word of God is the reason for 
our decision to cease giving Chris insulin. Since I have accepted Jesus as my 
personal Saviour and Lord [sic]. He has revealed himself to me in vision and 
spoke in words of his own that Christopher is healed and further that 
complete faith in Him not man's doctrine or shall I say the world's teachings 
will bring forth the manifestation of his healing.2 
 
Believing continued insulin treatment to be a sign of unfaithfulness, thus 
jeopardizing God’s miraculous provision, Carol stopped administering insulin on 
Wednesday, October 14. The next day Christopher seemed to function normally but 
by Thursday evening, roughly a day later, he reported feeling ill. Though Carol kept 
him home from school on Friday, no medical advice was sought. On Saturday 
Christopher’s condition was not improving and much to the horror of his parents, 
Christopher stopped breathing at around 1:00 Saturday afternoon. Arthur 
administered artificial respiration until police and ambulance services arrived. 
Christopher was quickly transported to hospital where he was pronounced dead on 
arrival. The official cause of death was the complications from diabetic 
hyperglycaemia.   
 The Tuttons were charged with criminal negligence manslaughter and failing 
to provide the necessaries of life, originally resulting in manslaughter convictions. 
The convictions were overturned on appeal and new trials were ordered. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred in instructing jurors “that no 
                                                        
 
2 Tutton, 1398. 
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mens rea was required for manslaughter by means of criminal negligence.”3 The 
Supreme Court of Canada took the Crown’s appeal by leave. Only six Justices ruled 
on the case, returning a unanimous decision to deny the Crown’s appeal and order 
new trials. They held that the mens rea (or the fault element) most certainly needed 
to be proved by the Crown, but unfortunately the Court was evenly divided on 
nature of fault required for criminal negligence. New trials never eventuated, 
allowing the Tuttons to fade into judicial history. 
 Sadly, a similar series of events took place in Rimbey, Alberta in December, 
1998.  After two weeks of illness, Calahan Shippy, fourteen-year-old son of Steven 
and Ruth Shippy, died of the same diabetic complications that claimed the life of 
Christopher Tutton. The parents were charged with criminal negligence 
manslaughter and failing to provide the necessaries of life, but were convicted only 
of the latter.4 After seeing autopsy photographs of Calahan, the presiding Judge, 
Douglas Sirrs, compared the boy to a holocaust victim. Sirrs J said the parents 
showed “wilful blindness on medical matters.”5 Crown Prosecutor, Ian Fraser, 
reminded the Judge at the sentencing hearing that a virtually identical case, R v. 
Goetz, involving relatives of the Shippy’s from the same small town, took place 
fourteen years prior. A young girl died of pneumonia and her parents were also 
convicted of failing to provide the necessaries. Addressing the Court prior to 
sentencing, Ruth Shippy had this to say: 
                                                        
 
3 Tutton, 1399. 
 
4 R. v Shippy & Shippy (2000). [Hereafter Shippy] 
 
5 Appendix: Shippy Sentencing Hearing, 2. [Hereafter Appendix] 
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My children are my life. I did everything I possibly could with Calahan. I 
mean I live for my kids. I live for my family. All I want to do is protect them, 
make sure they’re well.6 
 
Also at the sentencing hearing, Judge Sirrs asked Steven Shippy  to clarify his 
comment to reporters following his trial that he “wouldn’t change a thing.”7 Shippy 
replied: 
No, that is my religious belief. But as far as -- it’s an awful hard thing to lose a 
son and to say if something like that happened again I don’t know. All I can 
say my religious beliefs I would like to say if something come up like that 
again I don’t know what I’d do. (sic.)8 
 
Sirrs J handed down a suspended sentence with three years’ probation. A portion of 
the sentencing hearing is transcribed as follows: 
I have found you guilty as the parents of Calahan, who was under the 
age of 16 years, in failing to provide for him the necessaries of life in that you 
refused to seek out the medical aid that was necessary to ensure that his 
health was not endangered permanently. 
 I have in all other aspects determined that you are loving and caring 
parents. It is your position that it is your devout faith which I understand 
does not permit the intervention of doctors or nurses to assist in providing 
medical treatment that justifies your actions in the eyes of God. You have a 
problem in Canada. The laws that presently exist in Canada is that you may 
believe and worship as you please provided that you are 16 years of age. 
At age 16 Calahan would have been able and been deemed to be on his 
own. He would, as a matter of right, be able to accept all your beliefs. But 
until he is 16 years of age you, as his parents, do not have the unfettered right 
to do with him as your faith would teach you to do. 
The law of Canada does not permit you to deny Calahan medical 
treatment because of your religious beliefs. In Canada we have one of the 
most comprehensive social, medical and hospital plans in the world. Our 
                                                        
 
6 Appendix, 9. 
 
7 The local newspaper reported Shippy’s response following the announcement of the verdict and it 
was repeated in Court: “After the verdict the boy’s father said that he believes he has the right not to 
seek medical help for his eight children. ‘I wouldn’t change a thing,’ Steven Shippy said. He added that 
he thinks Calahan would have died even if they had taken him to a hospital. ‘I believe that God takes 
someone for a purpose.’” (Appendix, 3.) 
 
8 Appendix, 8. 
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society has collectively decided that we do not want children to suffer 
because of their parent’s inability to pay for medical treatment. As much as 
you might try to reject the values of Canadian society, your individual rights 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms do not give you the right 
to reject medical treatment for your children when there is a danger to the 
permanent health of those children. 
The government authorities did not intervene with your decision not 
to correct Calahan’s cleft palate although the doctor in the trial gave evidence 
that this problem could have been routinely corrected with minor surgery. 
This problem did not endanger Calahan’s long term health. However, when 
you refused medical treatment for Calahan when he was obviously very ill 
and you were treating him for the flu, I have found that you purposely 
endangered Calahan’s life and you tried to justify it by your religious beliefs.  
In this situation you should and can expect the authorities to 
intervene in your lives. The law is clear that you cannot endanger the life of a 
child because of your religious beliefs and until a child is 16 years of age, they 
cannot decide such issues for themselves.  Mr. and Mrs. Shippy, you are both 
mature adults. By all respects except for your failure to seek medical help for 
Calahan you appear to be loving, caring, responsible parents. The crime for 
which you have been convicted, as has been pointed out by the Crown, calls 
for a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment.  
The aggravating factor in this offence is that both of you are in a 
position of trust to Calahan. Calahan relied on your experience and 
knowledge to decide what was best for him. Your decision for him that it was 
God’s will that he die smacks of Darwinism in that he believed that for the 
good of the human race only the strong should survive. Our Canadian law 
rejects his theories. 
In your favour I have considered the following, you have no previous 
convictions. You are otherwise of good character. You would appear to have 
good work records in that both of you are hardworking contributors to 
society. And I have seen visible displays of your remorse for what happened 
to Calahan.  
As first offenders, I believe it to be enough punishment that both of 
you will now have criminal records. That is, you are criminals in Canadian 
society.9 
 
 Thankfully, faith healing deaths occur infrequently, especially in Canada, but 
the same cannot be said about our more religious neighbours to the south. On March 
28, 2008 in Oregon, Carl and Raylene Worthington were indicted on charges of 
manslaughter and criminal mistreatment in the death of their fifteen-month-old 
                                                        
 
9 Appendix, 9-10. 
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daughter, Eva. She died on March 2 of bronchial pneumonia and a blood infection—
conditions easily treatable with antibiotics. In keeping with their deep religious 
convictions, the Worthingtons were committed to treating Eva’s illness with prayer 
alone.10 On July 23, 2009, an Oregon jury acquitted both parents of the more serious 
manslaughter charges. On July 31, however, the jury found the father guilty of 
second degree criminal mistreatment and Judge Steven L. Maurer sentenced Carl 
Worthington to two months in a Clackamas County Jail, and five years’ probation.11   
Dale and Leilani Neumann of Weston, Wisconsin were charged on April 28, 
2008 with second degree reckless homicide in the death of their eleven-year-old 
daughter, Madeline.12 She died on March 23 from an undiagnosed diabetic 
condition. Believing Madeline to be suffering from a spiritual attack, the parents 
elected to pray for her rather than seek medical care. She was ill for approximately 
two weeks before she quietly stopped breathing in the family home. In separate 
trials in 2009 both parents were found guilty and on October 7, 2009 both parents 
were sentenced to thirty days in jail during each of the next six years.13 They were 
                                                        
 
10 “Parents indicted on Faith-healing death”, Oregon City, Oregon, March 31 2008, The Associated 
Press, accessed, April 1, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=4557821 
 
11 Tom Wolfe, "Worthington Gets Jail Time in Faith Healing Death," accessed July 31, 2009,  
http://www.oregonlive.com/clackamascounty/index.ssf/2009/07/worthington_gets_jail_time_in.ht
ml. ; The Worthington case in Clackamas, Oregon has become the focus on an entire book. See 
Cameron Stauth, In the Name of God: The True Story to Save Children from Faith-Healing Homicide  
(New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2013). 
 
12 “Parents charged,” accessed April 28, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/28/prayer.death.ap/index.html 
 
13 Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, "Wisconsin Couple Sentenced in Death of Their Sick Child," New York 
Times, October 8, 2009,  accessed October 8, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/us/08sentence.html 
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also given ten years’ probation and ordered to ensure regular medical examinations 
for their remaining children. 
Purpose 
 
As we can see from the preamble, jurisdictions in both the US and Canada 
seek to confront the oddity of these kinds of tragic deaths, but independently of the 
law there is another story afoot. For many centuries Christianity has been regarded 
by its world-wide faithful as a wonder working religion. Its greatest wonder and 
core doctrinal feature is that Jesus Christ has reconciled fallen humanity to God 
through his death and resurrection. Triumph over decay, disease, and ultimately 
death, is at the core of the Christian faith. The four gospels of the Christian New 
Testament are replete with stories of miraculous healings that often forestall the 
(apparent) inevitability of physical death. Jesus and his disciples were proclaimed as 
wonder workers and sacred Christian texts promise that if future disciples have 
sufficient faith they too can continue the ministry of healing and renewal that Jesus 
initiated. Consider two of the most prominent scriptural declarations of the healing 
power and the physical invulnerability of the faithful: 
And these signs will accompany those who believe: In my name they will 
drive out demons; they will speak in new tongues; they will pick up snakes 
with their hands; and when they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at 
all; they will place their hands on sick people, and they will get well.14 
 
Is anyone among you in trouble? Let them pray. Is anyone happy? Let them 
sing songs of praise. Is anyone among you sick? Let them call the elders of the 
church to pray over them and anoint them with oil in the name of the Lord. 
And the prayer offered in faith will make the sick person well; the Lord will 
                                                        
 
14 Mark 16:17,18 (New International Version; hereafter NIV). 
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raise them up. If they have sinned, they will be forgiven. Therefore confess 
your sins to each other and pray for each other so that you may be healed. 
The prayer of a righteous person is powerful and effective.15  
 
Christians all over the world and down through the centuries have generally 
affirmed that theirs is a religion of ‘healing’, but people are often surprised to learn 
that even the fine point about snake handling and poison consumption is taken 
seriously by some. Ritual snake handling and deliberate poison consumption are, in 
fact, features of worship in some Pentecostal churches in places like Kentucky, 
Tennessee, West Virginia, etc.16 State jurisdictions in which snake handling fatalities 
have occurred most frequently have made the practice illegal.17 The public policy 
concern, it seems, is that something so predictably deadly shouldn’t be allowed even 
where the free exercise of religion is highly prized. And, when we learn of children 
who die needlessly at the hands of believers who take the Bible at least as seriously 
as snake handlers, we’re often confronted with a similar intuition. It seems legally 
inexcusable, indeed criminal, when a child’s death occurs because people genuinely 
trust, not just in an ancient text, but in a course of action that is predictably, if not 
certainly deadly. These faith healing deaths seem, even to most religious people, 
                                                        
 
15 James 5:13-16 (NIV). 
 
16 Julia Duin, "Death of Snake Handling Preacher Shines Light on Lethal Appalachian Tradition," 
accessed June 2, 2015,  
http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/01/death-of-snake-handling-preacher-shines-light-on-
lethal-appalachian-tradition/?hpt=hp_c3 
 
17 In the Kentucky Revised Statutes – Title XL  - Chapter 437 - Crimes against public peace, the law 
states, “Any person who displays, handles or uses any kind of reptile in connection with any religious 
service or gathering shall be fined not less than $50, nor more than $100.” 437.060  (accessed June 
15th, 2012, http://162.114.4.35/statutes/index.aspx).  In Tennessee Code 39-17-101 provides: “It is 
an offense for a person to display, exhibit, handle, or use a poisonous or dangerous snake or reptile in 
a manner that endangers the life or health of any person.” (accessed June 15, 2012, 
http://www.lawserver.com/law/state/tennessee/tn-code/tennessee_code_39-17-101) 
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completely unnecessary and even absurd. Alvin Plantinga, arguably the preeminent 
Evangelical Christian philosopher of the last few decades, has attributed the 
following view about faith healing to at least some sensible Christians and obliquely 
to himself: “it can’t be done, but even it could, it shouldn’t be.”18 If it’s so obvious 
that faith healing is dangerous, how do reasonable believers interpret those 
scriptural declarations? The standard interpretation related to divine healing is that 
God does promise to heal people in a general sense but he is not committed to a 
particular method, nor is he committed to physical healing in every instance. It’s 
entirely plausible, the trope continues, to think God has equipped modern 
generations with medical science, making the pronounced and sensational miracles 
of the past unnecessary. So, the contemporary believer can affirm that God does still 
‘heal’ people, but he does it indirectly, as it were, and with less fanfare. 
A significant study from 2008 found that 34% of Americans, and 54% of 
American evangelical Christians, believe they have personally experienced or 
witnessed some kind of divine healing. Nothing about the data, however, indicates 
that respondents relied on God to the exclusion of medical support and 
intervention.19 Doubtless, people who claim to have witnessed or to have been the 
recipient of divine healing are employing the best available medical technology and 
treatment. ‘Miracles’ and ‘healings’ are the words believers often use to describe and 
explain perhaps unlikely occurrences for which they are profoundly grateful. In her 
                                                        
 
18 Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," The Christian Scholar's Review 11, 
no. 3 (1982): 187. 
 
19  Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, "US Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Beliefs and 
Practices," (Pew Research Centre, 2008), 54., accessed June 1, 2015, 
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2religious-landscape-study-chapter-1.pdf 
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book, Medical Miracles, Canadian medical historian, Jacalyn Duffin, recounts an 
event early in her medical career as a haematologist. She was asked to give a blind 
review of a patient’s bone marrow slides for what she assumed was a law suit.20 The 
samples were taken over eighteen months and they indicated transitions from 
severe acute leukaemia to remission, to a relapse, and to yet another remission. 
Duffin reported: 
Only much later did I learn to my great surprise, that the patient was (and 
still is) alive. She had accepted aggressive chemotherapy in a university 
hospital, but she attributed her cure to the intercession of a Montreal woman, 
Marie d’Youville, who had been dead for two hundred years. This case 
became the capstone in the ‘cause’ for Youville’s canonization as the first 
Canadian-born saint.21 
 
Duffin’s story is instructive for a variety of reasons. First, Roman Catholicism, 
Christianity’s largest global denomination, requires, amongst other things, ‘proof’ of 
miracles to elevate its most venerated figures to sainthood. It should not be 
surprising then to hear testimony of miracles reported by the faithful from within 
the Church.22 Second, and most importantly for us, nowhere does the Roman 
Catholic Church—an institution reliant upon ‘miracles’—endorse the refusal of 
medical and scientific assistance in the pursuit of healing.23   
                                                        
 
20 Jacalyn Duffin, Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World  (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
21 Ibid., 1. 
 
22 David Hume said that testimony of the “extraordinary and the marvelous” is to be entirely 
expected among the religious. David Hume, "Of Miracles," in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963/1748), 523. 
 
23 Nowhere in Duffin’s two hundred page exposition of medical miracles, many used as evidence for 
sainthood, does she discuss faith healing independent of scientifically based medical assistance. 
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When confronted with a serious and perhaps life threatening medical 
diagnosis, no one could be faulted for desperately wishing for a miracle; it does 
seem, however, patently unreasonable—and unreasonable even to most 
Christians—to refuse available and reliable treatment in favour of relying on one. It’s 
like going out of one’s way to risk being bitten by a rattlesnake. It is not surprising 
that the criminal law would be brought to bear upon those parents who, in the eyes 
of the law, “purposely endanger” their children by opting for the miraculous over 
the reasonable. To the medical professionals who warned the Tuttons about the 
risks of failing to give Christopher insulin, the child’s death was entirely predictable. 
One suspects they felt vindicated on Christopher’s behalf by the criminal charges 
brought against the parents. From a dispassionate, let’s call it objective, legal point 
of view, faith healers who risk their children’s lives must be either (temporarily) 
delusional or exceedingly reckless. They need treatment or deserve punishment—or 
perhaps both. But, when we indulge this intuition a bit further and seriously 
consider holding loving, ‘innocent’ people criminally liable for such tragedies it 
seems legally excessive and morally untoward. It goes without saying these parents 
bear no ill will toward their children—if they did they would certainly be 
murderers! They, like any parent, want what is best for their children. So, holding 
such parents criminally liable may only multiply absurdities and exacerbate an 
already tragic sequence of events. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a clear examination of these 
conflicted legal and moral intuitions. We will consider the nature of the offences that 
best capture what faith healers do. Primary attention in the Canadian Criminal Code 
12 
 
 
must be given to s. 215, “failing to provide the necessaries of life”, and s. 219, 
“criminal negligence.” I will argue that faith healing deaths can be wrongful under 
criminal negligence. But, they are not obviously wrongful, or at least not as wrongful 
as many might prefer. Consequently, I will also argue that the trajectory of Canadian 
Jurisprudence since Tutton in 1989 has made criminal negligence prosecutions and 
convictions less likely. We need to consider both descriptive and normative 
elements as they relate to law and we need to consider both descriptive and 
normative elements as they relate to fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs. We 
need to understand the recent legal history of fault in criminal negligence and we 
need to understand how fault is understood in Charter-era jurisprudence, 
particularly from the perspective of the Supreme Court of Canada. And, lastly, we 
must acquire a keener appreciation of why criminal negligence manslaughter is 
such a vexing offence for triers of fact. The offence demands a great deal of 
interpretation and invariably it gets interpreted by people with conflicting and 
conflicted values.24 Some of these tensions relate to what the law is and some to 
what people think it ought to be; and some of these tensions relate to how morality 
is understood and how people think it ought to be understood. Often the facts in a 
criminal negligence case are beyond the dispute of either prosecution or defence; 
how to think about the fault or culpability that apparently caused the unnecessary 
and avoidable death is up for grabs. To that end, a variety of arguments favouring 
both conviction and acquittal of faith healers will be explored. Not all faith healing 
                                                        
 
24 Individual triers of fact may not be aware that they have conflicting values. Others may fully 
acknowledge which of their values are in tension. 
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deaths should be prosecuted under criminal negligence, but I will argue that some 
meeting certain criteria ought to be. I predict that some meeting those criteria may 
be tried but won’t be convicted—and they won’t be for some socially and morally 
justifiable reasons.  
My general purpose in writing is to clarify what faith healers actually do as it 
relates primarily to the offence of criminal negligence causing death. Not every 
death caused by another warrants prolonged criminal scrutiny. An unsuspecting, 
law-abiding motorist, who fatally hits a child who has darted into the path of her car, 
has in some clear sense caused another’s death; but, nothing about that death 
warrants criminal liability. The criminal law must, however, be brought to bear 
upon unnecessary but predictable deaths caused by an otherwise innocent, well-
meaning religious belief. What this dissertation promises to expose is the collision of 
two important social realities: the publically justifiable institution of law and the 
privately inscrutable value of religious belief. Law must take a dim view of 
deliberate behaviours that predictably cause death. Similarly, society must be 
cautious in the constraint of individual freedom and seek to avoid condemning 
moral innocence. Finally, my hope is for the dissertation to have predictive and 
practical utility. That is, I hope it makes an accurate prediction of how future faith 
healing deaths could play out in Canadian courts, and as such, I hope the arguments 
presented would be useful to triers of fact and legal practitioners tasked with 
considering these kinds of cases. And if no more children in Canada die this way—an 
unlikely, but hopeful prospect—this research will not have been in vain. 
Unfortunately, people die all too frequently because of the carelessness and 
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unreasonableness of others. Discerning whether someone is criminally at fault when 
these tragic events occur is a difficult task and hopefully this study makes that task 
clearer, if not easier. 
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Chapter 2: Getting Wrongful Deaths Right 
 
 
 Let us begin with a rather colloquial question and ask what is wrong with 
faith healing in the first place? We might say there is nothing wrong with faith 
healing in itself, just as we would surely say there is nothing legally wrong or 
problematic with going to Mass, celebrating Passover, or observing Ramadan. But 
not all well-meaning religious rites are immune from legal and moral controversy. 
We should recall from the Introduction that ritual snake handling among some 
American Christian fundamentalists has caused law makers from some States to 
draft legislation prohibiting the practice. Not every time someone picks up a 
rattlesnake in some rustic back country church is that person bitten, but law makers 
know that the risk of very serious harm is so high the public prohibition is 
warranted. While law makers are certainly concerned about the safety of the public, 
we should acknowledge that the risks of snake handling are borne primarily by the 
person intrepid enough to hold the snake in the first place. People of a more 
libertarian persuasion may think such legal prohibitions violate religious freedom. 
The ‘Harm principle’ famously expressed by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) is that 
there can be no justification for prohibiting people from actions having only 
personal and private implications—no matter how outrageous the actions or beliefs 
may appear to others. Perhaps if a person is courageous enough to pick up a live 
rattlesnake in the name of god, they’re courageous enough to die as well—and so be 
it. There is an obvious contrast with faith healing. While both practices must 
certainly take a great deal of courage, faith healing exposes another person—not 
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oneself—to grave danger. The child’s life, not the parent’s, is at risk. We don’t need 
additional laws to deal with this practice. We just need to enforce the laws we 
currently have—those laws that prohibit and condemn risking and causing 
another’s death. Like snake handling, faith healing does not always have tragic 
results. But the tragic results are predictable enough that the criminal law should 
have an obvious response to them. Well, maybe not obvious.  
Let us examine for a moment the two statutory heads in the Criminal Code of 
Canada under which faith healing deaths have been and could continue to be 
prosecuted. The less serious of the two is s. 215, which imposes the positive duty 
upon parents to provide the necessaries of life to their dependents. As in indictable 
offence the sentence provides for a maximum of five years and as a summary 
offence, the maximum sentence is eighteen months. The range gives discretion to 
the Crown to proceed on the basis of the presumed culpability or blameworthiness 
of the accused’s actions.25 The provision gives no explicit guidance about what 
constitutes ‘the necessaries’ of life, but it does offer the following in s. 215(2)(a)(ii): 
“the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is 
owed or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be injured 
permanently.” Knowingly withholding insulin from a diabetic child would fall rather 
clearly under this criminal provision. 
                                                        
 
25 The range between indictable offence and summary offence also gives the accused the choice 
between being tried in a provincial Magistrate’s Court by a judge alone or in a Superior Court of 
Court of Queen’s Bench by a jury. See Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Essentials of Canadian Law 
(Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2004), 25. 
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The more serious charge of criminal negligence is a kind of mixed duty, both 
positive and negative. It provides that: 
s. 219 (1)  Every one is criminally negligent who 
(a) in doing anything, or 
(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do, 
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. 
 
The severity of this charge is understood in part by the fact that the Crown can only 
proceed by indictment and that the maximum sentence in causing death is life 
imprisonment, or in causing injury, ten years. People accused of criminal negligence 
are entitled to trial by jury but they can still elect to be tried by a judge alone. The 
justification for the offence is highly complex, but just in terms of the wrong it seeks 
to deter or prohibit, the explanation is rather straightforward. All of us have a 
negative right not to be injured or physically endangered by another’s wanton or 
reckless disregard. We hold this right in rem, or against the world at large. 
Consequently, the world at large owes a correlative duty to everyone else not to put 
lives or safety at risk. We can all discharge this correlative negative duty toward 
everyone else simply by minding our own business and making sure that ‘our 
business’ (e.g., driving a vehicle, walking our dog, swinging a golf club) does not 
threaten the life or endanger the safety of others. Inasmuch as an omission to 
discharge a lawful positive duty also shows a wanton or reckless disregard for those 
owed these duties of care, we can also be guilty of criminal negligence. Combined, 
we can see that children rightfully owed the necessaries of life are owed the 
additional duty of being cared for in a manner lacking wanton or reckless disregard. 
It is difficult to know if, say, the Shippys showed wanton or reckless disregard for 
Calahan’s life by withholding insulin (i.e., the necessaries of his life). One could 
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sensibly ask why or how would wanton or reckless disregard make withholding the 
necessaries of life worse? The withholding just is wanton or reckless! Faith healing 
parents must know they’re putting their children’s lives at risk. How is this not 
acting with wanton or reckless disregard for a child’s life or safety? We should 
notice the statute provides for inclusive disjunctions. One needn’t be both wanton 
and reckless. One’s disregard needn’t be for both life and safety. If one is reckless 
about another’s safety and that person’s death ensues, this should suffice for 
criminal liability under criminal negligence. 
According to s. 222(2) of the Criminal Code, homicide is culpable or not 
culpable.  Following s. 222(3), homicide that is not culpable is not an offence. 
Manslaughter in Canada is constructed negatively insofar as s. 234 of the Code 
states, “Culpable homicide that is not murder or infanticide is manslaughter.” One 
can cause death by criminal negligence and thereby be guilty of criminal negligence 
causing death (s. 220) or criminal negligence manslaughter (s. 222 (5) (b)). 
‘Criminal negligence manslaughter’ and ‘criminal negligence causing death’ are 
separate offences but have identical fault elements. So, what we know about 
manslaughter is what it is not; it’s neither murder nor infanticide. As such, 
manslaughter confronts us with the pitfalls that accompany all negatively defined 
concepts or entities, namely, how are we to understand or discern this ‘thing’? How 
are we to discern this genuinely wrongful death that is neither murder nor 
infanticide? We want to discern whether faith healing deaths are wrongful. The 
Shippys show us that faith healers can be blamed for failing to provide the 
necessaries of life, that is, for not doing something. But can faith healers like the 
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Shippys or the Tuttons also be found liable for doing something, namely, causing the 
death of their child? Both sets of parents deliberately withheld something they knew 
or ought to have known was necessary to keep their child alive. How is this not 
wrong in precisely the way that s. 219 provides? Let’s begin to answer this question 
by considering some non-faith healing examples that illustrate the difficulties more 
vividly. 
On June 26, 2013, fifty-one-year-old, Leslie MacDonald, of Milton, Ontario 
was picking up her grandson, Maximus Huyskens, as a favour to her daughter and 
dropping him off at his day care. On the morning of the twenty-sixth, she buckled 
the boy into his car seat at her daughter’s home and drove away. MacDonald was 
tired from working the night before and she drove home to go to sleep—forgetting 
that Max was still in the car. At 5:00 PM, fulfilling the favour to her daughter, 
MacDonald responsibly got into her vehicle and drove to Max’s day care where she 
learned from the staff that he had not arrived that day. Only then did MacDonald 
realize what she had done. She returned to her vehicle to find Max not breathing. 
She drove to her daughter’s house, where they called paramedics, but Max could not 
be revived. He was pronounced dead with the cause of death being hyperthermia, or 
heat exhaustion. MacDonald was charged with criminal negligence manslaughter 
and failing to provide the necessaries of life.26  
                                                        
 
26 "Milton Grandmother Charged in Toddler's Car Death Due Back Sept. 9," CTV Toronto, accessed 
June 2, 2015, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/milton-grandmother-charged-in-toddler-s-car-death-
due-back-sept-9-1.1410199#ixzz3D2Os3wii. 
"Grandmother Charged in Death of Milton Boy inside Hot Car." CBC News, accessed June 2, 2015, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/grandmother-charged-in-death-of-milton-boy-inside-hot-
car-1.1373515. 
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Similar events took place in the summer of 2003 when Dominic Martin of 
Verdun, Quebec was intending to do something he and his wife did prior to work 
every day—drop off their twenty three month old daughter, Audrey, at day care.27 
Their routine was to drop Audrey off together and then Martin would drop off his 
wife, but this day saw a small alteration. Martin’s wife was in a hurry to get to work, 
so they agreed she would get dropped off first and then Martin would proceed to 
Audrey’s day care. That was the plan, but after dropping off his wife he simply 
drove, without thinking and in routine fashion, to his usual park’n ride location and 
embarked on his transit commute to downtown Montreal. With his daughter 
sleeping soundly in the backseat, strapped responsibly in her child restraint, he just 
forgot to take her to day care. At the end of the day he returned to find his daughter 
unconscious. He rushed her to hospital but she died hours later of heat exhaustion. 
After a brief police investigation Martin was charged with criminal negligence 
manslaughter to which he pled not guilty. The Crown dropped the charges in April 
of 2004 before Martin ever stood trial, citing not enough evidence to sustain the 
criminal charge.28  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
"Milton Grandma Sentenced for Grandson’s Death after Being Left for a Day in a Sweltering Car," The 
Canadian Press, accessed June 2, 2015, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2013/11/27/milton_grandma_sentenced_for_grandsons_deat
h_after_being_left_for_a_day_in_a_sweltering_car.html. 
 
27 "Father Charged in Baby's Death," CBC News, accessed July 18, 2003, 
http://montreal.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/View?filename=qc_babydeath20030718. 
 
28 I am indebted to Ms. Deborah Dean, Research Librarian for the Faculty of Law, University of 
Calgary, for confirming details on the Martin case. 
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Leslie MacDonald faced a different legal fate than that of Dominic Martin. She 
pled guilty to the lesser offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life, and the 
more serious manslaughter charge against her was dropped. MacDonald received a 
suspended sentence and two years probation. MacDonald is a criminal for failing to 
provide the necessaries of life, but not for positively committing a culpable 
homicide. In this sense, neither MacDonald nor Martin was convicted of a wrongful 
death. 
 Notwithstanding MacDonald’s criminal conviction, the wrongfulness of the 
deaths she and Martin caused is sufficiently vague. Let’s then consider a crystal clear 
example of a wrongful death—deaths, actually. Late in the afternoon on December 7, 
2007, Daniel Tschetter, driving a cement truck on a highway south of Calgary city 
limits, failed not just to slow down as he approached a red light on the outskirts of 
town, but failed even to brake.29 The speed limit was 80 km/h and witnesses 
reported that Tschetter had been driving erratically and passing vehicles prior to 
reaching the controlled intersection. He rear-ended a vehicle stopped ahead of him 
at a red light, killing all five passengers in the car. Accident reconstruction experts 
determined that Tschetter’s speed at the time of the collision was in excess of 100 
kilometres per hour. Following the collision witnesses reported seeing the driver 
take a few sips from a vodka bottle and then dispose of it in the churning drum of 
the cement mixer prior to the arrival of police. Tschetter’s blood alcohol content was 
below the legal limit, so intoxication was not regarded as a contributing factor. 
Establishing, as well, that the truck suffered no mechanical failures, Tschetter’s 
                                                        
 
29 R. v. Tschetter [2009] A.J. No. 542. [Hereafter Tschetter] 
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criminal conduct was never really in question. The question facing prosecutors and 
the Court was with what crime should he be charged and found guilty? Five counts 
of manslaughter, five counts of criminal negligence causing death, and one count of 
obstruction of justice (for disposing of the vodka bottle) were brought against the 
accused. In his ruling, Judge Fraser wrote, “Whether specific conduct should be 
categorized as criminal negligence is one of the most difficult and uncertain areas in 
the criminal law.”30 He spoke of the wide variety of offences to which Tschetter 
could be liable: 
The accused is not charged with dangerous driving causing death. However, 
by virtue of Section 662(5) of the Criminal Code, dangerous driving causing 
death is an included offence of both manslaughter and criminal negligence 
causing death. Therefore, as a result of the deaths caused by the accused, and 
the offences charged in the Information, the following alternative offences 
can be considered by the court: (1) Manslaughter by criminal negligence. (2) 
Manslaughter by an unlawful act (dangerous driving). (3) Criminal 
negligence causing death. (4) Dangerous driving causing death.”31  
  
In addition to the one count of obstruction of justice, Tschetter was found guilty of 
five counts of manslaughter and five counts of criminal negligence causing death. 
Because of the redundancy of the manslaughter and criminal negligence counts, 
Judge Fraser entered conditional judicial stays on the latter.   
The moral wrongness of Tschetter’s actions is unambiguous. Though not 
technically a murder, it seems to make precious little difference that he didn’t 
actually mean to kill anyone. He hardly could have done more harm if he had been 
trying. We might be inclined to ask him, with more than a hint outrage, “what the 
                                                        
 
30 Tschetter, para 10. 
 
31 Tschetter, para 8. 
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hell were you thinking?” We shall find in the chapters that follow, asking someone 
charged with criminal negligence manslaughter what he or she was thinking is not 
necessarily relevant to the accused’s guilt. As it turns out, there are very good 
reasons for this, but Tschetter’s guilt hinges on what he ought to have done 
differently rather than what he was thinking. In virtue of what he ought to have 
done so very differently, his guilt was never really in doubt. But, if Tschetter’s guilt 
supposedly hinged on what he ought not have done, then returning to the hot-car 
deaths, one might wonder about Martin and MacDonald. They were charged 
originally with one of the same crimes as Tschetter and surely they ought to have 
acted differently as well.   
To some at least, Martin and MacDonald may not be good examples of non-
culpable homicides. The question could be asked, with some righteous indignation 
left over from Tschetter, what additional evidence would be needed to prosecute 
and secure convictions for criminal negligence causing death? Stunningly careless 
acts like these resulting in the completely avoidable loss of life are surely culpable 
homicides. This is not merely ‘withholding the necessaries of life’; it’s far worse. 
Even very careful people can forget leaving their cell phones in restaurants, but not 
even the so-called ‘absent-minded’ forget leaving children in the back seats of 
automobiles—for an entire day! Must every charge of criminal negligence 
manslaughter be as conclusively and consummately wrongful as Tschetter?  
With some calm reflection, though, we seem to know well enough what 
additional evidence would be needed to justify the more serious criminal charge and 
make the children’s deaths wrongful. In the language of the Criminal Code, Leslie 
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MacDonald’s “disregard” for her grandson needed to be more wanton or more 
reckless. We need her behaviour to be more worthy of blame, more culpable, more 
unforgiveable, more of something on the emotional register—like that found in 
Tschetter. Short of that sort of finding, common humanity seems to tell us that a 
serious criminal charge is undeserved and makes a bad situation worse. After all, we 
already have a dead child and achingly bereaved family members. No purpose is 
served in compounding a family’s tragedy by making a regretful caregiver a criminal 
as well.  
Let’s consider one more case of criminal negligence causing death that will 
perhaps split the difference between Tschetter on the one hand and Martin and 
MacDonald on the other. Early in the evening of June 27, 2010, near Candiac, 
Quebec, twenty-one-year-old, Emma Czornobaj—a business student at Concordia 
University—stopped her Honda Civic in the passing lane of a four-lane highway 
separated by a large concrete median. She was not changing a flat tire. She did not 
have other mechanical issues. She didn’t pull over to use her cell phone. She stopped 
abruptly in the passing lane to usher some apparently orphaned ducklings off the 
highway and out of harm’s way. Both Czornobaj and the ducklings were safely on 
the side of the road when fifty-year-old, André Roy, and his sixteen-year-old 
daughter, Jessie, came around the curve on a Harley Davidson motorcycle. Roy could 
not brake in time and his motorcycle collided violently into the back of Czornobaj’s 
car, killing both Roy and his daughter instantly. Czornobaj was subsequently 
charged with two counts of criminal negligence causing death (s. 220) and two 
25 
 
 
counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death (s. 249).32 A jury 
found her guilty on all four counts and she has received a ninety-day jail sentence 
and a ten-year driving ban.33 She is currently appealing her sentence.34 
If Daniel Tschetter inspires no sympathy but people like Dominic Martin or 
Leslie MacDonald do, Emma Czornobaj leaves us feeling rather uneasy and maybe 
more equivocal. Far from showing monstrous indifference like Daniel Tschetter, 
Emma Czornobaj went out of her way to rescue some defenceless and imperilled 
wildlife. It’s interesting to note that if no one had been killed, Czornobaj could still 
have been ticketed in violation of s. 384 of the Quebec Highway Safety Code which 
prohibits vehicles from stopping in the middle of any roadway with a speed limit 70 
km/h or higher.35 We can imagine a very different news headline had that happened 
and no one was harmed in the process: “Woman ticketed while helping to save 
ducklings.” The moral blame from the public in that instance might have been on the 
overly zealous patrol officer, proving the old adage that no good deed goes 
                                                        
 
32 Tu Thanh Ha, "Braking to Save Ducks Leads to Highway Carnage and Criminal Trial," Globe and 
Mail, accessed September 6, 2013, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/trial-date-set-for-woman-involved-in-duck-
highway-tragedy/article14165920/. 
  
33 Graeme Hamilton, "Emma Czornobaj Found Guilty for Causing Deaths of Two Bikers When She 
Stopped to Save Ducks on Highway," National Post, accessed June 20, 2014, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/06/20/jury-finds-woman-guilty-for-causing-deaths-of-two-
bikers-when-she-stopped-to-save-ducks-on-highway/. 
 
34 “Emma Czornobaj, who stopped for ducks causing 2 deaths, appeals sentence,” CBC News-
Montreal, accessed January 9, 2015,  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/emma-czornobaj-who-stopped-for-ducks-causing-2-
deaths-appeals-sentence-1.2896005 
 
35 Section 384 of the Quebec Highway Safety Code, provides that “No person may stop a road vehicle 
on the roadway of a public highway where the maximum speed allowed is 70 km/h or more, unless 
in a case of necessity or when authorized to do so by signs or signals.”  Czornobaj could have been 
found in violation even if no one had been injured. The deaths turned her actions into a federal crime 
and not merely a Provincial regulatory offence. 
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unpunished. No doubt, though, the Quebec legislators had in mind something like 
the actual outcome of Czornobaj’s actions when they drafted and passed that 
regulatory provision. The compelling argument to the jury was obviously that 
Czornobaj herself ought to have better anticipated the risks she was creating for the 
lives and safety of fellow motorists. The triers of fact in Czornobaj’s case agreed that 
her actions sufficiently showed reckless disregard for the lives of André and Jessie 
Roy. But her case, and indeed the verdict has sparked a great deal of public 
controversy.36 It’s simply not obvious to everyone that she should be guilty of a 
crime that warrants incarceration. In this sense, Emma Czornobaj bears some 
resemblance to Dominic Martin and Leslie MacDonald.  
We want to discern whether or not accidentally caused deaths are criminally 
wrongful deaths. To be wrongful from a legal point of view the deaths must have 
been caused by culpable conduct. When murderers, rapists, paedophiles, and 
brutish cement truck drivers are prosecuted and convicted our moral sentiments 
are often satisfied and our moral intuitions confirmed. But in the vast majority of 
wrongful death-type cases, only a few of which have been represented here, there is 
quite simply very little in the way of moral satisfaction or confirmation. We are 
horrified by the result of needless and senseless death, but we may lack the stomach 
to call these careless people ‘criminals’. We can appreciate more clearly why, even in 
a case as clear and as satisfying as Tschetter, Fraser J would admit that criminal 
                                                        
 
36 Geoffrey Vendeville, "Online Petition Seeks Leniency for Duck-Saving Driver Emma Czornobaj," 
Montreal Gazzette,  accessed July 15, 2014,  
http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Online+petition+seeks+leniency+duck+saving+driver+Em
ma/10031277/story.html 
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negligence is an exceedingly troublesome area of law to make sense of. It’s 
troublesome, because, unlike murder, the moral or voluntary flaw we intuitively 
seek in the accused isn’t as obvious as we’d like it to be—and with our twenty-first 
century moral, legal, and political sensibilities, we’re loathe, as we should be, to 
stigmatize and condemn otherwise innocent people. 
Discussion about the relationship between law and morality can quickly 
draw us into some of the most foundational and intractable debates in 
jurisprudence, but the goal here is not to resolve longsuffering debates among legal 
positivists, legal realists, and natural lawyers. The goal is simply to assess whether 
faith healing deaths can and should lead to guilty verdicts in Canadian courtrooms, 
and most specifically, guilty verdicts of the more serious charge of criminal 
negligence causing death. I want to emphasize, again, the need for a mix of 
descriptive and normative considerations. We must consider legal principles and 
legal reasoning that have been at work in relatively recent judicial history, but we 
need to be aware of some of the legal and political facts that may well strain 
principle in shaping verdicts. To understand the criminal claims I want to make we 
need to make peace with the conflicted moral intuitions the cases we’ve surveyed so 
far leave us with. Criminal negligence is a vexing fault element and it is possible—it 
should be possible—to be guilty of criminal negligence causing death or criminal 
negligence manslaughter without being as obviously guilty as, say, Daniel Tschetter. 
Proof beyond reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty of criminal negligence 
should not require sentimental certainty. Convictions need to be morally and legally 
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justifiable, but they need not be characterized by moral certainty. Moral certainty is 
a luxury that is rarely afforded by cases involving criminal negligence.  
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Chapter 3: Sketching the Fault Lines in Tutton 
 
 
Having considered some of the challenges of discerning from a moral point of 
view a culpable homicide, we can turn our attention to something about which no 
similar ambiguity or vagueness should be acceptable, namely, the required fault 
element or mens rea that must be met to establish criminal liability for such deaths. I 
do not mean that there hasn’t been misunderstanding, disagreement, confusion, and 
contradiction over this issue in the past. Tutton is paradigmatic of all of this. But, if  
triers of fact are required to discern fault in the evidence provided they need to 
know what precisely they’re looking for and what precisely fault is. To make an 
accurate prediction of how future faith healing deaths might be adjudicated some 
relevant judicial and legal history needs to be considered. And there’s no better 
place to start than with Tutton itself. Of course, the fault debate didn’t begin with 
Tutton, but Tutton serves as an interesting place to begin because it’s in the middle, 
as it were. From a jurisprudential perspective Tutton finds the Supreme Court of 
Canada trying to decide how to reason about mens rea in cases of unintended or 
‘accidental’ harm-doing. But it’s not like they had never done this before. The 
novelty in 1989 was that the SCC was in the midst of trying to reconcile laws and 
legal doctrine created and developed in a pre-Charter era with the new political 
ethos of Charter sensitivity. Laws and judicial reasoning were being revisited and 
scrutinized to ensure compliance with Charter values. Tutton is also in the middle 
inasmuch as the Court was evenly divided on what mens rea threshold needed to be 
met in negligence-based offences like manslaughter and dangerous driving. Don 
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Stuart referred to the outcome of Tutton as exemplifying “deadlock and 
confusion.”37 In what follows, we will examine the explanations and justifications of 
fault in Tutton and examine the basic theoretical underpinnings that anchor the two 
sides of the debate. As we’ll see, the ‘fault line’ is not always a solid line.  
 
I 
 
Many of the important details of Tutton were recounted in the preamble, so I 
won’t rehearse them all here. We know that Christopher Tutton, a diabetic child, 
died when he was five years old in October, 1981 for lack of insulin. His parents had 
known he suffered from diabetes for quite some time. When he was first diagnosed 
in April,1979 doctors kept him hospitalized for a couple of weeks monitoring the 
young boy’s condition.38 Arthur and Carol educated themselves about the 
implications of diabetes and they tried to understand Christopher’s disorder as 
accurately as possible. Interestingly, they never withheld any other form of medical 
care from Christopher in any other noteworthy or evidentiary regard, but they 
believed in relation to this diabetic condition God was going to intervene.39 It took 
about a year and half after the initial diagnosis before they would act on that belief. 
                                                        
 
37 Don Stuart, "Criminal Negligence:  Deadlock and Confusion in the Supreme Court," Criminal Reports 
69, no. 3 (1989). 
 
38 Tutton, 1421, reports Dr. Love was as the presiding physician and indicates that Christopher was 
kept in hospital “for some weeks.”  
 
39 This is a legally salient point. It would be probative if the Tuttons could provide evidence at trial of 
numerous other times in which Christopher was ill and they withheld medical treatment in favour of 
prayer or trust and he recovered in a way that bespoke healing. It would be additionally probative to 
provide evidence of regular reliance on medical care for other ailments Christopher might have had. 
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In October, 1980 they deliberately suspended Christopher’s insulin injections, but 
within two days Christopher’s downturn was sufficiently alarming that they rushed 
him to hospital and doctors were able to stabilize him. Arthur and Carol were 
sternly admonished never to suspend insulin treatments again. They were reminded 
in no uncertain terms that Christopher’s condition was permanent—at any rate, no 
one had any good reason to think there was a medical cure anywhere on the 
scientific horizon. While Arthur and Carol educated themselves further on the 
nature of diabetes, their faith in a divine, supernatural cure went undeterred. One 
year after the first dramatic withdrawal, Carol decided, with apparent inspiration 
from God, that it was time to trust again in his healing power.40 There would be no 
third time, not for Christopher. Christopher died on Saturday, October 17, 1981, four 
days after his last insulin injection and considerable evidence that his condition 
worsened after the withdrawal. Both parents were charged with failing to provide 
the necessaries of life (then s. 197) and with criminal negligence manslaughter 
(then s. 202). 
The Tuttons were convicted at trial, but their convictions were overturned 
on appeal. Dubin JA, writing for the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal, held 
that inaccurate jury instructions were given by the trial judge. According to Dubin 
JA, the trial judge did not adequately disambiguate the two offences with which the 
Tuttons were charged, namely, failing to provide the necessaries and criminal 
negligence manslaughter. The primary confusion, the Appeal Court held, was 
                                                        
 
40 Arthur was not part of the decision to withdraw insulin the second time but when Carol informed 
her husband about her decision he consented to the course of action she chose. 
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generated by combining the fault elements for the two offences in the indictment. 
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s instructions created the impression in 
the minds of jurors that successfully proving the former was, in turn, sufficient 
evidence of the latter. McIntyre J in Tutton, quoted the trial judge’s instructions as 
they were recounted by Ontario Court of Appeal: 
“To succeed on this indictment therefore the Crown must satisfy you, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, of each and every one of these following 
elements:-- 
That it was the duty of the Tuttons to provide Christopher with the 
necessaries of life; 
That they omitted to do so without lawful excuse; 
That in omitting to do so they showed wanton or reckless disregard 
for the life or safety of Christopher;  
and that it was that omission or failure which did cause his death.” 
 
and, further, he said: 
 
“Another element which the Crown must establish is that the accused 
omitted to provide Christopher with insulin and timely medical assistance 
without lawful excuse. Excuse of course means excuse in law. A lawful excuse 
might be that the person does not have the money to purchase insulin or that 
because of some personal or physical incapacity he is unable to obtain the 
insulin or that he or she did not know how to administer it. It is not a lawful 
excuse for a person to have religious beliefs that say it is wrong to give 
insulin or that God has told them that it is not necessary to give insulin to a 
child. The law of this country is paramount and must be obeyed by everyone 
without exception. To sum up then. To succeed on this indictment the Crown 
must satisfy you, beyond a reasonable doubt. Firstly, that it was the duty of the 
Tuttons to provide Christopher with the necessaries of life, namely his daily 
injections of insulin and timely medical assistance. That they failed to do so 
without lawful excuse. That in omitting to do so they showed wanton or 
reckless disregard for his life or safety. That it was that omission or failure 
which caused his death.” [Emphasis in original]41 
 
Looking carefully at the instructions it’s not difficult to see why the jury returned 
guilty verdicts. The trial judge essentially foreclosed on the possibility that a lawful 
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excuse could be found for withholding Christopher’s insulin. Because it was obvious 
that the withdrawal caused Christopher’s death and no lawful excuse for the 
withdrawal was available, the logical conclusion for the jury was that the Tuttons 
were guilty as charged.   
The Crown appealed to the SCC and the appeal was taken by leave. All six SCC 
Justices voted to deny the appeal. All favoured new trials for the Tuttons with 
clearer, more accurate instructions to the jury with regard to the required mens rea. 
All six Justices also agreed that Dubin JA’s ruling was not without its own confusion. 
Dubin JA held that an objective test for criminal negligence was improper in this 
instance, but he did not affirm that a subjective test for criminal negligence was 
proper in all instances of criminal negligence. Dubin JA drew the distinction 
between acts of commission and acts of omission. Positive acts qua commissions 
that constituted wanton or reckless disregard for another’s life or safety could be 
evaluated based on an objective standard, but acts qua omissions like those of the 
Tuttons could only be blameworthy if some subjective test was satisfied. That is, 
unless the omission discernibly resulted from something subjective, like an 
awareness of risk or wilful blindness to a harmful risk, fault could not be found. A bit 
of reflection shows what concerned the SCC, namely, that Christopher’s death can be 
equally well explained either by reference to something his parents did (but ought 
not have done) or to something his parents didn’t do (but ought to have done).42 Not 
seeing the distinction the Court of Appeal drew, no one on the SCC was persuaded 
                                                        
 
42 Obviously enough this same reflection can be applied to Daniel Tschetter.  Did his actions result in 
deaths or did his failure to act as he might have or should have result in deaths? 
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that the offence required two distinct tests.43 Unfortunately, the Court was evenly 
divided upon what test was required and therefore, upon what advice a jury should 
be given relating to the mens rea.   
 Let’s now focus on the primary disagreement—the deadlock, if not the 
confusion—that divided the SCC. Dickson CJ and Wilson and La Forest JJ favoured a 
subjective test for the criminal negligence offence, while McIntyre, L'Heureux-Dubé, 
and Lamer JJ favoured an objective test. Wilson J described the interpretive 
challenge thusly:  
Section 202 (now s. 219) of the Code is, in my view, notorious in its 
ambiguity. Since its enactment in its present form in the 1955 Amendments 
to the Criminal Code it has bedevilled both courts and commentators who 
have sought out its meaning. The interpretation put upon it usually depends 
upon which words are emphasized. On the one hand, my colleague's 
judgment demonstrates that emphasizing the use of the words "shows" and 
"negligence" can lead to the conclusion that an objective standard of liability 
was intended and that proof of unreasonable conduct alone will suffice. On 
the other hand, if the words "wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or 
safety of other persons" are stressed along with the fact that what is 
prohibited is not negligence simpliciter but "criminal" negligence, one might 
conclude that Parliament intended some degree of advertence to the risk to 
the lives or safety of others to be an essential element of the offence. When 
faced with such fundamental ambiguity, it would be my view that the court 
should give the provision the interpretation most consonant, not only with 
the text and purpose of the provision, but also, where possible, with the 
broader concepts and principles of the law.44 
 
While Wilson J believed the statute was ambiguous she was confident that, in fact, 
Parliament did intend some degree of advertence to be shown by an accused and 
                                                        
 
43 Christopher’s death undoubtedly resulted from the absence of insulin.  The omission to give 
Christopher insulin caused his death. But this is an “ordinary language” gesture at the criminal 
negligence statute. While it may be obvious that in omitting to do something that was their duty to 
do, the Tutton’s caused Christopher’s death, it’s not obvious that “wanton or reckless disregard” 
should have two distinct fault tests. 
 
44 Tutton, 1403-04. 
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that the broader concepts and principles of law supported a more subjective 
approach to fault in criminal negligence. Nevertheless, she could see why the 
ambiguity inspired alternative interpretations and, even why the trial judge held the 
opinion “that no mens rea was required for manslaughter by means of criminal 
negligence.”45 Wilson J, defending the view that some subjective element was 
necessary for conviction, was not blind to the fact that the newly introduced Charter 
might create potential tensions and discontinuities with established doctrine and 
longstanding precedent. Nevertheless, she denied it was the Court’s responsibility to 
imagine problems that weren’t there or for Judges to do work that that was not 
theirs to do. She wrote: 
It is my view that the jurisprudence of this Court to date establishes that the 
criminal negligence prohibited under s. 202 is advertent negligence. I would 
not hesitate to depart from these precedents for solid reasons but I cannot, 
with due respect for those who think otherwise, agree that the case for the 
adoption of an objective standard of liability has been made out to the extent 
required to justify a departure from this Court’s previous decisions.  …  The 
adoption of an objective standard also creates, in my view, both the potential 
for a Charter violation and uncertainty as to the relevance of factors 
subjective to the accused under the new objective standard.46  
 
She went on: 
 
Should social protection require adoption of an objective standard it is open 
to Parliament to enact a law which clearly adopts such a standard. In my 
respectful view this Court should not do it for them.47 
 
Wilson J also did not deny that an objective standard of a sort would be necessary to 
discern the subjective element of “advertent negligence.” She took advertent 
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negligence to consist of a minimal awareness of the endangering risks to others. She 
referred to the jurisprudential work of Glanville Williams who defended the 
“important evidentiary use of objective standards in determining the mental state of 
mind.”48 Clearly, the point Wilson J seeks to draw out is that legally relevant mental 
states are indeed internal to a subject and, therefore, must be inferred from 
something more observable, in a word, more ‘objective’. This kind of explanation 
can be easily seen by considering the words of (then) Justice Dickson in the 
benchmark 1978 ruling, Sault Ste. Marie, where the SCC made valuable clarifications 
to various offences and their fault requirements:49 
Offences in which mens rea, consisting of some positive state of mind such as 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either 
as an inference from the nature of the act committed, or by additional 
evidence.50 (emphasis added) 
 
A positive state of mind can be lawfully ascribed or attributed to an accused in 
virtue of “the nature of the act committed.” That is, mens rea consisting of a mental 
state (a subjective and invisible thing) is inferred from a variety of contextual, 
                                                        
 
48 Quoted in Tutton, 1411. 
 
49 R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. [Hereafter, Sault Ste. Marie] The reverberations of 
this pre-Charter ruling have been substantial. In it, Dickson J outlined the fault elements for offences 
described as true crimes, strict liability offences, and absolute liability offences. True crimes require 
sufficient evidence of action done intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The ruling helped cement 
the traditional view that only positive states of mind could suffice as mens rea. Dickson J created the 
space for future disagreement and debate, however, by saying of public welfare offences that they are 
“not subject to the presumption of full mens rea.” (1327) This opens the door to a theory of mens rea 
that does not presume or necessarily include only positive states of mind.  Professor Stuart admits of 
Sault Ste-Marie that it has “serious weaknesses”, but he adds, “it deserves the highest commendation 
as one of the most comprehensive and comprehensible efforts in any jurisdiction to arrive at an 
integrated and principled approach to a difficult problem.” Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A 
Treatise, 5th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2007), 181. 
 
50 Sault Ste. Marie, 1325. 
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observable, and otherwise behavioural features (objective things). This doesn’t 
mean the mens rea (the fault element) is exclusively inferred from the actus reus 
(the conduct element), but the actus reus seen in the context of observable and 
public social interactions, speech, and other available features of the offending act, 
are the basis upon which mental states are ascribed or attributed to an accused. 
 Opposing Wilson J et al., was the objectivist wing led by McIntyre and Lamer 
JJ. McIntyre J concedes that normally, consideration of subjective features (mental 
states) is necessary for the attribution of fault, but negligence is both a different 
species of mental state and also a different basis for fault. He writes: 
Our concept of criminal liability relies primarily upon consideration of the 
mental state which accompanies or initiates the wrongful act, and the 
attribution of criminal liability without proof of such a blameworthy mental 
state raises serious concerns. Nonetheless, negligence has become accepted 
as a factor which may lead to criminal liability and strong arguments can be 
raised in its favour.51 
 
The criminal negligence statute provides a perfect example of the kind of exception 
that is justifiably and lawfully made. McIntrye J continues: 
… it must be observed at once that what is made criminal is negligence.  
Negligence connotes the opposite of thought-directed action. In other words, 
its existence precludes the element of positive intent to achieve a given 
result. This leads to the conclusion that what is sought to be restrained by 
punishment under s. 202 of the Code is conduct, and its results. What is 
punished, in other words, is not the state of mind, but the consequence of 
mindless action. … In criminal negligence, the act which exhibits the requisite 
degree of negligence is punished. If this distinction is not kept clear, the 
dividing line between the traditional mens rea offence and the offence of 
criminal negligence becomes blurred.52 
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He goes on: 
 
The test is that of reasonableness, and proof of conduct which reveals a 
marked and substantial departure from the standard which could be 
expected of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances will justify a 
conviction of criminal negligence.53 
 
McIntyre J agreed in part with the trial judge’s reasoning, but only with his approach 
to the defence of mistake of fact. The Tuttons argued at trial that they believed that 
Christopher was healed, explaining as an excuse their decision not to provide 
insulin. Had they been right Christopher would still be alive and no charges would 
have been brought. Their mistake about the facts of the matter was sincerely made. 
However, the trial judge instructed the jury that the sincere belief that Christopher 
had been healed would not be sufficient to exculpate the parents. The sincerely 
mistaken belief would need to have been reasonably held as well—and recall the 
trial judge made it perfectly clear how unreasonable he took their belief to be. 
McIntyre J held, “The jury”—not the judge—“would have to consider whether such 
belief was honest and whether it was reasonable. In this they would be required to 
consider the whole background of the case.”54 In other words, the trier of fact is 
responsible to determine the reasonableness of a belief. It is not for a judge to tell a 
jury an accused’s belief is unreasonable or otherwise.55 Additionally, proper 
application of the objective test would entail a full assessment, including both the 
                                                        
 
53 Ibid., 1431. 
 
54 Ibid., 1433. 
 
55 Recall the words of the trial judge: “It is not a lawful excuse for a person to have religious beliefs 
that say it is wrong to give insulin or that God has told them that it is not necessary to give insulin to 
a child.” 
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reasonableness of the accused in the circumstances and the reasonableness of the 
specific belief that caused the harm. 
Lamer J largely agreed with McIntyre J in endorsing an objective test for 
criminal negligence. Interestingly, he reads the statute very differently from Wilson J 
and presumes rather definitively that Parliament intends an objective test be 
applied to s. 202 and, further, when the Parliamentary intention is being applied, “a 
generous allowance” must be made “for factors which are particular to the accused, 
such as youth, mental development, education.”56 As we shall see in the following 
chapter, Lamer J’s concession about “generous allowances” to the application of the 
objective standard will become one of the most frequently quoted and most 
disputed features of the evolving objective standard. What contribution such 
“allowances” should make in assessing the fault of the accused is not obvious. In 
spite of Lamer J’s confidence that an objective test is evident in the wording of the 
statute, some legal scholars evidently agree that Wilson J is closer to the mark, at 
least as she assesses Parliament’s intentions. Regarding the absence of clear 
legislative definitions, Kent Roach writes: 
In Canada, confusion about mens rea continues because Parliament has not 
clearly and consistently defined fault elements such as ‘purposely,’ 
‘knowingly,’ ‘recklessly,’ or ‘negligently’ or specified what particular fault 
element applies for each offence. … As a result, the fault element must still be 
inferred from the legislative definition of each separate offence.57 
 
Similarly, Don Stuart writes: 
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In the Canadian context, given that there is a constitutional requirement of 
fault for any offence threatening the liberty interest, the only real issue is 
what the fault requirement actually entails. Jurisprudence on fault, both as a 
matter of common law and Charter interpretation, is still in a state of flux. 
There is considerable ambiguity and confusion about definition. A central 
issue continues to be whether the approach is subjective or objective.58 
 
In a tidy bit of irony, Lamer J would conclude his opinion in Tutton with the claim 
that in instances of criminal negligence the standard will be roughly the same, 
regardless of what designation it’s given in application. He writes: 
… When this is done, [viz., generous allowances are made for particularities 
of the accused] as we are considering conduct which is likely to cause death, 
that is a high risk conduct, the adoption of a subjective or of an objective test 
will, in practice, nearly if not always produce the same result.59 
 
So, the battle lines are drawn, and not without a great deal of qualification. 
Should negligence-based offences consider primarily what the accused was thinking 
and doing or what the accused ought to have been thinking and doing? The 
subjectivist wing of the Court believed that a necessary condition of the Tutton’s 
criminal culpability was some advertence to the ways in which they were 
jeopardizing Christopher’s life and safety. That is, wanton or reckless disregard for 
Christopher’s life or safety would somehow need to be provably found ‘in’ the 
psychological dispositions of the parents. The objectivist wing of the Court believed 
that a sufficient condition for meeting the requirement of mens rea was proof of a 
marked and substantial departure from an objective standard of reasonableness.  
Beyond a psychological capacity to have conformed one’s conduct to this external 
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standard, no additional subjective criminal elements need be proven.60 Provided it 
could be shown that the Tuttons markedly failed to behave as reasonable people 
would in similar circumstances, then wanton or reckless disregard for Christopher’s 
life or safety would, with lawful satisfaction, be shown. 
 
II 
Someone less familiar with the long tradition of doctrinal disagreement could 
wonder how highly educated women and men arrive at such incongruous views 
about such a crucial dimension of criminality. With the potential criminalization and 
incarceration at stake, people charged with these types of offences (viz., negligence-
based offences) rightfully deserve to know precisely what they have done wrong 
and why the Crown thinks their alleged wrongdoing is indeed culpable. People like 
                                                        
 
60 This is an important proviso and the Court acknowledged it by referencing the work or H.L.A. Hart. 
See H.L.A. Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility," in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 
ed. A.G. Guest (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1961). Suppose faith healing parents were found to be 
mentally deficient or otherwise not mentally capable of distinguishing between belief and reality. 
These subjective considerations could be completely exculpatory. Alan Brudner claims it’s important 
when dealing with religious harm doers to distinguish between varieties of hallucination. We could 
easily be persuaded that Carol Tutton was “hallucinating” when she thought God was talking with her 
about Christopher’s healing. The hallucination might have been beyond her control, making it wrong 
to attribute criminal liability for a harm caused while hallucinating. But, one could reasonably ask if 
she was hallucinating for the full four days leading up to Christopher’s death or just when she heard 
God’s voice. If she experienced some serious psychotic break evidence by her belief that God was 
really talking to her, she would still be morally responsible for her actions after the strong 
hallucination had lifted.  Brudner writes: “ … there may be a way of distinguishing the psychotic who 
knowingly commits a wrong in obedience to a divine voice he ‘hears’ from the fanatic who 
subordinates public rights of agency to private religious inspiration. If the defendant’s disorder is of a 
kind (a matter of expert evidence) that deprives him of the ability to distinguish between private 
inspiration or dictate of conscience and a public command from the sovereign of sovereigns, then he 
is in the same position as the man who kills in the insane belief he is the King’s public executioner.”  
Alan Brudner, Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice  (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 85.  Carol Tutton would obviously believe that she is being asked to obey and 
that the obedience is hers to freely give or refuse. If she withholds obedience and continues to give 
Christopher insulin she will feel the guilt of not being a good Christian. She’ll believe she could have 
done otherwise. The truly delusional person, without the rational capacity to choose otherwise is the 
person who can’t distinguish between a private belief and a public voice. God’s voice is truly not 
different from voice of some other awe-inspiring authority. 
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the Tuttons, and even Dominic Martin and Leslie MacDonald, know that the criminal 
law seeks to hold them to account in the deaths of their dependents. Their uniform 
opening defence might be that hindsight obviously shows they acted in a way that 
caused the death of their loved one, but they would insist their actions shouldn’t 
warrant criminal liability. The very last thing they meant to do was harm anyone, let 
alone kill anyone. In short, the result itself—tragic as it may be—should not be the 
only determinant of fault. Criminalization, intuition tells us, ought to capture a 
particular kind of moral wrongfulness from which it seems accidental and 
unintentional deaths are excluded. They are excluded because they don’t have that 
special ingredient that often marks the border between private or tort wrongs and 
more serious and public criminal wrongs. We could call this ingredient, 
‘mindfulness’. Surely, no one should face serious criminalization without a sufficient 
measure of criminal mindfulness—and faith healers would argue they don’t have it. 
Faith healers, along with people like Dominic Martin, will concede that their actions 
make them causally responsible for a death, but without proof of something more 
criminally mindful, no liability should attach. 
This intuition finds expression in the venerable Latin maxim, actus non facit 
reus nisi mens sit rea, (‘there is no guilty act where there is no guilty mind’). No 
doubt, this is one of the “broader concepts and principles of the law” that Wilson J 
and her subjectivist colleagues thought should inform an understanding of the mens 
rea of criminal negligence. Jeremy Horder says of the maxim, it “is rightly regarded 
as one of the most important common law principles of criminal liability. It is, 
however, a highly abstract principle. Beyond saying that a man’s mind must be 
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guilty if he is to be criminally liable for his conduct, the principle does not go.”61 Don 
Stuart says even less optimistically of the maxim that it is “time honoured but not 
necessarily helpful.”62 This ambivalence mirrors well the controversy especially 
evident in negligence-based offences. The important and time honoured principle 
invites the belief that something somehow ‘in the mind’ of the accused is necessary 
for any serious or true criminal conviction. This doctrinal commitment to mind-
related evidence has created problems and disagreements in jurisprudence 
generally, but they’re particularly problematic in the context of negligence-based 
offences because few people have thought that the concept of negligence positively 
describes a state of mind. If the doctrine is going to be applied faithfully, then the 
implications are quite stark. For example, at least two legal theorists have argued to 
keep negligent qua careless harm-doing out of the criminal realm completely. 
Renown jurist, J.W.C Turner wrote in 1936: 
'Intention' describes the state of mind of the man who not only foresaw, but 
also desired the possible' consequences of his conduct. 'Recklessness ' 
describes the state of his mind if he foresaw those consequences, although 
there is no evidence that he desired them; he may have been indifferent to 
their ensuing, or he may even have hoped that they would not ensue, but he 
knowingly took the risk of their ensuing. ‘Negligence’ indicates the state of 
mind of the man who acts without adverting to the possible consequences of 
his conduct; he does not foresee those consequences. The word further 
indicates that he is in some measure in fault, and that we should expect an 
ordinary, reasonable, man to foresee the possibility of the consequences and 
to, have regulated his conduct so as to avoid them. It is, however, submitted 
with emphasis that although this negligence may be blameworthy and may 
                                                        
 
61 Jeremy Horder, "Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea," Law Quarterly Review 
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ground civil liability, it is at the present day not sufficient to amount to mens 
rea in crimes at common law.63 
 
In addition, Jerome Hall published in 1963 a similarly seminal article, Negligent 
Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability.64 Hall’s worry, shared by Turner, 
was that imposing liability for negligently (i.e., inadvertently) caused harms is akin 
to strict liability—something justifiable in civil law but morally unacceptable to 
modern criminal law.65 We’ll call this the classical subjectivist position; i.e., the 
position that demands a rather literal reading of the venerable Latin maxim. Mens 
rea must pick out a culpable mental state that is causally responsible for the actus 
reus and if insufficient proof can be discerned of this mindful state then no 
conviction is justifiable. Echoing very similar legal and moral concerns, Wilson J in 
Tutton said she thought criminal negligence required sufficient evidence of 
advertence to the risk of harm. Let’s be reminded. Wilson J held: 
I do not, however, agree with my colleagues' conclusion that criminal 
negligence under (then) s. 202 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, 
consists only of conduct in breach of an objective standard and does not 
require the Crown to prove that the accused had any degree of guilty 
knowledge.66 
 
There is more to parse in Wilson J’s comment than might first appear. She could be 
saying that the fault standard makes breach of an objective standard necessary but 
                                                        
 
63 J.W.C. Turner, "The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law," Cambridge Law Journal 6, no. 1 
(1936): 39. 
 
64 Jerome Hall, "Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability," Columbia Law Review 
63(1963). 
 
65 Hall’s defence of Turner came shortly after H.L.A. Hart’s critique of Turner and his subsequent 
defence of criminal negligence in Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility." 
 
66 Tutton, 1401. 
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not sufficient for liability. In addition to an objective breach, she might be saying that 
proof of “guilty knowledge” is needed. She could also be saying that breach of an 
objective standard is irrelevant and that “guilty knowledge” alone will suffice for 
establishing mens rea. Some clarification is provided in what followed:  
By concluding that (the criminal negligence offence) prohibits conduct and 
the consequences of mindless action absent any blameworthy state of mind, 
they have, in effect, held that the crime of criminal negligence is an absolute 
liability offence. Conviction follows upon proof of conduct which reveals a 
marked and substantial departure from the standard expected of a 
reasonably prudent person in the circumstances regardless of what was 
actually in the accused's mind at the time the act was committed.67 
 
Here is the less ambiguous expression of her subjectivist interpretation of criminal 
negligence—a view that is consistent with the theoretical views of Turner and Hall. 
In other words, she is saying that if an objective breach is sufficient for culpability 
then the statute certainly does turn into an absolute liability offence. The general 
worry of classical subjectivists like Turner and Hall is that criminal punishment 
should only be visited upon those who, in some robust sense, psychologically 
authorized the harm they caused. Negligently qua inadvertently caused harm is not 
sufficiently authorized. Considering Dominic Martin once again, we might hear him 
capture this intuition by saying, “I authorized something that fateful day, namely, 
going to work on time. But, I didn’t authorize the risk to which I exposed my 
daughter.” To punish such a person for his harm-doing would be to punish an 
innocent person, to punish a person for results he was in no way committed to.  
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Jurists who demand subjective fault for serious crimes feel they have fixed 
upon the fault criterion that most scrupulously protects innocent people against 
false convictions and most faithfully upholds the venerable Latin maxim. A corollary 
of this concern about protecting innocence would also ensure that people could not 
be punished solely because society or some political authority thought the mere 
causation of a particularly bad result deserved it. On this classical rendering of fault, 
the only way to merit punishment is to have done a prohibited act with a 
correspondingly faulty mental state.68   
This commitment to a subjective test of fault in criminal negligence is still 
defended by some in contemporary jurisprudence. Claire Finklestein agrees with 
the classical view espoused by Turner and Hall that negligence qua inadvertence “is 
incompatible with traditional principles of criminal responsibility.”69 She concedes:  
Turner’s position is no longer seriously defended. Most criminal 
commentators now seem to accept liability for negligence in at least some 
form. In my view, however, Turner had the better position, even if he lacked 
compelling arguments for it.70 
 
Alan Brudner is a staunch defender of crucial elements of subjectivism, although the 
subjectivism he claims to defend is “moderate.”71 The view that he puts forward 
covers all serious crimes and along with Finklestein, Hall, and Turner, he too denies 
                                                        
 
68 I would like to use the word “corresponding” in a nontechnical sense, but it is important to 
acknowledge that Jeremy Horder (in Two Histories) critiques Turner’s subjectivism for, amongst 
other things, employing an unjustifiable “correspondence principle”; that is, the principle that makes 
correspondence between actus reus and (subjective) mens rea essential to criminal liability. 
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criminal liability for inadvertent harms. Expressing his subjectivist credentials, he 
holds:  
A punishable wrongdoer must have intentionally interfered with another 
agent’s freedom of choice or knowingly risked such an interference; 
inadvertent interferences are insufficient.72 
 
So, let’s be perfectly clear. On this more literal understanding of the 
venerable Latin maxim, penalizing inadvertent harm-doing is always unjustifiable. 
There may be justification for statutes variously referred to as “criminal negligence” 
or “gross negligence”, but the standard of fault is something more than mere 
inadvertence and something more than a simple failure to act in a way that society 
would prefer. As Wilson J indicates, there must be some advertence to the risk being 
taken, something akin to recklessness or wilful blindness. And, as (then) Dickson J 
said just prior to Charter-era jurisprudence in Sault Ste. Marie, this advertence “must 
be proved by the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act 
committed, or by additional evidence.”73 In other words, classical subjectivists are 
undaunted by what they take to be an unrealistic and unnecessary obligation to 
‘show’ the un-showable, namely, an invisible mental state. Subjectivists, especially 
like Dickson and Wilson JJ, needn’t be shackled with the now age-old criticisms 
against metaphysical dualism—even if it is the case that some classical subjectivists, 
like many in a bygone era, may have been Cartesian dualists themselves. 
Subjectivism needn’t be rejected just because few people these days believe in a 
Descartes’ immaterial soul or res cogitans, and thereby think it unverifiable. Hard-
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bitten physicalists believe that mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, emotions, etc.) are 
explained, or explainable in theory, in terms of neurophysiological brain states. 
From a more pragmatic legal point of view, people can avail themselves of this kind 
of physicalism or they could likewise contend that justifiable evidence of mental 
states in inferable from behaviour. There are a wide variety of scientifically robust 
options open to the jurist to justify his or her commitment to subjective tests for 
fault. 
 
III 
There is obviously a great deal more that could be said in defence of the 
subjectivist rendering of the venerable Latin maxim, but let’s turn our attention to 
the plausible theoretical underpinnings of the objectivist wing of the Court in 
Tutton. We’ll press into service George Fletcher’s Basic Concepts of Criminal Law to 
provide the theoretical foil to subjectivism.74 Fletcher does not just deny that 
criminal negligence should have a subjective test for fault; he argues that there is 
something generally amiss with thinking of any mens rea exclusively in terms of 
something ‘mindful’. In common legal idiom, an accused can be ‘found’ guilty or 
‘found’ not guilty, but that common idiom can be misleading. Rather than thinking of 
guilt or culpability as something dependent upon a guilty mind, Fletcher defends a 
broader conception of ‘finding fault’. We actually ‘attribute’ or ascribe fault to an 
accused through criminal proceedings. He describes it this way: 
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 The ‘attribution’ captures the idea of bringing home the crime to the offender 
and holding the offender responsible for the crime. Attribution signifies an 
active social and legal process. Attributing or imputing the wrongdoing to a 
suspect means that we hold him or her accountable, answerable, liable, and 
punishable for a particular instance of wrongdoing.75 
 
Subjectivist adherents to the venerable Latin maxim may not quarrel with what 
Fletcher says here about attribution, but they also want to emphasize the essential 
role that culpable mental states play in attributing wrongdoing. Liability, the 
subjectivist insists, requires proof that the offending wrong was done with a 
correspondingly culpable mental state. On Fletcher’s account, though, this is a gross 
over-simplification. The venerable Latin maxim both says too much and too little—
as, perhaps, most maxims do.   
According to Fletcher, attribution entails three legs of criminal inquiry: (1) 
Was there an offending action attributable to a person?; (2) Did the accused cause 
the harm that grounds the offence?; (3) Can blame or culpability be attributed to the 
accused in virtue of his or her actions? Fletcher’s third leg of inquiry addresses 
issues already raised by the previous two: “whether the action producing harm can 
be attributed to the suspect as a culpable or blameworthy action.”76 He writes:  
Two broadly different approaches have emerged to solve the last and most 
difficult inquiry about attribution. Each of these two approaches gives a 
different twist to the terms ‘culpability,’ ‘blameworthiness,’ and ‘mens rea.’ 
The interpretations are radically different, to be sure, but they are masked by 
a single set of terms to describe the question they pose and the solutions they 
offer. I shall refer to these as the ‘psychological’ and the ‘moral’ theories of 
attribution.77 
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The psychological theory is most closely aligned with the subjectivist view. In 
reference to this conventional psychological approach, Fletcher writes:  
The theory of attribution at work here seems to be that if the crime is 
mirrored in the consciousness of the actor, then he is accountable or 
responsible for that which his actions produce.  . . . The suspect’s state of 
mind, therefore is the key to attribution. The terms ‘culpability’ and ‘mens 
rea’ are interpreted accordingly to imply that if the actor has the appropriate 
mental state, he can be held accountable for his action or the ‘actus rea.’78  
 
So, here we see the psychological approach at the heart of why Turner, et al cannot 
justify condemning the harmful actions of the merely inadvertent. Though two legs 
of criminal attribution can almost always be satisfied in cases of negligent harm-
doing, the final leg cannot. If the crime is not mirrored in the mind of the accused 
then there can be no offence. While this psychological approach might conform well 
to some of our intuitions and might enjoy support from a numerous jurists, Fletcher 
believes it is mistaken. He prefers the alternative approach—his alternative 
approach, at any rate—what he calls the ‘moral’ approach, to attribution. Fletcher 
writes: 
 The question is not whether the crime is mirrored in the mind of the actor, 
but whether, regardless of the images that transpire in the actor’s 
consciousness, he or she can be fairly blamed for committing the wrongful 
act. The approach is not descriptive but evaluative. Attribution of the 
wrongful act is not posited solely on the basis of particular facts but on the 
basis of social and legal evaluation of all the facts bearing on whether the 
actor can be properly blamed for the crime.79  
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This approach to culpability considers far more than what the harm-doer was 
thinking but attempts to evaluate those and other facts in a broader social and moral 
context. One immediate advantage of Fletcher’s more holistic, more objective 
approach in terms of assessing culpability for unintentional deaths is that the trier 
of fact is not restricted to looking at the direct evidence (behavioural or otherwise) 
of the accused’s psychological states. In Fletcher’s words, there can be fault in not 
knowing, in not having positive mental states toward potentially harmful actions.80 
If, following the appropriate social and legal evaluation, it is decided that the 
accused ought to have acted otherwise, then criminal fault can be justifiably 
attributed to the negligent qua careless wrong-doer. With some confidence, I think, 
we can say this is the theoretical basis that motivated the objectivist wing in Tutton. 
Analysing whether or not the psychological approach to the attribution of 
criminal fault is as wholly deficient as Fletcher argues is beyond the scope of this 
study. In this chapter we are concerned with why intelligent, informed jurists would 
choose to reject or revise the more traditional approach to the venerable Latin 
maxim, particularly as it relates to the criminal negligence statute. From this 
alternative perspective the offence of criminal negligence entails no necessary 
connection to positive criminal mental states like recklessness or wilful blindness. 
Furthermore, it sees nothing fundamentally unjust in punishing a person because 
society discerned that more (or better) could have been expected from him in the 
circumstances in which he caused harm. A person’s harmful actions may be justly 
punished if, all things considered, they represent a sufficiently substantial departure 
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from a fair and lawful standard. The objectivist, or following Fletcher, the ‘moralist’, 
with respect to criminal negligence says that punishment is justified when the 
causation of harm is something beyond the pale in terms of what a reasonable, 
normal person does. 
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Chapter 4: Modifications to the Objective Standard 
 
Our abiding question is whether criminal fault of a rather serious sort can be 
attributed to faith healers when their religious beliefs result in the death of a loved-
one. This chapter will examine the details of five additional Supreme Court rulings 
from 1989 to 2008 to get a clearer sense of the evolution of judicial reasoning on 
fault in negligence-based offences. We will see the SCC wrestle with many of the 
theoretical and doctrinal concerns expressed in the previous chapter. As well, we’ll 
see the SCC at pains, in the bright light of Charter-era scrutiny, to protect an accused 
from the potential insensitivity of objective standards of fault. The first ruling we’ll 
look at was handed down concurrently with Tutton. 
R. v. Waite, [1989] 
 
On the afternoon and early evening of September 4, 1984, Michael Waite and 
some friends had been drinking beer together at a Fair in a rural Ontario town.81 At 
about 8:20 that evening, the Bethel Mennonite Church commenced a hayride for 
approximately forty to fifty of its young people, with three wagons each pulled by a 
farm tractor along a paved public road. Waite, still drinking beer in his vehicle with 
his friends, followed the hayride for a while and then elected to pass the three 
wagons in the left lane. While it was reported that some participants of the hayride 
were walking alongside the wagons moving freely from wagon to wagon, neither 
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Waite nor any of his companions reported seeing anyone walking anywhere on the 
road. Waite proceeded down the highway some distance before turning around to 
head back in the direction of the hay ride. He would later confess to saying to his 
buddies, "Let's see how close we can get." A friend reported that Waite said, "Let's 
play chicken." The sun was sufficiently set to require headlights but fog lights alone 
were operating at the time of the incident. Driving in the left hand lane straight 
toward the oncoming hayride, Waite admitted that he was probably travelling about 
70 miles per hour—20 miles per hour faster than the posted 50 mph limit. Evidence 
gathered from the crash site indicated that Waite may have been travelling as fast as 
90 mile per hour. At a distance of about 150 feet, Waite swerved his vehicle back 
into the proper right hand lane where he struck five participants who had been 
running alongside the hay wagons, killing four of them instantly, injuring another. 
Immediately following the collision, Waite stopped his vehicle to get rid of a cooler 
of beer being kept in the trunk. His blood alcohol content (BAC) was reported to be 
about .110 to .112—a little more than 20% higher than the .08 legal limit. He 
insisted that he was unaware of any pedestrians in his lane—the lane in which his 
vehicle was travelling when he struck the victims. 
Michael Waite was charged with four counts of causing death by criminal 
negligence and one count of causing harm by criminal negligence. Before the jury 
rendered its verdict they wanted to be very clear about the difference between 
criminal negligence and the lesser offence available to them, namely, dangerous 
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driving.82 The trial judge instructed the jury the mens rea required for dangerous 
driving was objective, while the mens rea for criminal negligence was subjective. 
The subjective test entailed the “deliberate and wilful assumption of risk.”83 
Waite was acquitted of all criminal negligence charges but found guilty of five 
counts of the less serious regulatory offence of dangerous driving. The Crown 
successfully appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal on the grounds that the trial 
judge’s instructions misrepresented the subjective element and that an objective 
standard ought to have been applied in any event. New trials were ordered. Waite 
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada arguing that the Court of 
Appeal erred in holding that an objective test was sufficient for criminal negligence. 
The SCC dismissed Waite’s appeal.  
That the SCC would elect to rule on both Tutton and Waite together is not 
surprising as the questions before the Court were virtually identical. Just as in 
Tutton, Dixon CJ, Wilson, and La Forrest JJ took a primarily subjective approach to 
criminal negligence, while McIntyre, L'Heureux-Dubé, and Lamer JJ thought the test 
was objective. In Waite, the Justices were unanimous, however, in disagreeing with 
the trial judge’s instruction to identify criminal negligence with the “deliberate and 
wilful assumption of risk.” One might take a more subjective approach to criminal 
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negligence (i.e., prefer some degree of advertence) but deny that the necessary 
mental element is “a deliberate and wilful assumption of risk.” Wilson J held: 
Although I believe there is a subjective element to criminal negligence, the 
judge in this case placed much too high an onus on the Crown to prove 
elements of deliberation and wilfulness. For the reasons I gave in R. v. Tutton 
I am of the view that the mental element in criminal negligence is the 
minimal intent of awareness of the prohibited risk or wilful blindness to the 
risk.84 
 
McIntrye J argued that there would have been no problem with the trial judge’s 
instructions had he stopped short of saying that the mens rea was the “deliberate 
and wilful assumption of risk.” McIntyre J conceded there is a minimal mental 
element involved in the test for criminal negligence, but the crucial hurdle is the 
objectivity of the marked and substantial departure from the behaviour of a 
reasonable person. He wrote: 
[the trial judge] was telling the jury that the mens rea required for proof of 
the commission of the offence could be found in the conduct of the accused. 
He did not mention specifically the test which has become accepted in this 
and most appellate courts in Canada, to the effect that criminal negligence is 
shown where the Crown proves conduct on the part of the accused which 
shows a marked and substantial departure from the standard of behaviour 
expected of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances.85 
 
R. v. Hundal,  [1993] 
 
On a wet and drizzly Vancouver afternoon Surinder Hundal was driving a 
dump truck east bound on Nelson Street. Traffic lights governed every intersection 
along the way on this busy downtown corridor and congestion was increasing on 
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the verge of rush hour. An observer who had been coincidently following Hundal for 
about twelve blocks reported that the truck had already gone through one 
intersection as a light was turning red. When Hundal approached the intersection at 
Cambie Street he believed the traffic light had turned yellow, but that he did not 
have time to stop the large vehicle carrying a heavy load. Instead he sounded his 
truck horn and without braking proceeded through the intersection at a speed of 50 
to 60 kilometres per hour. A southbound vehicle on Cambie had already proceeded 
well into the intersection on what all witnesses agreed was a green light, where it 
was broadsided by Hundal’s truck, killing the driver instantly. Witnesses testified, 
contrary to Hundal’s claim, that the light governing the flow of traffic on Nelson had 
been red for about a second before Hundal entered the intersection.86    
Hundal was charged with and convicted of dangerous driving causing death, 
a violation of s. 233 (now s. 249) of the Criminal Code—the same offence Michael 
Waite had been convicted of years earlier. The trial judge, after considering all the 
surrounding conditions, found Hundal’s behaviour “represented a gross departure 
from the standard of care to be expected from a prudent driver.”87 Hundal appealed 
to the BC Court of Appeal on the grounds that the offence of dangerous driving 
required the Crown to prove that the accused knew, under all the circumstances, his 
driving to be dangerous. Hundal insisted that he perceived the light to be yellow, not 
red, and that he believed he could not stop his heavy vehicle under the wet road 
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conditions. He had no choice but to proceed through the intersection. While he knew 
his driving was not ideally safe, he certainly did not think his driving was dangerous. 
And he certainly did not anticipate killing anyone. These were the thoughts that 
governed his actions, so he claimed.  
Hundal was unsuccessful in his appeal to the BC Supreme Court. Two Justices 
of the three-member appeal court found that “proof of a marked departure from the 
norm was sufficient to sustain a conviction for dangerous driving without any 
express finding of advertent negligence.”88 In other words, the majority held that it 
did not matter what Hundal was thinking or believed as he drove through the 
intersection. What mattered was how Hundal’s driving compared to the reasonably 
prudent driver in similar circumstances. Hundal appealed to the SCC and the Court 
agreed in large measure with the BC Court of Appeal’s ruling and unanimously 
dismissed Hundal’s appeal. Cory J wrote for the majority, and McLachlin and La 
Forrest JJ each gave concurring opinions.89 Two concerns occupied the Court. As in 
Tutton and Waite four years earlier, the crucial issue was “whether there is a 
subjective element in the requisite mens rea which must be established by the 
Crown.”90 The SCC also addressed a constitutional concern. Hundal claimed that if 
the Crown was not required to prove a subjective element to secure a conviction 
then the prison sentence associated with the offence would violate his s. 7 Charter 
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rights. In a Reference case in 1985, a BC law providing for imprisonment for 
violation of an absolute liability offence, was held to have no force or effect because 
it was inconsistent with s. 7 Charter rights.91 Cory J et al were not persuaded 
Hundal’s rights were similarly threatened. He wrote: 
Certainly every crime requires proof of an act or failure to act, coupled with 
an element of fault which is termed the mens rea. This Court has made it clear 
that s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits the 
imposition of imprisonment in the absence of proof of that element of fault. … 
Depending on the provisions of the particular section and the context in 
which it appears, the constitutional requirement of mens rea may be satisfied 
in different ways.  … In the appropriate context, negligence can be an 
acceptable basis of liability which meets the fault requirement of s. 7 of the 
Charter. 92 
 
 Hundal’s other considerable contribution to the discussion of negligence-
based offences is found in the Court’s reference to “modified objective test.” Cory J 
clearly had a positive view of such a notion as evidenced by his claim that “an 
objective test, or more specifically a modified objective test, is particularly 
appropriate to apply to dangerous driving.”93 Under closer scrutiny it is difficult to 
see a clear distinction between the objective test defended by half the Court in 
Tutton and its modified form elucidated in Hundal. In application to the offence of 
criminal negligence, McIntyre J said in Tutton that the objective test should not be 
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“made in a vacuum.” Lamer J said the test should make “generous allowances” for 
personal factors. According to the objectivist wing in Tutton, the objective test, 
properly construed and applied, would necessarily be sensitive to a variety of 
considerations. McIntyre J explained in Tutton:  
Events occur within the framework of other events and actions and when 
deciding on the nature of the questioned conduct surrounding circumstances 
must be considered. The decision must be made on a consideration of the 
facts existing at the time and in relation to the accused's perception of those 
facts. Since the test is objective, the accused's perception of the facts is not to 
be considered for the purpose of assessing malice or intention on the 
accused's part but only to form a basis for a conclusion as to whether or not 
the accused's conduct, in view of his perception of those facts, was 
reasonable. . . .  If an accused under s. 202 (now s.219) has an honest and 
reasonably held belief in the existence of certain facts, it may be a relevant 
consideration in assessing the reasonableness of his conduct.94 
 
This is all part of what McIntyre J took to be the proper application of the objective 
standard. Interestingly, four years later Cory J describes this as the modified form, 
saying that a “modified objective test was aptly described by McIntyre J.”95 It seems 
that Cory J believed that there was an objective test available to the Court in Tutton 
and Waite, and McIntyre J’s caution about applying the test “in a vacuum” 
demonstrated an objective test’s fundamental inadequacy. Cory J said of the 
objective test: 
There is no need to establish the intention of the particular accused.  The 
question to be answered under the objective test concerns what the accused 
"should" have known. The potential harshness of the objective standard may 
be lessened by the consideration of certain personal factors as well as the 
consideration of a defence of mistake of fact.96 
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Cory’s obvious concern with the objective test per se was its resemblance to 
absolute liability. That is, no one’s liberty rights should be violated for an absolute 
liability offence where there is, in effect, no measure of flexibility and no allowance 
for defence. We can see why Hundal would think this avenue worth exploring on 
appeal. If there’s a moral worry about offences that punish without fault, then he 
would want to ensure that he is not being punished without due consideration of 
where fault ought to be found. In turn, it’s clear why the Hundal Court would want to 
ensure, with very specific language, that fault is fully accounted for with an objective 
test. The language of the modified objective test was intended, it seems, to inspire 
confidence that Hundal’s Charter rights were thoroughly vindicated. Emphasizing 
the role of exculpatory defences, like the sincere and reasonable mistake of fact, 
goes some distance in addressing the more traditional subjective concerns. This is 
particularly evident in the concurring opinion written by (then) Justice McLachlin. 
She sought a more nuanced understanding of the modified objective test; indeed, it 
was her sole purpose in writing a concurring opinion in Hundal. She wrote:  
The label "modified objective test" might be taken to suggest an amalgam of 
objective and subjective factors; a test that looks at what ought to have been 
in the accused's mind, but goes on to consider what was actually there or not 
there.97 
 
She continues: 
Consideration of the context in which the term has been used suggests that 
the phrase "modified objective test" was introduced in an effort to ensure 
that jurists applying the objective test take into account all relevant 
circumstances in the events surrounding the alleged offence and give the 
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accused an opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt as to what a reasonable 
person would have thought in the particular situation in which the accused 
found himself or herself.98 
 
McLachlin J agrees with Cory J, that McIntyre J was in fact advocating a modified 
objective test in Tutton, though not referring to it as such. Furthermore, she agreed 
with McIntyre J’s claim in Tutton that an accused’s honest and reasonable belief 
could exculpate. We will now turn to two rulings, Creighton and Niglak, handed 
down concurrently in 1993, that illustrate very well the challenges in establishing 
the reasonableness of certain beliefs resulting in harm. 
R. v. Creighton, [1993] 
 
On October 26, 1989, Marc Creighton, Frank Caddedu, and Kimberly Martin 
were gathered in a private residence consuming substantial quantities of drugs and 
alcohol.99 The party persisted through the evening and into the next day. At around 
3:00 PM on the twenty-seventh shortly after allowing Creighton to inject her once 
again with cocaine, Martin experienced a severe reaction; she began to convulse, she 
soon lost consciousness, and stopped breathing. Though Creighton and Caddedu 
tried unsuccessfully to revive Martin, Creighton stubbornly refused to let Caddedu 
call for emergency medical assistance. In fact, he threatened him not to. Creighton 
instead persuaded Caddedu to help him put Martin’s still convulsing body on her 
bed and clean the room of incriminating evidence. Together they left the premises, 
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but later that evening Caddedu returned alone with the hope that Martin somehow 
recovered. Finding her dead, he called authorities. Though Martin suffered a cardiac 
arrest from the large quantity of cocaine in her system, experts testified that the 
cause of death was asphyxiation from choking on her own vomit. 
 Creighton was charged under s. 222(5)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code,100 
manslaughter provisions for causing death by means of an unlawful act and by 
means of criminal negligence.101 The trial judge employed an objective standard to 
establish fault for the unlawful act provision, requiring that a reasonable person 
should know the inherent dangers and risks involved in the illegal use of a 
prohibited narcotic.102 Fully aware of the divided court in Tutton, the trial judge 
elected to apply an objective standard but was confident that the accused knew he 
was injecting another person with a risky, dangerous, and volatile substance.103 
Conclusive evidence of this foreknowledge offered at trial was Creighton’s 
admission to investigators immediately upon hearing of his friend’s death: “You 
know better than I that that stuff kills a lot of people. I hear lots of things about 
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people dying of drug overdoses but I don't know them so I don't care.”104 Creighton 
was found guilty under both provisions and was sentenced to four years in prison.  
Creighton appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal on the grounds that 
unlawful act manslaughter violated his s. 7 liberty rights. Specifically, his complaint 
was that an objective test for discerning foreseeability of danger was insufficiently 
sensitive to an absence of subjective fault. The Court of Appeal took the concern to 
be interesting but denied that this particular case was the right vehicle for such a 
challenge. The Court of Appeal held that Creighton’s guilt was established by the 
trial judge under both objective and subjective tests. It saw ample sensitivity to 
Creighton’s subjective fault, finding that the obvious inference that he did know the 
injection could kill the deceased followed clearly from his admission that drug 
overdoses frequently kill people. They dismissed the appeal and upheld both 
conviction and sentencing. 
 Creighton subsequently appealed to the SCC where 5-4 majority upheld the 
conviction and, more significantly for Canadian jurisprudence, further entrenched 
the constitutionality of employing an objective standard for a serious criminal 
offence. Creighton is regarded as a landmark ruling in further clarifying confusions 
about mens rea in the relatively new era of Charter sensitivity. I will focus on only a 
few of the critical advancements.  
First, the Creighton Court was roughly divided on the constitutionality of the 
long standing common law tradition of manslaughter—a serious criminal offence 
for a clearly unintentional death. Then Chief Justice Lamer was concerned that the 
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common law tradition was not compatible with fundamental principles of justice 
that are foundational to the Charter. Justice McLachlin (as she was then), writing for 
the majority, distilled two closely related concerns from Lamer CJ’s dissenting 
opinion: one, that an exceedingly negative social stigma attaches to a conviction of 
manslaughter but that this stigma is undeserved by one who, as the tradition 
dictated, only foresaw harm, not death. Second, there is no symmetry between the 
required mens rea (foreseeability of harm) and the corresponding result (death). 
McLachlin J brought a historical perspective to Lamer CJ’s objection that 
manslaughter in Canada is unconstitutional: 
We are here concerned with a common law offence virtually as old as our 
system of criminal law. It has been applied in innumerable cases around the 
world. And it has been honed and refined over the centuries. Because of its 
residual nature, it may lack the logical symmetry of more modern statutory 
offences, but it has stood the practical test of time. Could all this be the case, 
one asks, if the law violates our fundamental notions of justice, themselves 
grounded in the history of the common law? Perhaps. Nevertheless, it must 
be with considerable caution that a twentieth century court approaches the 
invitation which has been put before us: to strike out, or alternatively, 
rewrite, the offence of manslaughter on the ground that this is necessary to 
bring the law into conformity with the principles of fundamental justice.105 
 
McLachlin J would go on to address Lamer CJ’s concern about stigma by arguing that 
Canadian society understands the distinction between murder and manslaughter 
well enough. Murder is the more serious crime, carrying with it the more negative 
social stigma—and so it should, in keeping with the long standing principle that 
intentional harms are more deserving of punishment than unintentional harms. 
Lamer CJ did not dispute that manslaughter is stigmatized less than murder. His 
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concern was not even that people who knowingly, but unintentionally, risk death 
would be punished for manslaughter. His concern was that the offence made it 
unnecessary for the accused to have foreseen and risked death. Manslaughter seems 
to punish people for unfortunate results, the risk of which they did not take nor 
foresee. McLachlin J responds in part by pointing out a more negative implication of 
Lamer CJ’s view: 
It would shock the public's conscience to think that a person could be 
convicted of manslaughter absent any moral fault based on foreseeability of 
harm. Conversely, it might well shock the public's conscience to convict a 
person who has killed another only of aggravated assault  -- the result of 
requiring foreseeability of death -- on the sole basis that the risk of death was 
not reasonably foreseeable. The terrible consequence of death demands 
more. In short, the mens rea requirement which the common law has 
adopted -- foreseeability of harm -- is entirely appropriate to the stigma 
associated with the offence of manslaughter. To change the mens rea 
requirement would be to risk the very disparity between mens rea and the 
stigma of which the appellant complains.106 
 
McLachlin J concedes that manslaughter faces a public perception problem. People 
run the risk of being convicted of a serious offence without a perfectly symmetrical 
blameworthy mens rea. But this is to be preferred to being morally guilty of taking 
another’s life and being blamed for a comparatively trivial offence. McLachlin J 
explained: 
The accused who asserts that the risk of death was not foreseeable is in effect 
asserting that a normal person would not have died in these circumstances, 
and that he could not foresee the peculiar vulnerability of the victim. 
Therefore, he says, he should be convicted only of assault causing bodily 
harm or some lesser offence. This is to abrogate the thin-skull rule that 
requires that the wrong-doer take his victim as he finds him. Conversely, to 
combine the test of reasonable foreseeability of bodily harm with the thin-
skull rule is to mandate that in some cases, foreseeability of the risk of bodily 
harm alone will properly result in a conviction for manslaughter. What the 
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appellant asks us to do, then, is to abandon the "thin-skull" rule. It is this rule 
which, on analysis, is alleged to be unjust. Such a conclusion I cannot accept. 
The law has consistently set its face against such a policy.107 
 
Furthermore, McLachlin J claimed that it would jeopardize important policy 
concerns that Parliament intended for manslaughter and criminal negligence 
legislation. There are reasons that objective standards are employed in negligence-
based criminal settings. While it is often impossible to accurately discern a person’s 
mental dispositions (e.g., Michael Waite or Surinder Hundal), it is nevertheless 
important to Parliament that law protect society against harms resulting from 
carelessness—harms that could have been reasonably avoided. A very practical way 
of supporting this social policy is by establishing minimal standards of conduct with 
which, in the vernacular, any normal person can comply. McLachlin J writes: 
Given the finality of death and the absolute unacceptability of killing another 
human being, it is not amiss to preserve the test which promises the greatest 
measure of deterrence, provided the penal consequences of the offence are 
not disproportionate. This is achieved by retaining the test of foreseeability 
of bodily harm in the offence of manslaughter.108 
 
McLachlin J believed that practical benefits followed, as well, from establishing the 
test of objective foreseeability of harm, not death as Lamer CJ preferred. This 
simpler test would relieve finders of fact from trying to distinguish between the 
foreseeability of death and the foreseeability of bodily injury—“a distinction” she 
claimed earlier, “reduces to a formalistic technicality when put in the context of the 
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thin-skull rule and the fact that death has in fact been inflicted by the accused's 
dangerous act.”109 
In my view, considerations of principle and policy dictate the maintenance of 
a single, uniform legal standard of care for such offences, subject to one 
exception:  incapacity to appreciate the nature of the risk which the activity 
in question entails.110 
 
Capacity and incapacity would be the primary concern in the case to follow. 
 
 
R. v. Naglik, [1993] 
 
In 1987, Christine Naglik, a teenaged mother, took her eleven-week-old son 
to a local hospital.111 The infant was suffering from, among other things, a broken 
collarbone, at least fifteen fractured ribs, a fractured vertebra, two separate skull 
fractures, haemorrhaging in the brain, and a detached retina. Medical authorities 
determined that the injuries had been sustained over a four week period. Naglik  
offered ‘innocent’ explanations to medical authorities and later to police of how her 
tiny son came to be in such a traumatized state but the evidence overwhelmingly 
contradicted her story. Seeking the most severe punishment the relevant offences 
could afford, the Crown proceeded by indictment charging Naglik and her common 
law husband, Peter Pople, with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries 
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111 R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122. [Hereafter Naglik] The following narrative is constructed from 
Naglik, 128, 129, and 147. 
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of life.112 With regard to discerning fault for failing to provide necessaries, the trial 
judge instructed the jury to employ an objective test. If the jury concluded that the 
parent “knew, or ought to have known, the seriousness of the child’s condition and 
that it required medical attention” then a guilty verdict should be rendered. Naglik 
and Pople were convicted on both counts and sentenced to four and half years for 
aggravated assault and two years for failure to provide necessaries, to be served 
concurrently. The infant survived but suffered permanent physical damage. 
 Naglik successfully appealed her s. 215 conviction to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal and a new trial ordered. Morden ACJO, writing for the majority, held that the 
objective test used to convict Naglik on the s. 215 offence was out of step with 
“authoritative precedent”. The Attorney General of Ontario subsequently appealed 
to the SCC on the Appeal Court’s approach to mens rea for s. 215.113 Lamer CJ quoted 
Morden ACJO:   
… the offence in question requires actual knowledge of (which would include 
wilful blindness with respect to) the circumstances which make the failure to 
perform the duty to provide necessaries an offence. It is an offence which 
may be committed intentionally or recklessly.  It is not an offence of mere 
negligence, where an honest belief in circumstances which do not require the 
performance of the duty must be based on reasonable grounds.114 
 
The central concern of the Court of Appeal was that Naglik seemed to have been 
genuinely unaware that she was neglecting the welfare of her son. Inasmuch as she 
                                                        
 
112 Naglik was charged under ss. 197(2)(a)(ii) and 197(3), now ss. 215(2)(a)(ii) and 215(3)) of the 
Criminal Code. 
 
113 Naglik also appealed to the SCC, claiming that errors were made in the trial judge’s decision to 
allow a certain testimony from the co-accused, Pople. Our focus on the Naglik judgement will be 
confined to what the Supreme Court had to say about mens rea. 
 
114 Naglik, 134. 
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was caring for him, she also seemed to be unaware that her manner of treating her 
infant son’s needs was in fact injurious to him. Most charitably, one might think of 
her situation as analogous to a small child’s treatment of a pet; sometimes children 
are unaware that their physical interactions are too rough for the welfare of their 
puppy or their kitten. Again, most charitably, Naglik seemed to be unaware that her 
methods of trying to stop the infant from crying were profoundly inappropriate and 
harmful to the infant. In sum, there was a great deal that she did not know about 
providing the necessaries of life. Due to this genuine absence of knowledge and 
awareness—an absence the trial judge deemed largely irrelevant—the Court of 
Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. 
Lamer CJ held that the wording of s. 215, specifically “everyone is under a 
legal duty as a parent…” entails an objective standard and there was no need for 
Parliament to have included in the statute anything as explicit as the person under 
the duty “ought to know” or “ought to have known” his or her failure would result in 
harm. Lamer CJ claimed: 
The policy goals of the provision support this interpretation. Section 215 is 
aimed at establishing a uniform minimum level of care to be provided for 
those to whom it applies, and this can only be achieved if those under the 
duty are held to a societal, rather than a personal, standard of conduct.115 
 
Consistent with his approach in Creighton, Lamer CJ’s conception of the objective 
standard is a great deal more accommodating to personal factors than the test 
endorsed by McLachlin J. He was quick to add that although the objective standard 
was the correct vehicle for assigning fault, … 
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… the reasonableness of the accused's conduct is not to be assessed in the 
abstract, but with reference to the circumstances of the accused and the 
offence, to avoid punishing the morally innocent who could not have acted 
other than they did in the circumstances.116 
 
Lamer CJ’s proviso regarding the correct application of the objective test bears a 
striking resemblance to Justice Dickson’s proviso in Tutton, namely, that it not be 
“applied in a vacuum”. Lamer CJ seems to be saying that an abstract description of 
Naglik’s “reasonableness” would wrongly lack context and relevance—
considerations that should not be excluded by the objective test. That the test can be 
applied too abstractly is not a weakness of the objective test per se. Rather, we 
should read both Lamer CJ and Dickson CJ (as he was in Tutton) as giving a warning 
about its incorrect application. Furthermore, Lamer CJ’s concern for the correct 
application speaks to his ultimate concern that one cannot be held legally or morally 
responsible for things they were incapable of avoiding. There are a number of 
important considerations in this regard. Lamer CJ wanted to know if “it was possible 
for Naglik to control or compensate for her incapacities in the circumstances.”117 He 
went on: 
For example, the evidence indicates that the services of a Public Health Nurse 
were made available to Naglik to help her with the adjustment to caring for 
the child, given her age, education and lack of experience with children. 
Naglik apparently resisted these attempts to assist her with the care of the 
baby.118 
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Lamer CJ did not comment on whether he took Naglik’s refusal to be culpable or 
exculpatory. Would the allowances of age, education, and lack of experience, provide 
evidence that she was not blameworthy in rejecting assistance and not 
blameworthy for her treatment of her child? Lamer CJ is saying she should be 
judged by what a reasonable young mother with her age, intelligence, and 
inexperience normally knows about child care. Given these particularities, could she 
have been expected to act other than she did? If these particularities are part of the 
objective standard against which she is being compared, perhaps she was incapable 
of providing the necessaries of life to her infant son. On the other hand, Lamer CJ 
could be asserting her culpability. If Naglik was deemed responsible enough to 
refuse assistance from a public health nurse, then she must be responsible for the 
consequences of that refusal. She voluntarily accepted the risks of not knowing 
enough. But, again, given her particularities as accommodated by the objective 
standard, what risks should she have been able to anticipate? Should she have 
known, for example, she might not be a very capable mother? One can easily 
imagine that even the most ideally situated new mother—someone far from the 
circumstances of Naglik—feels at some level incompetent, overwhelmed, and 
possibly not quite up to the challenge of caring for her new offspring. Section 215(2) 
indicates that the offence is committed whenever a person fails, without lawful 
excuse, in his or her duty to provide the necessaries to the relevant rights holder. 
The failure is made evident by endangering the person’s life, causing or being likely 
to cause the health of a person to be either endangered or injured permanently. 
Naglik claimed that her lawful excuse for failing to meet her parental duties was her 
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subjective innocence; i.e., her lack of awareness that she was doing anything wrong 
in terms of caring for her child. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed, not that she 
didn’t do anything harmful to her child—far from it—but that she wasn’t sufficiently 
aware that she was harming her child and this is what mattered for criminal 
liability. Lamer CJ, and indeed the entire SCC, disagreed. They had no difficulty in 
agreeing that Naglik’s subjective ignorance would be exculpatory if the test of fault 
was subjective. But Lamer CJ does open the door to at least some confusion by, in a 
word, relativizing the objective standard to accommodate for particularities. This is 
the worry that Lamer CJ’s opinion generated for McLachlin J.  She stated:  
I respectfully disagree with the Chief Justice's conclusion that when 
considering what the accused "ought to have known" under an objective 
standard, one should have regard to Ms. Naglik's "youth, experience, [and] 
education" …  For the reasons discussed in R. v Creighton, [1993] …  it is my 
view that in determining what Ms. Naglik "ought to have known", the trier of 
fact must determine the conduct of the reasonable person when engaging in 
the particular activity of the accused in the specific circumstances that 
prevailed. These circumstances do not include the personal characteristics of 
the accused, short of characteristics which deprived her of the capacity to 
appreciate the risk.  Youth, inexperience, and lack of education were not 
suggested on the evidence to deprive Ms. Naglik of the capacity to appreciate 
the risk associated with neglecting her child. Therefore, she must be held to 
the standard of the reasonably prudent person.119 
 
  Lamer CJ and McLachlin J interestingly juxtapose two different conceptions 
of the objective standard. Lamer CJ thinks it appropriate, indeed necessary, for the 
moral justification of objective fault to relativize or tailor the standard to the 
relevant particularities of the accused, while McLachlin J thinks the only relevant 
moral consideration for applying the uniform standard is the capacity of the 
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accused. She clearly doesn’t think that youth, inexperience, etc., exculpate bad 
parenting, whereas on Lamer CJ’s account it’s not entirely obvious that these things 
couldn’t exculpate. His point is that any fair application of the objective standard 
must show due consideration to a variety of factors relevant to the accused.  
 The exchanges between Lamer CJ and McLachlin J in both Creighton and 
Naglik are highly instructive in terms trying to understand the construction of the 
objective standard. Lamer CJ sees the standard more in terms of an ordinary person 
functioning in similar circumstances to the accused, while McLachlin J understands 
the “reasonable person” in more abstract terms—less of a person and more of an 
abstract principle to which the accused is compared. While this issue gets resolved 
in 1993 in McLachlin’s favour, we’ll see it challenged and in a sense overturned in 
the case that follows some fifteen years later.  
R. v. Beatty, [2008] 
 
 On a hot, sunny afternoon on July 23, 2003, Justin Beatty was eastbound in 
his pickup truck on the Trans-Canada Highway about fourteen kilometres west of 
Chase, British Columbia.120 At approximately 2:00 PM, Justin’s vehicle veered across 
the centre line into the westbound lane and collided head on with a small car killing 
its three occupants. Beatty had not been drinking and he was not otherwise 
distracted or incapacitated. By his own admission, he must have momentarily lost 
consciousness or perhaps fell asleep. Witnesses to Beatty’s driving for the short time 
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prior to the collision reported no erratic or otherwise unsafe driving. Experts who 
investigated and reconstructed the collision determined a number of important 
details: first, that the truck had only veered a half a metre into the westbound lane 
when it struck the victim’s car; second, neither driver took evasive action; third, 
both vehicles were travelling at or around the posted 90 km speed limit, indicating 
that excessive speed was not a factor; fourth, no mechanical failure could be found 
in either vehicle. Though Beatty was able to walk away from his vehicle, he was 
reportedly dazed and not altogether comprehending. He told a police officer that he 
had been working in the sun all day and that maybe he had heat stroke. An 
ambulance driver reported him saying he didn’t know what happened and that he 
must have fallen asleep.  
 Justin Beatty was subsequently charged under s. 249(4) of the criminal code, 
dangerous driving causing death, the same offence of which both Michael Waite and 
Surinder Hundal had been convicted. While the trial judge relied particularly on the 
Hundal ruling to inform her decision, she saw more contrast with Hundal than 
similarity as evidenced by her concluding remarks at trial: 
The circumstances in this case are different. Here there is no evidence of any 
improper driving by Mr. Beatty before his truck veered into the westbound 
lane and into the oncoming vehicle. While that act of driving was clearly 
negligent it occurred within a matter of seconds. Moreover, there was no 
evidence of any evasive measures or evidence of any obstruction in the 
eastbound lane that might have caused him to veer into the westbound lane. 
In my view, the only reasonable inference to be drawn in these 
circumstances, of Mr. Beatty’s manner of driving, was that he experienced a 
loss of awareness, whether that was caused by him nodding off or for some 
other reason. That loss of awareness resulted in him continuing to drive 
straight instead of following the curve in the road and thereby cross the 
double solid line. These few seconds of clearly negligent driving, which had 
devastating consequences, are the only evidence of Mr. Beatty’s manner of 
driving. In my view, Hundal requires something more than a few seconds of 
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lapsed attention to establish objectively dangerous driving. Criminal 
culpability cannot be found, beyond a reasonable doubt, on such a paucity of 
evidence.121 
 
Beatty was acquitted on all criminal charges, though the trial judge was very clear 
that civil law could regard the issue of liability very differently.122 She went on to 
describe why exactly Beatty’s driving did not meet the objective standard for 
criminal liability: 
… in assessing criminal culpability it is not the consequences of a negligent 
act of driving that determines whether an accused’s manner of driving is 
objectively dangerous. It is the driving itself that must be examined. In my 
view, Mr. Beatty’s few seconds of negligent driving, in the absence of 
something more, is insufficient evidence to support a finding of a marked 
departure from the standard of care of a prudent driver.123 
 
The Crown successfully appealed on the grounds that the trial judge failed to 
apply the right standard of fault. The argument was not that the standard should be 
subjective, but rather that the objective standard was not described accurately. In 
large measure, we see disagreement over what stands as a marked departure from 
reasonable conduct in the circumstances—the same disagreement that occupied the 
SCC in Creighton and Naglik. Finch BCJA, writing for the BC Court of Appeal, held: 
Viewed objectively, the respondent’s failure to confine his vehicle to its own 
lane of travel was in “all the circumstances” highly dangerous to other 
persons lawfully using the highway, and in particular those approaching in a 
westerly direction on their own side of the road. 
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redress for his actions will be found.”  [Beatty, para. 14] 
 
123 Beatty, para 14. 
 
77 
 
 
The trial judge addressed her attention to the respondent’s “momentary lack 
of attention” and his “few seconds of lapsed attention”.  She held that such a 
momentary lapse should not be characterized as dangerous driving. 
 
In my respectful opinion the learned trial judge asked the wrong question. 
The right question was whether crossing the centre line into the path of 
oncoming traffic at 90 kilometres per hour, on a well-travelled highway was 
objectively dangerous.  I think that question could only be answered in the 
affirmative.  Driving in that way is clearly a “marked departure” from the 
standard of care a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s 
situation.124 
 
Crossing the median is, according to the Court of Appeal, highly dangerous and a 
marked departure precisely because it can quite reasonably and predictably result 
in the events that transpired. Had the trial judge focussed properly on the 
objectively dangerous driving and not on the brief moment of subjective 
inadvertence, she would have known to consider whether a reasonable person in 
similar circumstances would have been aware of such risks. If Beatty’s explanation 
showed that he could not have been aware of those risks, then and only then should 
he have been acquitted. Because the trial judge did not derive this important 
consideration the BC Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new 
trial.  
 The judgment of the Court of Appeal is not without intuitive attraction. 
Clearly, crossing the median on two-lane highway at 90 kilometres per hour is 
dangerous, which is why it must be done with the greatest of care. Even if it is 
granted that driving motor vehicles in our society is inherently risky, no one can 
deny that the risks increase exponentially when one drives in the wrong lane. 
Beatty’s victims were using the road lawfully and, still, they were harmed. One can 
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easily imagine that this is precisely the sort of catastrophe that law makers have in 
mind when drafting rules of the road, perhaps especially criminal offences like s. 
249. Now, the fact that many drivers experience similar lapses of attention without 
the tragic consequences does not minimize the inherent danger of those lapses.  
Momentary lapses of attention are a common and predictable feature of human 
experience, even behind the wheel of a car, but predicting when such lapses will 
occur is very difficult. But, this is why vigilance and care are necessary 
characteristics, indeed necessary virtues, of anyone licensed to drive an automobile. 
We should be reminded that in Hundal Cory J argued that criminal sanctions for 
negligent driving may well serve the purpose of promoting such vigilance.  
 Beatty appealed to the SCC on the grounds that BC Court of Appeal, in 
rejecting the reasoning of the trial judge, created a presumption of guilt for anyone 
who causes an accident of the sort that Beatty caused. The only exculpatory 
explanations would be ones that included mechanical failure or some kind of 
unanticipated medical condition. In the absence of such explanation, the 
presumption, but not a finding, Beatty claimed, was “dangerous driving.” In other 
words, the presumption relieved the Crown of proving the offence. It was the Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning that was mistaken, not the trial judge’s, and Beatty wanted 
this recognized and his acquittals restored. 
The SCC was unanimous in allowing Beatty’s appeal and restoring the 
acquittals on the three dangerous driving charges. Charron J wrote for the majority, 
while McLachlin CJ and Fish J provided partially concurring opinions, disagreeing 
with Justice Charron’s derivation.  
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We have already seen that punishment of the morally innocent is a primary 
concern in Charter-era criminal jurisprudence. Rulings on Tutton and Hundal have 
explicitly addressed the need to distance negligence-based offences from absolute 
liability offences. I have already argued that some of the concerns that turned the 
objective test into the modified objective test were generated by Charter intolerance 
to penal consequences for no-fault offences. I contend that one of the main 
outcomes from Beatty is a subtle rebalancing of the hard won ‘uniform’ standard in 
Creighton with certain subjectivist considerations. We see this in the following claim 
from Charron J, writing for the majority: 
The distinction between a mere departure and a marked departure is a 
question of degree. It is only when the conduct meets the higher threshold 
that the court may find, on the basis of that conduct alone, a blameworthy 
state of mind.125 
 
One shouldn’t infer that a marked departure entails correspondence to some 
subjective fault element like recklessness or wilful blindness. Charron J is, however, 
referring to the mental state variously thought of as either carelessness, or being 
distracted, or unaware. But, the accused must have had the capacity at the time of 
the offence to have been aware or more aware of the risk. Charron J continues: 
The degree of negligence is the determinative question because criminal fault 
must be based on conduct that merits punishment.126 
 
This is a difficult assertion to parse, but it becomes lynch pin to understanding the 
majority’s position on fault in negligence. This issue will occupy the rest of our 
analysis of Beatty. 
                                                        
 
125 Beatty, para 7. 
 
126 Ibid. 
80 
 
 
What could be meant by the ‘degree of negligence’? What is the degree of 
marked departure? Of what is it constituted? Let us consider the possibility that 
‘degrees of negligence’ is determined by assessing what occurs during the interval of 
carelessness. While this may seem obvious what is not obvious is precisely what to 
include in the description of the “occurrence” that could distinguish a non-culpable 
“occurrence” from a culpable one. Put more plainly, it is difficult to know what is 
relevant to the commission of the offence. If we look at the actual legislation for 
clues we will find little that inspires agreement.  
s. 249. (1) Every one commits an offence who operates (a) a motor vehicle in 
a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which 
the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time 
is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place. 
 
How is the prohibited ‘manner’ to be discerned? What is a ‘manner’ that is 
dangerous to the public”? If degree of negligence is going to be understood in terms 
of ‘something more’ then these questions will need to be addressed. One thing is 
clear; Charron J is committed to discerning degrees of negligence without reference 
to consequences. She makes this explicit: 
As the words of the provision make plain, it is the manner in which the motor 
vehicle was operated that is at issue [in determining the actus reus], not the 
consequence of the driving. The consequence, as here where death was 
caused, may make the offence a more serious one under s. 249(4), but it has 
no bearing on the question whether the offence of dangerous operation of a 
motor vehicle has been made out or not. Again, this is also an important 
distinction. If the focus is improperly placed on the consequence, it almost 
begs the question to then ask whether an act that killed someone was 
dangerous. The court must not leap to its conclusion about the manner of 
driving based on the consequence.127 
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Whatever Justin Beatty did, killing three people was neither necessary nor sufficient 
in discerning his degree of negligence. What occurred that July afternoon needed 
something more to warrant a dangerous driving conviction, but not apparently 
more deaths or more harm. The majority held that the offence of dangerous driving 
needed to differentiate very clearly between the actus reus of the offence and its 
mens rea. It felt that the actus reus had been clearly and tragically made out, but that 
this was not evidence of mens rea. The mens rea, being objective, would need to be 
understood in terms of normative ‘care’. As an operator of a vehicle, Justin Beatty’s 
lack of care was not a sufficient departure from the way normal people drive. 
Recall that no Justice dissented; no Justice held that the appeal should be set 
aside. McLachlin CJ’s partially concurring opinion disagreed with the majority of the 
Court’s opinion on two contentious issues: first, that Beatty’s driving alone was 
sufficient to establish the actus reus of the offence, and second, that the mens rea is 
to be understood in terms of a marked departure of care. A minority view of the 
Court, written by McLachlin CJ, and supported by Binnie and Lebel JJ, was that 
Beatty’s driving did not reach the standard of a marked and substantial departure 
from the driving of a reasonable person under the conditions. As a result, they (the 
minority) did not infer sufficient objective mens rea. In terms of the disagreement 
with Justice Charron and the majority, McLachlin CJ writes: 
…  my colleague describes the actus reus in terms of dangerous  operation of 
a motor vehicle and the mens rea in terms of a marked departure from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s 
circumstances. In discussing the actus reus, my colleague observes that 
82 
 
 
“[n]othing is gained by adding to the words of s. 249 at this stage of the 
analysis”.  With respect, I take a different view.128 
 
The Chief Justice continues:  
The jurisprudence of this Court offers assistance on what constitutes the 
actus reus and mens rea of dangerous driving and how the two elements of 
the offence should be described. Hundal, [1993], confirmed in Creighton, 
[1993], indicates that the characterization of “marked departure” from the 
norm applies to the actus reus of the offence, and that the mens rea of the 
offence flows by inference from that finding, absent an excuse casting a 
reasonable doubt on the accused’s capacity.129 
 
Given McLachlin CJ’s, disagreement with Charron J’s approach to the mens 
rea of the offence, there is good reason to believe that Charron J, above, conceived of 
the fault element with subjective considerations, and consequently, in a fashion 
quite removed from the modified objective test conceived of in Creighton and 
Hundal.  Additionally, there is no good reason to think that Charron J inferred an 
absence of fault by looking to the actus reus in itself. When Charron J said, “[t]he lack 
of care must be serious enough to merit punishment” we should take her at her 
word. She means that a serious lack of care is sufficient for mens rea. She may be 
referring to an “objective standard” of carelessness, but this would be objective in 
the same sense as using visible anger and a verbal threat, ‘I will kill you’, as evidence 
                                                        
 
128 Ibid., paras 57-58. Charron J acknowledges the disagreement with McLachlin CJ in para 43: “I 
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of mens rea for a murder. It may be objective inasmuch as it is objectively observed, 
but it’s not the same as the objective test.130 
 We are now in a better position to see that the majority’s desire for 
“something more” to secure convictions for dangerous driving is, in the final 
analysis, a desire for more subjective fault—something that could be inferred from 
Waite, Hundal, and, of course, Daniel Tschetter. Charron J is not looking for more 
harmful consequences, but simply more subjective “carelessness.” More 
carelessness would manifest itself in either longer intervals of carelessness or more 
frequently repeated departures from normal “careful” driving.  
We will turn our attention to McLachlin CJ’s account of the “something more” 
that will meet the requirement of the criminal “degree of negligence.” McLachlin CJ 
summarizes what is at stake in Beatty in the following way: 
The problem at the heart of this case is whether acts of momentary lapse of 
attention can constitute the offence of dangerous driving. The accused was 
driving in an entirely normal manner until his vehicle suddenly swerved over 
the centre line of the road, for reasons that remain unclear. Clearly there was 
momentary lapse of attention. The issue is whether this is capable of 
                                                        
 
130 There should be no confusion here. Charron J explicitly claims to be applying the modified 
objective test. My contention is that in her search for criminal mens rea she looks for culpable mental 
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determining the question of mens rea, the court should consider the totality of the evidence, including 
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requirement for the offence of dangerous driving will be satisfied by applying a modified objective 
test.  This means that, unlike offences that can only be committed if the accused possesses a 
subjective form of mens rea, it is not necessary for the Crown to prove that the accused had a positive 
state of mind, such as intent, recklessness or wilful blindness.  Of course, this does not mean that the 
actual state of mind of the accused is irrelevant.  For example, if proof is made that a driver purposely 
drove into the path of an oncoming vehicle in an intentionally dangerous manner for the purpose of 
scaring the passengers of that vehicle or impressing someone in his own vehicle with his bravado, 
the requirement of mens rea will easily be met. One way of looking at it is to say that the subjective 
mens rea of intentionally creating a danger for other users of the highway within the meaning of s. 
249 of the Criminal Code constitutes a “marked departure” from the standard expected of a 
reasonably prudent driver.” 
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establishing the actus reus and mens rea of the offence. In my view, 
momentary lapse of attention without more cannot establish the actus reus 
or mens rea of the offence of dangerous driving.131  
 
A casual read of this comment may yield the conclusion that there is less that 
divides the Chief Justice from the majority than I have so far argued for, but we 
should not ignore two important details in the above comment. First, McLachlin CJ 
will emphasize acts or conduct that must constitute the offence, while Charron J 
emphasizes carelessness. Secondly, the Chief Justice will look to one thing to signify 
both actus reus and the mens rea. The one thing in this instance ends up being the 
act of crossing the median. If the actus reus cannot be made out by that act then 
neither can the mens rea. McLachlin CJ states: 
Additional inquiry into the accused’s actual state of mind is unnecessary.  If 
the only evidence is of momentary lapse of attention, the actus reus is not 
established and the Crown’s case fails, making further inquiry unnecessary.  
On the other hand, if the accused is driving in a manner that constitutes a 
marked departure from the norm, the inference will be that he lacked the 
requisite mental state of care of a reasonable person, absent an excuse, such 
as a sudden and unexpected onset of illness.132 
 
McLachlin CJ’s emphasis on careless conduct faces the challenge of drawing limits 
around what the accused actually did and did not do in relation to culpability. The 
objective standard is, ultimately, a conception of what a reasonable person would do 
or not do under similar circumstances faced by the accused. But, to have such a 
conception one must know how to divide off what the accused did from what the 
                                                        
 
131 Ibid., paras 68-69. 
 
132 Ibid., para 78. 
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circumstances contributed to the episode. McLachlin CJ’s summation of Beatty’s 
conduct is as follows: 
The only evidence adduced by the Crown in the case at bar was evidence of a 
momentary lapse of attention that caused the accused’s vehicle to cross the 
centre line of the highway. In all other respects, the accused’s driving was, on 
the evidence, entirely normal. It follows that all that has been established is 
momentary lapse of attention. The marked departure required for the 
offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle has not been made out. 
The Crown did not succeed in proving that the accused’s manner of driving, 
viewed as a whole, constituted a marked departure from the standard of care 
of a reasonably prudent driver. It follows that it did not prove the actus reus 
of the offence, and its case must fail.133 
 
Charron J agreed with the trial judge in believing that when a driver 
experiences a momentary lapse of attention, even if this momentary lapse results in 
another’s death, there is insufficient ground for liability. Upon this view it is not a 
marked departure. It was held an unjustified presumption to assume that just 
because someone crosses a line and kills people he or she is guilty of a crime. Now 
though, the presumption is turned on its head. Courts following Beatty may now 
presume that momentary carelessness can occur without fault on Canadian 
highways. If in one of those moments people are killed we will stoically take this to 
be a tragic and unfortunate result, but no one’s criminal doing. These are unintended 
results for which civil damages may be recovered, but they are results that demand 
no moral response from the state. Charron J, echoing the Chief Justice, wrote: 
Even the most able and prudent driver will from time to time suffer from 
momentary lapses of attention. These lapses may well result in conduct that, 
when viewed objectively, falls below the standard expected of a reasonably 
prudent driver. Such automatic and reflexive conduct may even pose a 
danger to other users of the highway.  Indeed, the facts in this case provide a 
                                                        
 
133 Ibid., paras 80-81. 
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graphic example. … The fact that the danger may be the product of little 
conscious thought becomes of concern because, as McLachlin J. (as she then 
was) aptly put it in R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, at p. 59:  “The law does 
not lightly brand a person as a criminal.”134 
 
Here again, we see the Court’s deep subjective bias even at the heart of an objective 
test for liability. When and where there is “little conscious thought” to examine, as in 
Beatty, there is little to which triers of fact are able to attach blame. In those cases 
where exclusively careless harm has occurred we should be particularly concerned 
about a rush to judgement. Charron J concludes: 
If every departure from the civil norm is to be criminalized, regardless of the 
degree, we risk casting the net too widely and branding as criminals persons 
who are in reality not morally blameworthy. Such an approach risks violating 
the principle of fundamental justice that the morally innocent not be 
deprived of liberty.135 
 
 As we conclude our examination of Beatty it bears emphasis: the modified 
objective test still seeks out marked and substantial departures from a norm. But 
the refreshed ‘norm’ established by the majority and contested by the Chief Justice 
is a standard of genuine care and attentiveness. Both the majority and the Chief 
Justice agree that one instance of unlawful “line crossing” does not a criminal make, 
regardless of the catastrophic consequences. Both agree that one instance of 
unlawful line crossing is not sufficient to establish the mens rea. But there is 
unmistakeable disagreement about what fundamentally constitutes mens rea. 
According to the majority the lapse of attention (a consideration of mental states) is 
not, “without something more” sufficient for so-called objective mens rea. This kind 
                                                        
 
134 Ibid., para 34. 
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of lapse does not depart markedly enough from a reasonable standard. Though, 
McLachlin CJ may have preferred to focus the modified objective test on more 
instances of authorized line crossing (i.e., unexcused and objectively dangerous 
driving) with less emphasis upon ‘care’, even her conception would not ignore the 
indefensible and inexcusable voluntary considerations that could authorize an 
instance of line crossing. The modified objective test is, after all, sensitive to issues 
of capacity and if it were known that Beatty’s incapacity to remain attentive and 
confine his vehicle to his lane had been the result of something he authorized (e.g., 
ignoring physician’s orders or taking sleep medication) then the marked and 
substantial departure would have been established. 
Collectively, the SCC seems to be saying that Justin Beatty is not guilty of the 
offence because, perhaps just as in the case of Dominic Martin, this tragedy could 
have happened to any of us. Any licenced driver in Canada is capable of momentary 
carelessness and unlawful line crossing. Every loving parent in Canada is capable of 
momentary carelessness that could cross a line into earth shattering regret. The fact 
that people tragically, but predictably, die in the course of normal living shouldn’t 
create a presumption of criminal guilt. But let’s consider once again a compelling 
statement of obiter dicta from Justice McLachlin (as she was then) in Creighton: 
Given the finality of death and the absolute unacceptability of killing another 
human being, it is not amiss to preserve the test which promises the greatest 
measure of deterrence, provided the penal consequences of the offence are 
not disproportionate.136 
 
                                                        
 
136 Creighton, 59. 
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Perhaps it’s not unsurprising to hear this stronger, less forgiving tone in a case like 
Creighton, a case that fails to inspire a great deal of sympathy or empathy, neither 
for the victim, nor certainly for the accused. In Creighton there is arguably enough 
moral fault to go around that the legal handwringing that can often accompany 
criminal negligence cases is lessened here. In Marc Creighton we see another Daniel 
Tschetter. There wouldn’t be much public disagreement about branding Marc 
Creighton a criminal. Beatty, in stark contrast, can yield considerable empathy from 
reasonable people. Three innocent and unsuspecting people lost their lives because 
of Justin Beatty’s miniscule failure to comply with the law. Should it matter that he 
only broke it ‘momentarily’ when the consequences are so profoundly devastating? 
The BC Court of Appeal, in overturning Beatty’s original acquittals could very well 
have been considering the words of the Justice McLachlin quoted above. It does not 
seem like the greatest possible deterrent to fail to punish someone for breaking a 
law whose public policy goal is to protect lives and property and promote safe social 
coordination. Perhaps it would be callous to remind 2008-McLachlin CJ of what 
1993-McLachlin J wrote fifteen years prior with respect to the “absolute 
unacceptability of killing another human being.” 
Implications 
 
We began this chapter with the goal of seeing how the SCC would resolve 
their disagreement about fault in cases of negligent harm-doing.  As we saw, these 
cases include a variety of scenarios including but not limited to driving offences, 
failing to provide the necessaries, and manslaughter. Following Tutton, some 
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Justices thought fault for those types of offences required a subjective test proving 
that the harm (the actus reus) resulted from recklessness or wilful blindness—i.e., 
some mental state indicating minimal advertence to the risk of harm. Others 
believed no such psychological scrutiny, beyond the assessment of capacity, was 
necessary, and that only a marked departure from an established norm was 
sufficient for liability. The difficulty facing those favouring the objective standard 
was to determine what or who belonged in the “established norm”. After all, one 
could argue that it’s a marked departure from a norm to drive and kill five people or 
three people or two people—or one person! One could argue that it’s a marked 
departure from a norm to fail to see that one is not sufficiently caring for one’s badly 
battered infant. One could argue that it’s a marked departure from a norm to inject 
another human being with cocaine and then expect the law to turn a blind eye when 
that other human being dies. In other words, there’s nothing obvious about the 
application of an objective standard that could prevent it from making certain kinds 
of harmful consequences the criterion by which an accused is judged. The standard 
could end up being quite harsh, quite unforgiving, quite absolute. On the other hand, 
if the objective standard is to consists of normal human traits like reason, thought, 
and care it’s difficult, independent of results, to determine precisely what that 
standard looks like. Obviously the offences for which objective standards are needed 
seek to discourage, deter, and prohibit certain kinds of behaviours and their 
predictable consequences. Critics of subjectivism often refer to the profound 
challenge of discerning mental states and relevant correspondence to the offending 
action or harm. But a bit of reflection on objective standards of criminal fault shows 
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that they don’t fare much better in terms of insuring that we get the attribution of 
fault “just right.”  
What we observed in the five SCC rulings was an explicit and definitive shift 
toward the objective standard of fault for negligence-based offences. A large part of 
the shift was devoted to ensuring the application of the standard met the moral 
demands of the Charter. We observed in the progression from Waite to Beatty 
certain subjective characteristics more willingly accommodated within the 
construction of the objective standard. By this I mean that the SCC moved their own 
reasoning about the objective standard away from observable behaviours and 
consequences, away from disembodied conceptions of reason, towards a more 
robustly humanized standard. Certainly reason or rationality can be thought of as a 
subjective property; reason goes on in a person in the same way that emotions and 
desires do. What we saw defended by Lamer J in Tutton and Waite, by Lamer CJ in 
Naglik and Creighton, and also Charron J in Beatty was a more fully personified 
objective standard of rationality. One could think about “it” (the objective standard) 
as being relativized to certain circumstances. Reductively, this could mean that 
reason simpliciter ought to be understood contextually. But that doesn’t capture 
what the Court increasingly has come to say about applying the objective 
standard—and this, I think, is true even of McLachlin CJ in Beatty. The reasonable 
person, is after all, a person. The objective standard is not really an ‘object’; and if 
the standard is really ‘out there’ then what the standard consists of is not a Platonic 
form, but something of our making. The reasonable person bears the marks of an 
imperfect human being.  
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When triers of fact construct a reasonable person in their minds, Canada’s 
Supreme Court expects them to construct this person with a variety of human 
mindful qualities, not just practical reason. When applying the objective standard 
the trier of fact is not looking ‘inside’ the accused, performing some psychological 
inventory akin to traditional subjectivism. Rather, it seems the SCC expects the trier 
of fact to look carefully at the accused and ask if this person was somewhere in the 
vicinity of what a real person would have done in those circumstances. Of course, 
triers of fact are responsible to decide for themselves what qualities a real person 
would have in particular circumstances. Triers of fact, equipped by law with this 
formal shell, have an enormous amount of legal and moral influence in Canadian 
society. If one doubts this, we could consider again the jury’s verdict in the Emma 
Czornobaj case. It’s not for a trial judge to tell triers of fact what a reasonable person 
does, thinks, or values. It’s open to lawyers to influence how triers of fact will 
embody and enliven that formal shell, but ultimately that process is left in the hands 
of jurors or magistrates. These people also possess varying degrees of 
reasonableness, along with varying degrees of other things (e.g., religious beliefs) 
relevant to their judgments.  
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Chapter 5: Facts and Values for a ‘Reasonable Person’ 
 
Chapter 4 leaves us with a form of the reasonable person by which faith 
healers will need to be judged if they cause the death of dependent. The content of 
that form needs to be filled out in relation to faith healing deaths with at least as 
much detail as we found in Beatty’s relation to dangerous driving. Punishing a tragic 
moment of line crossing did not sit well with the SCC, and as argued in chapter 2, 
criminalizing faith healers for the deaths they cause need not sit well with ordinary 
Canadians either. There is simply no clear sense of what justice demands in these 
kinds of cases. This, by the way, would still be true of Beatty. Just because the SCC 
held that a fatal momentary lapse of attention on a highway does not constitute the 
offence of dangerous driving does not mean all Canadians ought to agree that justice 
is served by their ruling. The Court’s ruling on Beatty can still leave ordinary 
Canadians with a significant degree of ambivalence. In the last chapter, we discussed 
the importance of what is dubbed the venerable Latin maxim; but here’s an even 
more ancient maxim with even more universal appeal: justitia suum cuique 
distribuit.  “Justice gives to all their due.”137 Giving to each his or her due is often 
surprisingly difficult, perhaps especially with negligence-based offences, because 
our intellectual, emotional, and moral resources pull us in a variety of directions. 
Chapter 4 enabled us to anchor the fault element of at least some negligence-based 
offences—the kind under which faith healing deaths will fall—in the breach of an 
                                                        
 
137 The idiom can be interpreted from a variety of ancient sources including Plato and Aristotle, but it 
is formally expressed by Marcus Tullius Cicero (107-44 BCE) in De Legibus  Book I, § 15. 
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objective standard.138 What this means is that if faith healers are prosecuted fault 
will have less to do with a psychological description of the accused and more to do 
with something that we think ought to have characterized the accused’s actions. 
Triers of fact are really being asked to consider, among other things, a 
counterfactual: namely, if the accused had acted more like a reasonable person 
would the offending harm have still as likely occurred? Chapter 4 looked at the 
shifting justification of the objective standard from the point of view of the SCC. 
After years of conscientious handwringing about absolute liability, inflexibility, and 
punishing the morally innocent, Canadian jurisprudence has found a way, at least in 
some contexts, to encourage the construction of the reasonable person with 
sufficient sensitivity to the way real people function in the everyday world. This 
humanizing of the objective standard seems to express our refined scruples about 
what is genuinely due someone accused with this kind of crime.   
Anxiety about attributing fault to faith healers or anyone else charged with 
offences of unintended or negligent harm-doing will no doubt persist, and it should 
persist. In virtually every instance in which the charge of criminal negligence is laid, 
there is really no question that the accused performed the action that resulted in the 
offending harm. In this sense, there is simply no mystery for jurors or judges to 
                                                        
 
138 It is important to emphasize ‘some’ negligence-based offences entail breaches of objective 
standards. Recently, in R. v. A.D.H. , 2013 SCC 28, the Court held that child abandonment required a 
subjective test. The accused in this case was a young mother who gave birth in the washroom of a 
retail store. She claimed she did not know she was pregnant before expelling her infant into the 
toilet. Believing the infant was dead, she left the body in the toilet and vacated the premises. The 
infant was found alive a short time later and transported to hospital. Pursuant to s. 218, the accused 
was charged with unlawfully abandoning a child under the age of 10 years old and thereby 
endangering its life. The accused was acquitted on the grounds that the Crown did not prove 
subjective mens rea. The acquittal was upheld by the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan and the 
Crown’s appeal to the SCC was dismissed. 
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solve. The crucial question for the trier of fact is simply one of fault. Is this person 
justly blamed and deserving of the punishment for the harm he or she caused? Mayo 
Moran, in Rethinking the Reasonable Person, explains that some of the tension we 
experience in these types of offences results from the uncontroversial fact that they 
straddle the line between true crimes and civil wrongs. She writes: 
Negligence is the thinnest form of criminal culpability and is in that respect 
most closely related to its civilian counterpart. Thus, to connect the 
reasonable person in his civil and in his criminal contexts is to link civil and 
criminal law at their point of closest relation.139 
 
The close relation bespeaks, Moran claims, the importance of ongoing discussion 
and analysis of the always contentious reasonable person standard.  “After all”, she 
says, “it is the very conceptual and normative proximity between civil and criminal 
law here that makes the reasonable person so controversial as a basis of criminal 
culpability and generates the important scholarly discussion concerning the exact 
nature of culpability in negligence.”140 In other words, we shouldn’t expect the 
handwringing to stop. It needn’t stop at the theoretical level—the level at which this 
study is engaged. And it ought not stop at the practical level where triers of fact do 
their work and contribute to the ongoing social evaluation in attributing fault. This 
ongoing reflective assessment is the last line of defence against precipitously and 
perhaps callously punishing people for causing results we either don’t like or want 
to see avoided.     
                                                        
 
139 Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective 
Standard  (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 4. 
 
140 Ibid. 
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The trier of fact in criminal negligence cases plays a crucial role in the 
constructing the standard of the reasonable person and then in determining 
whether the accused sufficiently departed from that standard. Ostensibly, this study 
hopes to make claims with regard to the potential criminal liability of faith healers, 
but those claims are presumptuous in certain respects. Even though we have spent a 
great deal of time trying to get an accurate sense of how the SCC has reasoned its 
way through the related issues, obviously enough it’s not the SCC who decides the 
overwhelming majority of particular cases. Supreme Court rulings inform judicial 
instructions, and once clear judicial instructions are given to jurors at trial it is for 
them to decide if a particular accused sufficiently breached the standard to warrant 
criminal liability.141 In Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, Kenneth 
Simons describes the responsibility of triers of fact in terms of three main 
                                                        
 
141 People accused of criminal negligence can elect to be tried either by jury or by a judge. The 
Tuttons chose to be tried by a jury. So did Daniel Tschetter. So did Emma Czornobaj. Judges decide 
what evidence is admissible at trial. Prosecutors will largely determine the offence to which the 
accused is answerable. The Judge is responsible to make clear to the jury the statute(s) in question 
and the standards that must be met for guilty verdicts to be rendered. But, of course, the Judge 
cannot tell the jury what the facts of the case are or how they should think about them. It is the 
responsibility of the advocating attorneys to present the facts to be considered. They are also free to 
encourage the jury to think about the facts in ways that suit the interests of their clients.  Lawyers 
can tell a jury, “A reasonable person in this circumstance thinks or does X”, but it is up to individual 
jurors to decide for themselves and, then in jury deliberations, to try to persuade others what they 
think a reasonable person would have done or not have done. When the trier of fact is the magistrate 
or judge alone, the attorneys are directing their arguments vis-à-vis the facts and their perspective on 
the reasonable person, to the Judge herself. There is a great deal of calculation that goes in the 
decision to be tried either by Judge or by jury. In the 2014 trial of Emma Czornobaj, The National Post 
reported the following: “Emma Czornobaj decided to take her chances with a jury and her gamble 
failed.” (Graeme Hamilton, "Emma Czornobaj Found Guilty for Causing Deaths of Two Bikers When 
She Stopped to Save Ducks on Highway" accessed June 20, 2014, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/jury-finds-woman-guilty-for-causing-deaths-of-two-
bikers-when-she-stopped-to-save-ducks-on-highway  
An accused will try to discern whether his or her case will be more sympathetically heard by a jury of 
peers or by a single trial judge. 
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considerations.142 First, triers of fact in the criminal setting are expected to employ a 
normative standard that is by nature more vague than if they could simply apply a 
rule.143 Secondly, the trier of fact is obligated to “anthropomorphize” or “personify” 
the standard and this ironically entails challenges to the impartiality that is 
supposed to be a hallmark of the criminal justice system. In keeping with the first 
consideration, there is no rule, according to Simons, by which this personifying 
process must be undertaken. The likelihood of creating the reasonable person in 
one’s own image, as it were, becomes a considerable temptation, if not a cynical 
reality. Thirdly, Simons argues, “the standard effectively results in the delegation of 
law making power to the trier of fact.”144 What this means is that triers of fact are 
granted official authority to make lawful or unlawful certain types of behaviour that, 
of course, could never be captured in a negligence-based statute. For example the 
statute prohibiting dangerous driving must be sufficiently general to capture a wide 
variety of instances, obviously not alike in detail. Wait, Hundal, Tschetter, and Beatty 
are all evidence of this. Triers of fact can render certain fact patterns either lawful or 
unlawful. The triers of fact in the Czornibaj verdict have announced that drivers who 
cause the loss of human life in order to save non-human animal life are guilty of 
                                                        
 
142 Kenneth W. Simons, "Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law," Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 3, no. 2 (2002).   
 
143 Simons refers to the “Hand Rule” often used in civil cases. Learned Hand (1872-1961), an 
American Judge after whom the test is named, presided over a now famous civil case in which an 
unsecured barge in New York Harbour caused the sinking of an adjacent vessel. The test Hand 
devised consists of a simple mathematical formula by which negligence can be calculated. It involves 
the probability of loss, costs of actual loss, and the burdens of prevention. No similar kind of rule 
functions in the criminal context.  
 
144 Simons, "Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law," 315. 
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serious crimes. They do this obviously without any help from a statue that says 
anything about ducks. Triers of fact in faith healing deaths would enjoy the same 
delegated power to pronounce upon religiously motivated health care treatments. 
In summary, then, of Simon’s three elements, the reasonable person used by jurors 
in criminal negligence cases is whatever they agree he or she is. In the absence of an 
over-arching criminal negligence rule the likelihood of legal disagreement is 
considerable. 
What particular facts and values are possessed by individual triers of fact 
will, in large measure, determine whether they think faith healers are rightly 
convicted of criminal negligence. Of course, some of these facts and values will be 
influenced by precedent and established judicial reasoning. Let’s consider a small 
sampling of what may be gleaned from some of the negligence-based cases that 
could be informative to the trier of fact in a faith healing case. From Creighton one 
might be persuaded that an “absolute prohibition” against causing another’s death 
must be tempered by the caution against too quickly branding people criminals.  
From Beatty, we learn more explicitly (and more in the order of ratio decidendi) that 
causing some deaths in the course of the everyday is an unfortunate but predictable 
reality on Canadian highways. Causing the death of another is amongst the very 
worst things anybody can ever do, but not always is it beyond what can be imagined 
from an ordinary person in certain circumstances. But, from Czornobaj we learn that 
stopping in the middle of the road to usher helpless wildlife across a busy highway 
is not “everyday” operation of a motor vehicle. Leslie MacDonald’s actions, one 
learns, were beyond the standard thought appropriate for s. 215. That is, she failed, 
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in a marked and substantial fashion, to provide the necessaries of life to her 
grandson. Steven and Ruth Shippy similarly failed to provide the necessaries of life 
to their son, Calahan. But, neither Leslie MacDonald nor the Shippys were found 
guilty of criminal negligence causing death (s. 220) or criminal negligence 
manslaughter (s. 222(5)(b))—the more serious charges. Relative to these more 
serious offences their actions were not, apparently, a sufficiently egregious 
departure to announce that wanton or reckless disregard for life or safety was 
shown. Criminal negligence is a more serious offence than failing to provide the 
necessaries because someone found guilty of the former is more severely punished 
and more negatively stigmatized than someone found guilty of the latter. These are 
just a few considerations mixing description with evaluation that could influence the 
thinking of a trier of fact. In what follows, we will give clearer content to the relevant 
facts and values bearing upon liability for faith healers in criminal negligence. We 
want, after all, faith healers who cause death to receive their legal due: certainly not 
more, but hopefully for the sake of needlessly dead children, not less either. We will 
concede, trivially I believe, that faith healers culpably “fail to provide the necessaries 
of life” and that they depart markedly from the standard in that regard. The far more 
significant legal hurdle to clear is in regards to the charge of criminal negligence. Do 
the actions of faith healers objectively show wanton or reckless disregard for the 
lives and safety of their children? Rather more straightforwardly: are faith healers 
who cause death in Canada criminally unreasonable?  
Discerning criminal unreasonableness requires asking what an accused could 
have done or should have done to have avoided the harm he or she caused. I argued 
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at the close of the last chapter that at least with respect to the dangerous driving 
offence the SCC wanted the objective standard to show more sensitivity to some 
subjective considerations, most specifically to the care expected in relation to the 
harm-doing. By this I meant that the reasonable person with regard to the 
dangerous driving offence does not function as an automaton, or more 
appropriately, an auto-pilot. The reasonable driver, the SCC argued, is not perfectly 
programmed to flawlessly and unerringly navigate his or her vehicle along Canadian 
road ways.145 Such an auto-pilot, of course, would never cause any deaths with fault. 
Some other human driver or pedestrian might collide with an auto-pilot resulting in 
his own death, but it wouldn’t be the fault of the ever-dependable auto-pilot. But the 
ordinary driver in Canada suffers from things perfectly programmed auto-pilots do 
not; he or she suffers from, amongst other things, inattention and momentary 
carelessness. In short, the reasonable driver is an ordinarily careful driver. The 
ordinary driver is not like Michael Waite or Surinder Hundal, nor apparently like 
Emma Czornobaj. But he or she is like Justin Beatty. The ordinary driver is 
psychologically normal, which is to say such drivers are well suited for safety on 
public roads, but they are neither failsafe nor foolproof. The concern of the SCC in 
Beatty, and going right back to Tutton, is that use of an objective standard can run 
the risk of becoming an absolute standard, that is, a standard demanding liability 
absolutely if and when bad consequences result from human causation. If we have a 
                                                        
 
145 There’s no reason to believe driving will become flawless and deaths will be eliminated with the 
growing trend toward self-driving cars. For example, cars will need to be programmed to make 
decisions between running over careless pedestrians or swerving to avoid them, thus risking the 
lives of the occupants. See Patrick Lin, “The Ethics of Autonomous Cars,” The Atlantic, October 8, 
2013, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-
of-autonomous-cars/280360/ 
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standard that included no human frailties, no human imperfections, no genuine 
human psychology then in a sense every objective standard we create would 
become, in Simon’s language, a “superpersonified” standard, or an auto-pilot, as it 
were.146 And of course, super-persons never make mistakes. If the standard by 
which people are judged never makes mistakes then criminal liability ensues every 
time the undesired results of the offence occur. But to avoid the worry that an 
objective standard entails the creation of an absolute liability offence, some capacity 
for causing bad results must be provided for in the design of the reasonable person. 
If the subjective test entails looking for certain faulty psychological markers in the 
mind of the accused, then the objective test entails seeing a certain degree of normal 
human imperfection already in the ordinary, non-super-person. This is how the SCC 
expects the trier of fact to personify the objective standard, at least in regards to 
dangerous driving.  In Beatty, it was granted that driving an automobile is inherently 
risky. Everyone who operates a motor vehicle knows this and necessarily consents 
to certain risks whenever we get behind the wheel of a car. We all know, along with 
Justin Beatty, that anyone of us could end up on either end of one of those traffic 
fatalities, either as the careless driver or the victim of another’s carelessness. The 
objective standard must reflect these social and psychological realities. We do not, 
apparently, consent to the risks of sharing the road with brutish cement truck 
drivers or hyper-vigilant animal lovers. These are marked and substantial 
departures, at least according to some triers of fact.  
                                                        
 
146 Simons, "Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law," 313. Simons argues it’s a misguided 
effort to “superpersonify” the reasonable person. 
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What about the objective standard vis-à-vis criminal negligence? Our study 
has discussed two people guilty of this crime and, coincidentally, they’ve been found 
guilty of dangerous driving as well. Daniel Tschetter, the brutish cement truck 
driver who killed five people, is unambiguously guilty of criminal negligence 
manslaughter. Emma Czornobaj, the hyper-vigilant animal lover, was found guilty of 
criminal negligence causing death, but her convictions are open to wide swaths of 
disagreement. Recall in chapter 2, I argued that not every verdict of criminal guilt 
need be as uniformly satisfying as Tschetter. It is possible to breach a standard in a 
marked and substantial way, and still not satisfy everyone’s moral intuitions or even 
reconcile each person’s competing moral intuitions. This simply means that 
everyone must acknowledge some degree of dissonance between the objective 
standard and one’s personal sense of justice. In part, of course, this is what makes 
the standard, after all, ‘objective’. Not only is the standard outside of the accused, it 
is indeed outside of each trier of fact too—or so it should be! Each trier of fact must 
somehow embrace a personification that is potentially different from oneself. In the 
case of Daniel Tschetter, there is a likely a deep sense of confidence in the trier of 
fact that his actions departed markedly from any conceivable reasonable person in 
his circumstances. We simply don’t have that same sense of collective moral clarity 
when it comes to Emma Czornobaj. I suspect many triers of fact would feel deeply 
ambivalent about what people like the Tuttons and the Shippys have done as well.  
In the context of holding religious beliefs that bear upon care for one’s child, 
what does the reasonable person think and do? Recall that in Beatty, the entire 
Court agreed that momentary carelessness “without something more” cannot 
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amount to a violation of the objective standard in dangerous driving. What is the 
‘something more’ that could be identified by the trier of fact as a marked and 
substantial departure? In considering whether faith healers are criminally 
unreasonable, it’s important not to lose sight of the central feature that makes the 
question meaningful, namely, that their actions resulted in a child’s death. It’s easy 
in the normal course of speech to think the question gestures at the idea that 
believing in faith healing is so astonishingly foolish as to warrant the adjective 
‘criminal’.  We should have no gripe with people who want to believe astonishingly 
foolish things, but we should be legally, politically, and morally concerned when 
certain beliefs result in clearly avoidable deaths. We learned from Beatty that 
causing avoidable deaths with less than entirely careful driving does not meet a 
criminal threshold. Oddly speaking, dangerous driving does not amount to 
criminally dangerous driving. By parity of reasoning we can see why criminal 
negligence liability may not attach to people like Dominic Martin and Leslie 
MacDonald. Their mistake, in the non-legal sense at any rate, was also just ordinary 
carelessness. Emma Czornobaj’s ‘mistake’ was not like Beatty’s or Martin’s. So, how 
should one think about the deaths caused by faith healers? Do they resemble 
careless and non-culpable deaths in any relevant way? Let’s consider. 
The careless deaths of Audrey Martin and Max Huyskens resulted from 
rather normal, everyday human behaviour, but Christopher Tutton and Callahan 
Shippy died far more directly from the intentional exercise of beliefs and values. One 
might object by saying that religious belief is part of normal, everyday human 
behaviour too. This may be true. Even ardent atheist, Dan Dennett, is content to 
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describe religious belief as rather normal.147 Religious belief is not just normal; it’s 
natural!148 The protestations of still other hard-bitten atheists notwithstanding, I 
think we should say that today most religious belief, whether normal or natural, is 
quite harmless—just like most driving. But surely it’s not reasonable to think that 
there are inherent risks in the religious life akin to those of driving. We’ve arrived at 
a place in Canadian jurisprudence where we accept that in some contexts the loss of 
human life will predictably occur and in such circumstances justice demands that no 
one need be branded a criminal. But is the exercise of religion one of those contexts 
where society must stoically accept the reality of accidental death? Faith healing 
deaths don’t seem to bear the marks of anything ‘accidental’. It’s not an accident that 
Christopher Tutton and Calahan Shippy died. Given the course of action valued and 
chosen by the parents, reasonable people would have predicted their deaths. Indeed, 
in Christopher’s case, after the first failed ‘attempt’ the parents were warned again 
of the dire consequences of withholding insulin. While we might predict deaths will 
occur in a general sense on Canadian highways, there was no way to predict when 
Justin Beatty got into his truck that fateful day that his actions would result in 
innocent deaths. Perhaps even more tragically, while we might predict that some 
children every year will die because of a caregiver’s (ironic) carelessness, there was 
very little that one could observe from the outside to warrant a prediction that 
                                                        
 
147 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon  (New York, NY: Viking 
Penguin, 2006). 
 
148 Dennett believes religion could disappear just as “naturally.” As a species we became “religious” 
by having an intentional stance to our surroundings.  A now more highly evolved intentional stance 
would make religion unnecessary to cope with our surroundings—so thinks Dennett. 
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Dominic Martin’s child was gravely at risk.149 These deaths serve as cautionary tales 
for all of us everywhere: “when you think you’re being careful, be more careful!” But 
the cautionary tale related to faith healing deaths is surely very different. If one had 
opportunity to talk with the Tutton’s prior to their decision to withhold insulin, 
certainly no reasonable person would have said, “be careful.” If there is a cautionary 
tale related to the Tuttons or the Shippys, it is pointedly this: “when you think you’re 
being reasonable, think again!” Because faith healing deaths so obviously result from 
voluntary, cognitively well-orchestrated courses of action, courses of action others 
know are deadly, it makes perfectly good sense to see at least the beginnings of 
marked and substantial departure—at least from ordinary careless people like 
Justin Beatty or Dominic Martin.  
  Another preliminary objection to the claim that faith healers depart 
markedly from reasonable people or otherwise act well beyond the bounds of the 
ordinary is to consider that reasonable parents are all capable of making mistaken 
health related judgements jeopardizing a child’s life.150 Well-meaning parents can 
make these kinds of errors. A defence attorney could agree that the faith healer 
made an error in judgement—it happens! The point isn’t to show that faith healers 
are themselves consummately reasonable in their health related judgements; they 
                                                        
 
149 Tragically, these types of deaths continue to occur and 2014 saw some high profile American 
instances. A common theme in the causal story is a rushed change of routine. Dominic Martin and 
Leslie MacDonald meet this fact pattern. It has been dubbed “the forgotten baby syndrome. Gene 
Weingarten, “The last word: Forgotten baby syndrome,” (March 26, 2009), accessed March 30, 2009, 
http://theweek.com/article/index/9471.    
 
150 A controversial topic is the issue of mandatory child vaccinations. Some high-profile celebrities 
and political figures in the US have resisted such policies, claiming some vaccinations cause autism or 
other harms greater than what the vaccinations are meant to prevent. Of course, not receiving the 
vaccinations puts not just the child at risk; it contributes to a larger public health risk. 
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simply cannot depart so markedly from the judgements of a reasonable parent that 
wanton or reckless disregard for another’s life or safety becomes the legal 
description of their actions. So, the objection goes, maybe faith healers aren’t 
careless in a ‘Justin Beatty’ sense, but departing markedly from the other mistakes 
that parents can make will require a great deal more argument or evidence. If the 
SCC agreed that normal automobile drivers are not perfect automatons, maybe 
triers of fact should agree that reasonable parents aren’t perfect parents either. 
Fair enough. Before one can know, though, if the departure is marked, one 
must first know what one is departing from. In the abstract, we’ve agreed that faith 
healing parents shouldn’t be measured against perfect parents. If Justin Beatty bears 
some resemblance to the reasonably imperfect driver, what might a reasonably 
imperfect parent look like? What does the reasonably imperfect person do or think 
in these health-related circumstances? To get a clearer sense of who the faith healer 
could be compared to, we need first consider some preliminary issues confronting 
any trier of fact attempting to grasp ‘reasonableness’. To set a standard some 
alternative conceptions must be held in mind; the trier of fact wouldn’t need to set a 
standard if, as a substantive legal matter, it was given to him or her by a judge or 
even by the statute itself. The reasonable person necessary for legal and social 
evaluation does not exist a priori, and if it did only discussion, argument, and 
communication would disclose it. No doubt this could explain almost metaphysically 
what a jury seeks to do in its deliberations, namely, to sift the evidence and consider 
what a truly reasonable person would have done under the same circumstances. 
Perhaps there exists amongst some jurists a kind of Platonic or maybe Kantian hope 
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that men and women of practical reason, in dialogue with one another, will 
converge on the right conception of reason and, thereby, the right verdict.151 Two 
concerns must be faced by this metaphysically ambitious view of what juries or even 
judges do. The first is that there is simply too much evidence that courts make 
mistakes. For all their conscientious hopes that they will be guided by reason and a 
concern of justice, the history of failure in this regard is overwhelming. The second 
and more practical concern is this. Let’s grant that by careful deliberations a 
conception of what a reasonable person would or would not do is somehow 
accurately derived. This is not half of the practical legal battle. What awaits the 
triers of fact is an assessment of the gap between what their reasonable person 
would have done and what, in fact, the accused did. The gap (i.e., the departure) 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ must be sufficiently substantial for liability to follow.  
Frequent reference to ‘reasonable’ has already been made, but we should 
acknowledge we’ve played fast and loose with presumed synonyms like ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘normal’.  As one begins to personify ‘reasonableness’, how might any of these 
terms help inform that evaluative process? Two basic approaches commend 
themselves. Either we can personify the standard simply by reference to 
psychological and sociological norms derived from observation or statistical 
analysis, or we can employ some aspirational or qualitative characteristic we think 
should define the standard. The first approach considers human and social reality 
                                                        
 
151 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., expresses his disdain for formal legal reasoning prevalent in his day: “I 
once heard a very eminent judge say that he never let a decision go until he was absolutely sure that 
it was right. So judicial dissent often is blamed, as if it meant simply that one side or the other were 
not doing their sums right, and if they would take more trouble, agreement inevitably would come.” 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of Law," in Classical Readings and Canadian Cases in the Philosophy 
of Law, ed. Susan Dimock (Toronto, ON: Prentice Hall, 1897/2002), 71. 
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from a rather descriptive point view, while the second approach is more 
conventionally normative in the sense it describes from a more objective, maybe 
even universal, perspective what a person—any person—ought to do or think. 
Considering these two conceptual anchor points, one should be immediately struck 
with the perennial ‘fact/value’ or ‘is/ought’ distinction. This distinction has been 
and continues to be notoriously thorny. David Hume’s famous challenge cautions (in 
particular the religious person) against too quickly leaping from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, or 
deriving a judgment about the way things ought to be from observing the way things 
are. The general Humean objection is not that values can have no justification, but 
that deriving values from facts can never be justified by logic or reason. No one 
should make the mistake that somehow values cannot be sufficiently explained. 
Let’s consider how the fact/value distinction comes to bear on the 
conception of the objective standard again in Beatty, for example. The SCC 
determined that it’s a simple social fact, unfortunately descriptive of the 
unavoidable risks of operating a vehicle on Canadian highways, that normal human 
beings will have lapses of attention and kill other motorists. This is nothing to aspire 
to! Nobody thinks the loss of life on Canadian highways ought to happen in anything 
like an obligatory sense found in law or morals. One might think it ‘ought’ to happen 
if one considers human nature, mechanical engineering, and the laws of physics, but 
this sense of ought has nothing to do with obliging the reasonable person. Appeal to 
the simple facts as they currently exist constrains what might be aspired to or what 
might be realistically hoped for. In essence, the SCC says the following: “As law 
makers and as adjudicators of law, we can and should aspire to make road ways 
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safer but in the course of operating vehicles some people will be causally 
responsible for the deaths of others. It’s just a fact.” Given this fact, it’s not justifiable 
to hold people like Justin Beatty criminally responsible for the deaths they cause. 
Punishment and public condemnation will never eliminate these kinds of 
unfortunate but inevitable events.     
But, here comes the thorny part. It’s also just a fact that some people like 
Michael Waite, Surinder Hundal, and even Marc Creighton are going to show more 
than normal carelessness and also be causally responsible for loss of life. To them 
and others like them Canadian society says something very different than it says to 
Justin Beatty: “You ought not behave that way; you should have been more attentive 
to the risks your course of action was generating.” But notice, it’s still entirely 
predictable that the Waites, Hundals, and Creightons of the world won’t behave as 
they should and, barring some astronomical criminal law reform, no 
accommodation for this ‘fact’ will be provided. We tell them, figuratively with a 
criminal verdict, “You ought to have aspired to more.” It’s one thing to take the risk 
of getting behind the wheel of a vehicle and driving it otherwise lawfully—that is, 
carefully, but for a split second—and another thing entirely to speed, to run yellow 
lights, to drive under the influence, or to stop in the middle of highways to usher 
ducklings across the road.  
Even though it’s entirely predictable that otherwise law abiding people will 
use narcotics, the law would like to discourage people from doing so, and also from 
injecting their friends with dangerous amounts of cocaine. Though drug use is 
common or ‘ordinary’ in some sense, Canadian jurisprudence expects triers of fact 
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to personify a standard whereby the ‘reasonable person' either aspires not to use 
drugs or aspires to use them more safely—at any rate, far more safely than Marc 
Creighton did. When things go badly, as they did for Kimberly Martin—Creighton’s 
unfortunate friend—triers of fact are entitled to say that Creighton departed 
markedly from what we hoped he would do. This hope, though, did not spring from 
the facts of his background or the sociological facts of drug use in Canada. These 
facts could help triers of fact predict what he would do. In this sense, Creighton may 
not have departed one hint from what society expected of someone like him in his 
circumstances. Indeed, a sociologist might have bet on it. But, the trier of fact is not 
supposed to personify the objective standard so descriptively, at least not in these 
circumstances. Sometimes and for some contexts triers of fact are entitled to expect 
more than the factually predictable. From a more general moral perspective we all 
feel entitled to expect more from people like Creighton or Hundal and maybe even 
Czornobaj, not because the facts tell us we should, but rather because we simply 
value the expectation more than the stoically descriptive alternative. We value a 
world in which fewer people speed, fewer people recklessly disobey traffic laws, 
fewer people engage in dangerous drug use, fewer people do astonishingly foolish 
things, etc.  And because we value this world—a world that doesn’t exist, but a 
world we feel justified in trying to realize—law enables triers of fact to expect more 
from people in some contexts than others. It seems Canadian jurisprudence has 
progressed to the place where some worlds are worth aspiring to but others, sadly, 
are not. At the very least, society may concede that our collective hopes couldn’t be 
realized with threats of criminal punishment. We can’t expect Justin Beatty to be 
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super-human, but triers of fact are entitled to expect more from Marc Creighton, 
more from Daniel Tschetter, and maybe even more from Emma Czornobaj.   
What should triers of fact be willing to tell people like the Tuttons or the 
Shippys? What ‘facts’ and ‘values’ should come to bear upon the construction of a 
reasonable person in this regard? When objective standards are legitimized as they 
have been so comprehensively in Canadian jurisprudence, an enormous amount of 
responsibility and authority is placed in the hands of triers of fact. Concerns about 
‘judicial activism’ are frequently debated amongst philosophers of law and political 
scientists, but a bit of reflection about what triers of fact must do when presented 
with a negligence-based offences shows clearly that they are also positioned to be 
‘law makers’ in similarly controversial ways. The worry about judicial activism is 
that unelected judges do the work of elected legislators; i.e., these judges ‘legislate 
from the bench’. Jurors, in effect, do the same things—or so the objection goes.152 
While they will certainly hear lawyers encouraging them to imbue the reasonable 
person with certain virtues and not others, ultimately the assessment of whether 
the accused departed markedly from their norm lies with them. Ideally, the good 
trier of fact should have a capacity for some degree of objectivity and impartiality. 
It’s one thing to agree in principle that a standard of fault is objective, and another 
entirely to be ‘objective’ in constructing it. A judge who cannot see past his own bias 
would make for a very weak trial judge. While jurors cannot realistically be 
                                                        
 
152 The American organization “Fully Informed Jury Association” has a website with the explicit goal of 
educating prospective jurors of their rights as triers of fact. It also hopes to educate the public 
generally about the value of “activist juries.”  Some of the slogans on their web page are as follows: 
“You cannot be required to check your conscience at the courthouse door.”; “When justice requires it, 
you have the right and responsibility to set aside unjust or unjustly applied law.”; “If there is no 
victim, there is no crime.” See fija.org. 
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expected to possess the same level of impartiality as a judge, their own biases and 
pre-reflective judgments should be acknowledged. Criminal negligence (and other 
negligence-based offences) pose particular challenges for jurors because they are 
not often being asked to decide what factually happened—as they might in a more 
stereotypical criminal case involving, say, circumstantial evidence. Rather the trier 
of fact is being asked to decide what, as a matter of value, ought to have happened, 
and then to decide if the accused was sufficiently out of step with this evaluative 
judgement. Every potential juror should be capable of acknowledging that one’s own 
values need not be the only values imposed on every other Canadian and certainly 
need not be the exact values that determine what the ‘reasonable person’ does.  
Again to use biblical imagery, no trier of fact should be in the business of creating 
the reasonable person in one’s own image!  
Some jurisprudential contrast will help to illustrate where Canadian triers of 
fact could find themselves, particularly with respect to assessing criminal negligence 
in a faith healing death. Given the demonstrably greater religiosity of American 
society, the concern over jury bias takes on added complexity in US Courts. A recent 
study by American legal sociologists, Brian Bornstein and Monica Miller, entitled 
God in the Courtroom: Religion’s Role at Trial, reveals that some judges encourage 
jurors to use and rely on their religious beliefs when deliberating over a case.153 
This is particularly evident when jury’s must agonize over the death penalty. 
Bornstein and Miller write: 
                                                        
 
153 Brian H. Bornstein and Monica K. Miller, God in the Courtroom: Religion's Role at Trial  (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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For instance, one judge said, ‘the court in no way means to suggest that the 
jurors cannot rely on their personal faith and deeply held beliefs when facing 
the awesome decision of whether to impose the sentence of death on a fellow 
citizen’ (Jones v. Kemp, 1989). Another judge wrote, ‘Prayer is almost 
certainly a part of the personal decision-making process of many people, a 
process that is employed when serving on a jury’ (State v. De Mille, 1988); 
another stated that: ‘We do not find it surprising that conscientious people 
who are faced with a life and death decision resort to their religious scruples 
in reaching such a decision. Such deep introspection neither violates 
principles of justice nor prejudices the defendant’ (Young v. State, 2000, 
quoting Bieghler v. State, 1997).154 
 
Thankfully, Canadian court rooms no longer have to decide Capital offences. But 
they still need to consider the facts of each case with an open mind. Most frequently 
this entails the moral obligation to see facts as they are and not as a trier of fact 
wants them to be. But this is precisely the inescapable challenge for triers of fact in 
the potential faith healing trials. In a sense the facts are clear; religious parents 
acted in a way virtually no normal Canadian acts—and a child predictably dies. 
While it is highly unlikely any Canadian jury in a criminal case involving faith 
healing would ever be given the religiously sympathetic advice reported by 
Bornstein and Miller (and enunciated above), some instruction must be given vis-à-
vis the objective standard. While they would certainly be told that impartiality is a 
virtue their reasonable person should have, and that this person does not 
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, or religion, it is not for law or judges 
to prescribe to the trier of fact how a reasonable person should think about faith 
healing or stopping for ducks. That dialectic will likely be provided by lawyers, but 
even if it weren’t it would still be left to the trier of fact to decide if faith healers 
depart criminally from their evaluative judgment. Our next step is to consider what 
                                                        
 
154 Ibid., 68-69. 
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this virtue of impartiality could mean for the construction of the reasonable person 
against whom a faith healer would be compared.   
  
114 
 
 
Chapter 6: Pre-empting the ‘Mistake of Fact’ Defence 
 
Thus far we have sought to explain the (current) state of Canadian criminal 
jurisprudence with respect to unintentionally caused deaths. We have sought to 
analyze the salient judicial history along with certain procedural norms relevant to 
the trier of fact to help us better appreciate what is at stake in the criminalization of 
faith healing deaths. With the legitimization of objective standards in negligence-
based offences we can better understand the significant responsibility that falls to 
the trier of fact in such cases. Two closely related questions will occupy the 
attention of triers of fact in a wrongful death case involving faith healers. First, is the 
Crown presenting evidence that shows the accused acted with wanton or reckless 
disregard for the life or safety of the deceased? This evidence need not be of a 
personal psychological nature. No psychologist, no psychiatrist, no clergy, no spouse 
need be called as a witness to help inform the jury of what precisely the accused was 
thinking while he or she was refusing to provide conventional medical care to the 
child.155 Rather, what the trier of fact will be looking for and what the Crown is 
obligated to provide is evidence that the accused failed to act in a way that society 
could expect from a reasonable parent in similar circumstances. Secondly, does the 
evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt that the objective standard has been 
breached in a marked and substantial way? The trier of fact might be persuaded in 
the affirmative with respect to the first question, but remain unpersuaded on the 
second. That is, there may be undeniable evidence that, objectively speaking, the 
                                                        
 
155 Of course they could be. Character witnesses were called in defence at the trials of Steven and Ruth 
Shippy. The point is that proving the charges does not entail proving very much about the positive 
mental states of the accused. 
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accused acted in a wanton or reckless fashion, but the trier of fact may deny that the 
departure from the standard he or she has conceived is not sufficient to ground 
criminal liability. The properly instructed juror in this case must be looking for more 
than a difference of opinion between the reasonable person and the faith healer. 
Rather, to ensure that the faith healer’s legal rights are protected the difference 
between what the faith healer has done and what could be expected of a reasonable 
person must be considerable. If the Crown can satisfy the jury with respect to these 
two questions then guilty verdicts under criminal negligence can be returned and 
the faith healer can be properly branded a criminal—specifically, for more than 
simply failing to provide the necessaries of life. Recall from the sentencing hearing 
of Steven and Ruth Shippy, Judge Sirrs declared “you are criminals in Canadian 
society”—guilty of s. 215.156 When the Tuttons were originally tried, a jury rendered 
a similar pronouncement with respect to the criminal negligence offence. Judicial 
history reveals that for a wide variety of reasons those guilty verdicts did not stand 
up on appeal. Far more legal clarity exists today and Crown prosecutors could very 
well proceed with criminal negligence charges, confident at least that earlier 
questions regarding the requisite fault element are sufficiently settled.  
I will concede quickly that the Tutton or Shippy fact patterns in no way 
exhaust all the various ways in which faith healers could end up causing the death of 
a child. In Shawn Peters’ book, When Prayer Fails, a horrifying litany of cases is 
surveyed, only some of which are similar to the deaths of Christopher and 
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Calahan.157 Of course not all involve failures to treat permanent ailments like 
diabetes. Examples include untreated skin lesions and tumours, bowel or intestinal 
blockages, appendicitis, intestinal infections. Some involve untreated injuries like 
insect bites, animal bites, etc. The point I want to make very clear is that I concede 
that no two faith healing scenarios are identical in all respects. Even Tutton and 
Shippy, though both involve consenting parents and two diabetic children, are 
different inasmuch as Christopher was barely of school age, while Calahan was 
fourteen-years-old.158 Certainly facts about the child are going to be relevant. Facts 
about the length of the medically untreated ailment are going to be relevant. Though 
the standard for criminal fault is objective, still, facts about what the parents 
actually knew about the child’s ailment are going to be relevant. It would be open to 
the trier of fact to conclude that some parents, but maybe not others, ought to have 
known better. What medical authorities advised or didn’t advise parents or 
caregivers to do or not do regarding treatment is going to be relevant. Proximity to 
care, availability of care, etc., is all going to be relevant. While I am going to argue 
that people like the Tuttons can be and should be found liable for criminal 
negligence, I will not argue that every faith healing death should result in a 
conviction of criminal negligence. I mean only to argue that given the near absolute 
                                                        
 
157 Shawn Francis Peters, When Prayer Fails: Faith Healing, Children and the Law  (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
158 The age of the deceased is or could be relevant given the standing of the ‘mature minor’ doctrine 
in Canada. In 2009 the SCC ruled on a case involving a fifteen-year-old Jehovah’s Witness who 
wanted to refuse blood transfusions to treat her chronic Crones Disease. The Court held that if an 
assessment identified that a minor had sufficiently mature character she should have a right to 
determine her own medical future. In A.C.’s particular case, the SCC held that her rights had not been 
violated by the provisions.  See A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services),  2009 SCC 30, 
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 181. 
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prohibition against causing death in certain ways it would not be unjust to call faith 
healers criminals in a more serious sense than did Judge Sirrs. 
We will turn to making the case against faith healers and, for the sake of 
argument, I will assume we are prosecuting people like the Tuttons. They have 
caused death by deliberately withholding medical treatment known to be necessary. 
This may sound as though the fault lies somewhere in their minds, but make no 
mistake; they are being accused of showing wanton or reckless disregard for 
Christopher’s life or safety and their fault lies in the evidence that no reasonable 
person acts this way. What exactly is this evidence? What could a prosecutor 
provide to the trier of fact highlighting the parent’s fault? We have a needlessly dead 
boy for starters. But the existence of a needlessly dead boy is hardly res ipsa loquitur 
(i.e., it’s not a ‘thing that speaks for itself’). The loss of life in Beatty did not speak for 
itself. Indeed, the three innocent victims occupying the other vehicle were 
figuratively barred from speaking at all. Recall how very clear Charron J was in 
disallowing results or consequences from playing a role in the determination of 
fault. Granted, the loss of life in Beatty resulted from something the SCC took to be 
the predictable consequences of normal people engaged in a socially valuable, but 
otherwise inherently risky social practice. Choices per se were not really part of the 
causal story, whereas faith healing deaths are the direct result of deliberation, 
choices, and will. Consequently, the bare result of Christopher’s death should 
figuratively speak more loudly than the loss of life in Beatty. Nevertheless, we can 
grant that the loss of life does not constitute sufficient proof of the offence. What 
other evidence can be provided?  
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 The next line of evidential support is found in considering the nature of the 
parent’s refusal to provide insulin. The nature of the refusal is so important because 
it could potentially be evidence of something more sinister than criminal 
negligence.159 Any parent who knowingly withholds insulin from his or her diabetic 
child might easily be accused of murder. In doing so, a parent could mean to cause 
the death or bodily harm of a child and be reckless whether death ensues or not.160 
But of course, genuine faith healers never ‘mean’ to kill their children. Therefore, the 
Tuttons would deny that they refused Christopher anything, including insulin. Let’s 
suppose they claim they ‘refused’ nothing. To the contrary, they might argue that 
they provided Christopher with everything he needed every step of the way. They 
simply believed that insulin was no longer necessary. They didn’t mean to withhold 
insulin from someone who needed it; they meant to stop giving it to someone who 
didn’t. The defence will argue that far from showing disregard for Christopher’s life 
or safety, nothing concerned the parents more.   
 Let’s consider more carefully this denial that they refused Christopher any 
necessaries of life. They did not stop providing Christopher with food, water, and 
shelter. If they failed to provide Christopher with the necessaries of life, if they failed 
to do what was their lawful duty to do and satisfy their son’s positive rights, they did 
                                                        
 
159 This study has relied on the probative comparisons to toddler deaths in hot cars. We’ve assumed 
the two Canadian cases have resulted from something similar to the deaths in Beatty, namely, 
momentary carelessness. An American case involving a toddler death is receiving a great deal of 
media scrutiny precisely because of the concern that an intentional murder can easily masquerade as 
tragic accident. See Eliott McLaughlin, Ralph Ellis, "Tragic Accident or Murder in Hot-Car Toddler 
Death?" CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/25/justice/georgia-toddler-
death/index.html?iref=allsearch 
 
160 This wording is drawn from one way a culpable homicide could be defined as murder in the 
Criminal Code at s. 229 (a)(i)(ii). 
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so by an honest and sincere mistake. And if psychology is all that mattered or if a 
subjective test alone was all that applied then proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the parents were wanton or reckless in withholding insulin would be difficult. 
No one doubts the parents are sincere. But, should reasonable people simply accept 
what amounts to the ‘mistake of fact’ defence? From a charitable perspective, and 
one that doesn’t want to take the illiberal posture of criticizing religious beliefs, it 
seems simpler to take faith healers at their word. But, let’s recall that for mistakes to 
be exculpatory they must be more than sincerely held. They must be sincerely and 
reasonably held.161 
Before we consider the reasonableness of faith healing beliefs in a more 
general sense, let’s consider the factual content of beliefs as they relate to faith 
healing. That is, let’s consider the obvious and uncomplicated claim that people like 
the Tuttons sincerely, but mistakenly, believed their child no longer needed insulin. 
In religious parlance, Christopher was believed to be ‘healed’ but perhaps the 
defence will want to appeal to a more common sense notion of having been cured. 
Parents believe this of their children quite frequently and sometimes they’re 
mistaken. Well, the Tuttons were mistaken too—or so the defence may want to 
argue. Is this an unreasonable thing to accept? Should a trier of fact believe this 
claim? Notice, we’re not here assessing whether it was reasonable for them to think 
Christopher was divinely healed. We’re asking whether it’s reasonable to believe 
                                                        
 
161 Professor Stuart writes: “Where the fault requirement is the external standard of objective 
negligence, it would make no logical sense to allow a mistaken belief defence to absolve unless a 
reasonable person would have made that mistake. The mistake would have to be both honest and 
reasonable.” Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise., 287. 
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that they really believed Christopher was cured. Recall the distinction we just made 
between the failure to provide insulin to someone who needed it and stopping the 
provision for someone who didn’t. Assessing whether the Tuttons really believed 
Christopher was cured is not different from any other assessment triers of fact 
would be asked to make about the content of an accused’s claim or testimony. Recall 
Surinder Hundal. The court didn’t believe his claim that he was not aware the light 
was red or that he believed the light to be yellow. In the well-known rape case, 
Pappajohn, the trial judge refused to allow the ‘mistake of fact’ defence to be 
considered by the jury because he did not believe the accused’s claim that he 
thought his victim was consenting.162 The trier of fact doesn’t have to consider the 
mistake of fact defence if the putative mistaken belief does not have, as McIntrye J 
called it in Pappajohn, the “air of reality.”163 I am certainly not calling the Tuttons 
liars in the sense intimated in Pappajohn. But, our question here is nevertheless 
probative: were the parents really thinking that Christopher was genuinely cured 
when they suspended his insulin?   
Let’s set up a paradigmatic case of a parent believing a child is cured of an 
ailment and let’s call it Mistake 1. A child suffers from an accurately diagnosed 
ailment for which she is prescribed, let’s say, a regimen of medication to be 
                                                        
 
162 Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120. The case is well known for its contributions to the 
“mistake of fact” defence. The trial judge would not allow the mistake of fact defence to be considered 
by the jury because the accused’s account of the events was not believable. 
 
163 McIntyre J actually only used the phrase once in his judgement and that in reference to another 
case where, “the facts established at least an air of reality to [the accused’s] defence” (Pappajohn,  
133). His general claim, however, was that in considering all the evidence there was no sufficient 
reason for the trial judge to have believed George Pappajohn’s version of the events. In the absence of 
a believable story, there would be no reason for a jury to consider a ‘mistake of fact’ defence. 
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administered at home by the parents. After only a few days the child’s symptoms are 
gone and her normal state of health is restored; that is, the child appears ‘cured’ and 
so the parents stop administering the medication even though both the physician 
reminded them to continue use until the medication was gone. Though the child 
appears stable and no change occurs to indicate a relapse, 72 hours after the 
medication was suspended the child suddenly takes a turn for the worse and dies in 
the midst of the parents’ frantic efforts to summon medical assistance. Let’s suppose 
the mother, believing the child was cured, said she stopped thinking about her 
child’s ailment and the unused medication within 24 hours of her child’s initial 
recovery. That the child died was a complete, utter, and catastrophic surprise—not 
different than if the child had been hit by a car that very same day. Let’s also grant 
that the cause of death is directly attributable to the absence of the necessary 
medication. If we’re simply consulting what the parent was thinking then it certainly 
appears that the parent acted as though she long since stopped believing her child 
was ill. She believed the child was cured. She ended up making a sincere mistake of 
fact. 
Is it not possible for a faith healing parent, say Carol Tutton, to be given a 
similar description? This is actually a more difficult argument to make than first 
appears. In the paradigm case, Mistake 1, we have parents whose child has a non-
permanent condition for which medical treatment was prescribed. The parents 
stopped giving the medication after they thought the child no longer needed it. In 
the faith healing case—call it Mistake 2—we have parents whose child has a 
presumably permanent condition for which medication has long been used for long 
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term successful treatment. The parents withhold the medication because, allegedly, 
they believe the child’s condition has been cured. Are these two accounts not just 
two different instances of one sort of mistake, namely, a general mistake about a 
child’s health? Consider what a mistaken belief in this second context would consist 
of from the perspective of a reasonable person. Most everyone in our society has 
experience taking medicine and being ‘cured’ because of it. That is, a change for the 
better has occurred. We have a headache and taking pain relief medicine relieves or 
moderates the pain. We have a toothache and we go to a dentist; the source of the 
discomfort is treated, and lo and behold, our toothache goes away. Why is medical 
science so successful at relieving our discomforts and treating our ailments? 
Because medical researchers better understand the causes of certain discomforts 
and ailments, and subsequently have become better at counteracting those causes 
and causing something else more desirable, or at least less undesirable. Are these 
causes always perfectly or even clearly understood? Not always, but even so, 
researchers can concede that sometimes the most we can hope to achieve is some 
kind of correlative understanding between two kinds of conditions: a treatment and 
a symptom. Perhaps with certain ailments we will need to be content to treat 
symptoms until we can better understand causes. In any case, parents in Mistake 1 
know that the medication they used to treat their child was designed to cause the 
ailment to go away. They, like millions of parents, have learned to trust in the very 
same sequence of events—because the sequence happens, with the help of medical 
science, all the time. The Tuttons, parents in Mistake 2, would be completely familiar 
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with this sequence. Indeed, they were relying on it right up to the moment they 
decided to withhold insulin.  
Let’s consider the following narratives expressing the reasoning in each 
scenario. The parent in Mistake 1:   
“My child has an ailment the cause of which is unknown to me, but I trust is 
better understood by medical professionals. Medical professionals prescribe 
a medication the application of which will relieve the symptoms of the 
ailment and allegedly cure the ailment, making continued use of the 
medication unnecessary. Millions of children just like mine have been cured 
by treatments just like this. I have received no warnings from medical 
professionals that my child’s ailment is permanent, so it is altogether 
reasonable to think this ailment will not get worse and will go away if I 
follow the advice of the doctors. When my child’s symptoms improved and, 
indeed, went away, I assumed the medication had done its job and that my 
child had been cured. I never gave my child’s life and safety another thought. 
Had I thought for even a moment my child’s life was still in danger I would 
have immediately resumed treatment and sought further medical attention. 
What better reason could I have for believing my child was cured than that 
her physical signs improved?”  
This can’t sound anything like the reasoning that goes on in the typical faith healer. 
We know that about a year earlier, the Tuttons ‘believed’ that Christopher’s diabetic 
condition had been divinely healed. Following the suspension of insulin injections 
he was quickly hospitalized and Christopher’s life was saved. The Tuttons were 
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sternly warned not to suspend insulin injections again. They were told again that 
Christopher’s condition was permanent, but that many diabetics just like 
Christopher could lead normal lives with routine insulin injections. The narrative 
reasoning in Mistake 2 could go as follows:  
“My child has an ailment the cause of which is unknown to me, but is 
presumably better understood by medical professionals. Medical 
professionals prescribe a medication the application of which will allow my 
child to live normally, making continued use of the medication presumably 
necessary. Many people just like my child suffer from this ailment and live 
normal lives with the prescribed treatment. I have received warnings from 
medical professionals that my child’s ailment is permanent, so it is 
presumably unreasonable to think this ailment will ever go away. 
Nevertheless, I suspended treatment not because of anything I saw or 
observed about my child, but because of something I believed about God and 
the Bible. I immediately observed my child’s symptoms return and I kept him 
home from school. I did not believe that continued insulin use would harm 
my child but I did believe that continued insulin use would reveal my own 
lack of faith and thereby frustrate God’s desire to do the miraculous. Though 
my child’s condition worsened I held a deep conviction God wanted to cure 
my son and vindicate my faith. I believed I was being asked to trust him and 
this trust was, I also believed, incompatible with continued use of insulin. 
What better reason would anyone have for believing my son was healed than 
that, as a diabetic, he could live without insulin?” 
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There is nothing in this account that faith healers could find disagreeable or 
objectionable. But notice, it would be entirely incredible to hear a parent in Mistake 
2 express the claim that concluded Mistake 1: “I never gave my child’s life and safety 
another thought.” This would be unreasonable to believe as a matter of fact. One 
might hear the exact phrase said, not as a matter of fact, but as a hopeful declaration 
of faith. Consider the famous Psalm 23: “Yea, though I walk through the valley of the 
shadow of death, I will fear no evil; for thou art with me.”164 As a matter of fact, the 
people who take existential comfort in this verse typically have good reason to fear 
something. That’s what reasonable or otherwise normal people do in the “valleys” of 
trouble. They declare their faith; they aspire to have courage. They want to believe 
they are not alone. If faith healing parents can’t say what parents in Mistake 1 say, 
then it’s patently obvious they didn’t really believe, as a matter of fact, that their 
children were “healed”, past tense. If they’re going to rely on a mistake of fact 
defence to rebut the charge of criminal negligence, they’re going to need a fact they 
really believed and were plausibly mistaken about. 
Perhaps faith healers will object and say they believed something false, and 
provided they believed something false, the mistake of fact defence is still available 
to them. Let’s consider this. First, we need to get clear on the ‘something’ believed 
that turned out to be false. We might be tempted to simplify their mistake and say 
they sincerely believed that “withholding insulin would not harm my son.” If they 
hadn’t believed this or they had been right about their belief then Christopher 
would not have died and no offence would have taken place. But that cannot be the 
                                                        
 
164 Psalm 23:4 (King James Version) 
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exculpating mistake either. Suppose the neighbour’s daughter, Sally, suffered from 
precisely the same form of diabetes that Christopher did and Sally received insulin 
just as Christopher did. Would the Tuttons believe that no harm would come to Sally 
if insulin is withheld from her? No. They would believe it would result in her death 
in the same way that snake handlers know that unbelievers who are bitten by 
rattlesnakes typically die. Why would withholding insulin from Sally result in harm? 
A variety of explanations would be presented by the faith healer. Perhaps God had 
not decided to heal her. Perhaps the parents needed first to trust in God. The only 
reason the faith healer can have the belief that “withholding insulin won’t harm my 
child” is if he or she has the prior, more fundamental belief that “God wills to heal my 
child.” This is a different belief from “God has healed my child” or “withholding 
insulin won’t harm my child.”  
Why shouldn’t we concede that the Tutton’s false belief was that “God has 
healed Christopher”? If we look at this closely, again, we don’t see the sincere, 
genuine belief that Christopher was (past tense) healed.  No doubt they were hoping 
beyond hope that he would live and that they would be able to exalt in God’s power, 
proclaiming it to an unbelieving world. But they did not suspend insulin because 
they believed Christopher was healed; they suspended insulin because they believed 
continued use would make Christopher’s healing unknowable. The only epistemic 
justification for believing God had healed Christopher would be ex post facto. Only 
after they proved to God they trusted enough to withhold insulin would God then do 
the thing scripture promises he’ll do, namely, heal people. Faith healers like the 
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Tuttons and the Shippys believe they have no epistemic right to claim belief in God’s 
healing power unless they act in a way that relies on it in a particular sort of way. 
 The sort of belief endorsed here could also be captured with the Latin 
distinction de re / de dicto.165 That is, one can believe something ‘of the thing’ or 
something ‘of the word(s).’166 Faith healers know that it’s possible to pay lip service 
to religious doctrine and that many people who claim to be believers are not real 
believers. It’s simply not good enough to affirm a general belief that “God can heal 
people.” To believe this de dicto and yet refuse to believe de re that “God can heal my 
son” is a sign of insufficient faith! The complaint of many a fundamentalist 
(regardless of religion) is that too many adherents to ‘the faith’ are merely nominal; 
they are believers ‘in name only’ because they’re superficial believers. They pay a 
cheap kind of lip service to ‘true’ doctrine; they believe de dicto what true believers 
think should be accepted in crucial instances de re. In other words, nominal 
believers believe pragmatically in belief, in appearing to believe, but real believers 
know this kind of vacuous faith does not please God.167   
                                                        
 
165 W.V. Quine helped drew a great deal of attention to the de re/de dicto distinction from twentieth-
century analytic philosophers. Quine himself was dubious of the distinction, as he was famously 
about the analytic/synthetic distinction. See W.V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attititudes," 
Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 5 (1956). 
 
166 A standard example of the distinction can be expressed by the ambiguous sentence, “Smith 
believes someone is a terrorist.” Smith’s belief could mean two very different things depending upon 
the distinction. For example, Smith could believe someone (de re) is a terrorist, in which case 
authorities might like to talk to Smith and find out what she knows about this particular person. Or 
Smith could believe, as most of us do, that someone (de dicto) is a terrorist. Of course, Smith and the 
rest of us are completely useless to authorities because we have no clue who the terrorists in the 
world might be. We know they exist somewhere.The latter claim is vaguely empirical, but it wouldn’t 
need to be put to the test. 
 
167 Conservative Christians will know full well that not everyone who uses Christian lingo necessarily 
commit their lives in the ways God expects. This suspicion is captured in the following biblical 
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Atheists, like Bertrand Russell, see through this with the same clarity as the 
fundamentalist. The nominal, half-hearted religious person believes what is 
convenient and pragmatic for him or her to believe. It is comforting to believe 
generally that God can heal people. And if no miraculous healing occurs, none the 
worse for that, God’s grace will manifest itself in some other mysterious way. But no 
fool would actually believe that ‘God has healed my child’ when there’s not the 
slightest bit of evidence for it! This kind of approach to religious faith, Russell 
penetratingly wrote:  
… causes him [i.e., the pragmatic theist, e.g., William James] to substitute 
belief in God for God, and to pretend that this will do just as well. But this is 
only a form of the subjectivistic madness which is characteristic of most of 
modern philosophy.168  
 
Russell’s complaint was that pragmatic and idealist conceptions of truth and reality 
encouraged especially Christian believers to relax within one’s own intellectual 
scruples and not take seriously the fact of an external world capable of impressing 
itself upon an alert mind. This external world would obviously not impress belief in 
God upon an alert mind—not according to Russell. Conversely, the pragmatic 
religious believer could avoid the more absurd doctrines of one’s faith by simply 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
passage: “Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the 
one who does the will of my Father who is in heaven.  Many will say to me on that day, ‘Lord, Lord, 
did we not prophesy in your name and in your name drive out demons and in your name perform 
many miracles?’  Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!’” 
(Matthew 7:21-23 NIV). 
 
168 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy  (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin, 1946), 772-
73. Russell not only disagreed with American pragmatists, he also had longstanding disagreements 
with the British Idealists such as F.H. Bradley.  
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rationalizing them away through some hermeneutical contortion.169 Instead of 
soberly considering radical doctrines or immoral claims as evidence of a system’s 
overall unintelligibility, more liberal religious believers reinterpret what is 
distasteful—say, perhaps about slavery, violence, or women—and accept the parts 
of Christian teaching that fit more congenially with their existential needs and their 
modern moral impulses—say, about, love, peace, self-sacrifice, etc.170 
Fundamentalists like the Tuttons would share Russell’s complaint, but disagree 
sharply with the atheist who says there’s no good reason to believe God is really ‘out 
there’. Faith healers (to say little of snake handlers) are prepared to act, to reify their 
beliefs, and thereby prove that both atheists and nominalists are wrong. Atheists, 
fundamentalists will say, are wrong because God is really out there and willing to act 
in the world in ways that only God could. He can be trusted and should be trusted, in 
exactly the same way any real person could be trusted to act and keep promises. 
And fundamentalists will say that religious nominalists or pragmatists are wrong 
                                                        
 
169 An example of this can be found in the various theological accounts that assist the Christian to 
rationalize beliefs about the Eucharist. Various Christian traditions endorse the idea that when 
adherents participate in the Eucharist or Communion or the Lord’s table (as it is variously known) 
Christ’s body and blood become or are made present in the elements of bread and wine. Realists like 
Russell—to say nothing of Dawkins, et al—would encourage Christians to reflect more sensibly on 
the content of that doctrinal commitment. Everyone who eats human flesh or drinks human blood 
engages in cannibalism; i.e., they are acting as a real cannibal. Of course, no Christians believe they 
engage in real cannibalism when they participate in their ancient sacrament. They believe something 
else about the words, “This is my body, which is for you; … This cup is the new covenant in my blood.” 
(I Corinthians 11:23-24 NIV ). 
 
170 In addition to the doctrines related to the Eucharist and Christ’s penal substitution for human sin 
(a kind of metaphysical honour killing), other standard examples of distasteful claims come explicitly 
from Christian scripture: “Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity 
of heart, just as you would obey Christ.” (Ephesians 5: 23 NIV); “Slaves, in reverent fear of God submit 
yourselves to your masters, not only to those who are good and considerate, but also to those who 
are harsh. For it is commendable if someone bears up under the pain of unjust suffering because they 
are conscious of God.” (1 Peter 2:18,19 NIV); “I do not permit a woman to teach or to assume 
authority over a man; she must be quiet.” (I Tim 2:12 NIV).  
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too, because they trust in only in their belief, in their articles of faith, but not “in the 
things” to which their beliefs bear witness. 
In spite of their best efforts to believe that Christopher had been healed or 
was being healed or that the withdrawal of insulin would not harm him, the 
evidence to the contrary can be found in Carol’s decision to keep him home from 
school and to monitor him as closely as she did. These are not the behaviours of a 
parent who, like in Mistake 1, thinks her child is cured; they might be the behaviours 
of a parent who is trying to believe her child is healed—and this trying makes all the 
difference in terms of holding genuine and reasonable beliefs.   
In search of another potential candidate for a mistake of fact, what about the 
sincere belief that “God wills to heal my child”?  Well, no doubt this proposition was 
sincerely believed. Indeed, nothing else can explain the courage it would take to 
withhold insulin in such a case. Christian scripture tells the believer that “faith is 
confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see.”171 
Additionally, believers are told they “live by faith, not by sight.”172 Faith healers 
would certainly be encouraged by these biblical pronouncements. But, a belief about 
what one hopes to be the case cannot be exculpating. By sight, as it were, it looks to 
all the world that the child is in peril; but, by faith, there is hope in something that 
cannot be seen. Scripture also reminds the faith healer: “For our struggle is not 
against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the 
                                                        
 
171 Hebrews 11:1 (NIV). 
 
172 II Corinthians 5:7 (NIV). 
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powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly 
realms.”173 In other words, true believers try to believe that their struggle isn’t 
really with the world as it appears. The true believer realizes that one’s perceptions 
often cannot be trusted because there are more sinister and malevolent forces 
obscuring one’s ‘real’ vision. This is where the genuine battle for belief is being 
waged. Instead of allowing the empirical world to foster doubt—as people like 
Russell would say it ought—the true believer strives to disavow those perceptions.   
Such an orientation to so-called ‘reality’ is entirely acceptable as a private 
epistemic posture. People are free to believe in all manner of personal superstition. 
Unfortunately, beliefs issuing from this other-worldly perspective and beliefs based 
on hope cannot possibly be candidates for excusing mistakes of fact. On the 
contrary, in the public realm of law such beliefs would provide better evidence for 
the Crown of wilful blindness. The fault in wilful blindness is customarily referred to 
as a culpable failure to make appropriate inquiries about the alleged wrong. 
Sometimes the circumstances in question are such that a reasonable person would 
doubt their appearance. To fail to make appropriate inquiries is to fail in the 
circumstances to exercise a reasonable degree of incredulity, to wilfully blind 
oneself to the possibility of error. The trier of fact should be able to see very clearly 
that wilful blindness is the most accurate legal description of what a faith healer 
does. Unlike perhaps typical examples of wilful blindness where the accused 
presumably benefits from ignoring reality, faith healers are, granted, not as morally 
blameworthy. But, there’s still no debate that faith healers blind themselves to a 
                                                        
 
173 Ephesians 6:12 (NIV). 
132 
 
 
reality that is evident to virtually all other observers—and a child dies as a result. It 
should hardly matter that faith healers are not buying stolen goods from the trunk 
of someone’s car; the results are worse—and there’s no debate that they blinded 
themselves to these tragic but predictable results.  
 A related difficulty with the presumed mistaken belief that “God wills to heal 
my child” is that there are no conditions under which it could be falsified or proved 
mistaken. It could always be the case that God wills or desires to heal a particular 
person, but for a variety of perfectly inscrutable reasons, perhaps unknowable to 
sinful mortals, God’s healing power cannot be manifested in that instance. Beliefs 
about the intentions, beliefs, and desires of a deity are the kind of thing about which 
the religious adherent cannot possibly be proven wrong.  Believing that “God wills 
to heal my child” is epistemically on par with the belief that “Allah is dishonoured by 
my daughter’s secular behaviour” or “God’s justice is vindicated in the killing of 
abortion doctors” or “God hates fags.” The honour killer cannot be proven factually 
wrong. How could anyone possibly know that Allah or the Islamic religion generally 
is not particularly dishonoured by the secular behaviour of women?174 How can 
anyone possibly know that God is not outraged by abortion, so much so that he 
seeks out mercenaries to combat the scourge with unlawful violence? And of course, 
how can anyone possibly know that homosexuality is not an abomination—as stated 
                                                        
 
174 “But those who disobey Allah and His Messenger and transgress His limits will be admitted to a 
Fire, to abide therein: And they shall have a humiliating punishment. If any of your women are guilty 
of lewdness, Take the evidence of four (Reliable) witnesses from amongst you against them; and if 
they testify, confine them to houses until death do claim them, or Allah ordain for them some (other) 
way.  If two men among you are guilty of lewdness, punish them both. If they repent and amend, 
Leave them alone; for Allah is Oft-returning, Most Merciful.” Quran - Book IV An-Nisa “Women” v.14-
16. 
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clearly in Leviticus 18:22. Nothing about reality or the world as we know it could 
verifiably disconfirm these beliefs about beliefs. After all, the belief isn’t about 
anything in the world; it’s rather about a presumed divine mental state. It takes little 
imagination to see that if human mental states are difficult or controversial to 
discern, then “the mind of God” permissibly remains perfectly mysterious.175   
We should quickly add that nothing about believing in divine mental states 
could possibly exculpate the honour killer, or the violent anti-abortionist, or the 
faith healer. The honour killer intends, for no good reason understood by law, to kill 
his daughter. The sincere belief that the offending daughter is wholly dishonourable 
and deserving of an ignominious death is of no legal relevance. When the violent 
anti-abortionist sets up his sniper rifle, he means for no good reason understood by 
law, to kill the abortion doctor across the street. And the faith healing parent longs 
to exalt in the “reality” of God’s supernatural power, if only “it” would show up as 
promised. Of course, the intention of the faith healer won’t satisfy the mens rea 
requirement of criminal negligence; there’s nothing criminally faulty about hoping 
to luxuriate in the reality of God’s miraculous powers. It’s interesting, however, that 
all three could easily be examples of people genuinely and sincerely obeying the 
presumed “will of God.” No one would ever dream of considering the defence of 
                                                        
 
175 There are some philosophers critical of this line of reasoning. The objection is that there is nothing 
metaphysically impossible or epistemically incoherent about the idea of a God communicating 
publically and verifiably with humans in this world. If humans can communicate in this way, the 
challenge shouldn’t be that great for an omnipotent God. He could, after all, “show up” at any minute 
in ways that everyone in India, Japan, South America, etc., could not reasonably deny. It’s only special 
pleading that encourages people to simply assume that the divine mind is inscrutable. The claim 
must either be that God currently refuses to communicate with humans or no God capable of 
communication exists. This argument is developed by American philosopher of science, Norwood 
Russell Hanson, in What I Do Not Believe and Other Essays, ed. Stephen Toulmin and H. Woolf (New 
York, NY: Springer, 1971). 
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mistake of fact for the first two, so why should a trier of fact be more willing to 
consider the mistake of fact for faith healers? Likely, of course, because the mistake 
vaguely admitted to (viz., “God wills to heal my child”) is seen by the sympathetic 
trier of fact to mean less about God’s desires and more about a parent’s hopes. As we 
have seen though, when those beliefs are scrutinized it’s difficult to a find sincere 
mistake of fact. Faith healers do not genuinely believe that God has healed (past 
tense); at best they are hoping he will heal or is healing—and hopes are not 
candidates for mistakes of fact.176   
Perhaps in a last ditch effort to salvage the mistake of fact defence, the faith 
healer might say, “Look, we were trying to be obedient Christians. We were hoping 
to see our son healed. Even though ‘the world’ told us it was unreasonable, we were 
convinced that he was going to be healed. We really didn’t think the child would die. 
He did die. We’re very sorry we were mistaken.” Now, frankly such claims are rarely 
made in the wake of faith healing deaths. As an empirical fact, while many faith 
healers are naturally saddened by the loss of a child, they are frequently resolute in 
the course of action they those. Following their guilty verdict, Steven Shippy stood 
on court house steps and said to reporters, “I wouldn’t change a thing” and “I believe 
that God takes someone for a reason.”177 But, be that as it may; suppose the defence 
took the more conciliatory route asserted above. Doesn’t the claim, “we were 
                                                        
 
176 I do not dispute that faith healers believe in the testimony of fellow faith healers. Nor do I dispute 
that a faith healer can attribute divine causation to past cures.  I’m quite sure that virtually all faith 
healers can give a long list of instances where they prayed for some remedy to, say, a headache or the 
flu, and the hoped-for relief eventuated. No reasonable person would be obliged to attribute divine 
causation to events that happen quite naturally with startling regularity. 
 
177Appendix, 3. 
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mistaken” sound more like a confession than an exculpatory pronouncement of 
mistake of fact? To issue the statement above and conclude, “we were mistaken” 
entails an admission that they were aware of the risks to their child, but in an effort 
to vindicate their faith they chose to disregard those risks and trust God in the face 
of all the evidence. This is not admitting one was wrong about some particular fact 
that, had he not been, none of this would have happened and no offence would have 
occurred. This is an admission that things didn’t turn out as hoped for. The defence 
might stubbornly object, saying the accused was mistaken about a particular fact 
that, had he been right about, no offence would have occurred. The Tuttons were 
wrong, the defence could insist, about God having healed Christopher. Had they 
been right, none of ‘this’ would have happened!  
But, ‘this’ is very fuzzy. To now belabour the point, they didn’t believe, as a 
matter of fact, God had healed Christopher; they wanted to believe God healed 
Christopher; they hoped that God would heal Christopher. But let’s suppose for the 
sake of argument that the impossible had occurred and Christopher’s diabetes ‘just 
went away.’ Not only would he have become a world famous medical example, of 
course the Tuttons would never have been charged with a crime. Their deepest 
fantasy would have come true. But, that’s precisely why the “mistake of fact” cannot 
be available to them. Their belief “If God had only instantaneously made it such that 
Christopher could live without insulin” is on par with other outlandish beliefs. For 
example: “If Joe Pesci had only instantaneously made it such that Christopher could 
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live without insulin” the parents would never have been charged with a crime.178 
Here’s another: “I thought Mary was a mermaid. If I had been right about this, she 
wouldn’t have drowned when I threw her in the lake, and no offence would have 
occurred.” Of course it’s possible that Christopher might not have died in the midst 
of the faith healing episode. Perhaps he could have been revived by emergency 
medical personnel like he had been once before. But it is impossible, given his 
condition, that he could have survived long without insulin. The mistake the Tuttons 
made—irrelevant as a defence—was believing in the first place Christopher could 
possibly be healed. This might be a mistake about what facts are, but this is not a 
‘mistake of fact.’ They could not possibly have been right about this—and they had 
been repeatedly told as much.  
Consider a standard mistake of fact story of a non-sexual variety. Aidan tells 
Ben to come over to his new apartment and make himself at home—the key will be 
under the mat. Aidan will join Ben in a few hours. Ben does as Aidan says but goes to 
the wrong apartment. Casey, who also leaves a key under his mat, is out for the day. 
Casey returns and can see through the window a stranger roaming around in his 
apartment. Casey calls the police and Ben is arrested for break and enter. Ben made 
a mistake. Had he gone to the right apartment, no offence would have occurred. Ben  
did unlawfully enter Casey’s apartment; that is, he committed the actus reus. But the 
exculpating mistake was done sincerely and reasonably. Even Casey, and of course 
the police, can see that Ben could have been right. The problem, of course, with the 
                                                        
 
178 George Carlin, American comedian, said, “You know who I pray to? Joe Pesci.”, accessed February 
1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPOfurmrjxo at 6:50. 
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Tuttons and the Shippys dealing with diabetic children is that it is (currently) 
physically impossible for them to have been right. Without this possibility, no 
mistake of fact is a reasonable defence.179 
Giving evidence that faith healers hope in something other-worldly—things 
frequently but not always fatal—should sufficiently rebut the mistake of fact 
defence, but certainly more can be said, and must be said, to mount a positive case 
against the faith healer. Some evidence in the form of argument has been provided 
to show that a better explanation of the faith healers actions is wilful blindness 
rather than mistake of fact, but more in terms of positive evidence must be given if a 
marked and substantial departure from reasonableness is going to be sufficiently 
proven. It bears repeating, the only burden on the defence is obviously enough to 
mount a defence against the evidence. Professor Stuart writes: 
As a matter of logic and principle, an accused’s defence of ignorance or 
mistake of fact will often amount to a plea that the Crown has not proved the 
applicable fault requirement. In such cases it is misleading to speak of a 
“defence” of mistake of fact, since that language may be wrongly interpreted 
has having specific substantive requirements or somehow affecting the onus 
of proof.180 
 
So, the burden of proof continues to lie squarely with the Crown, but in addressing 
the presumed “mistake of fact” the impartial trier of fact should agree that a 
reasonable person would have, at the very least, made inquiries into both the status 
                                                        
 
179 Shawn Peters recounts one of the many American cases in which diabetic children died at the 
hands of faith-healing parents. In this instance he is referring to Shannon Nixon, a 16 year old victim 
who died in the summer of 1995. He writes: “There is little hope for victims of [diabetic ketoacidosis] 
who do not receive this relatively cheap treatment [regular insulin injections]; diabetes experts say 
that their survival rate is zero. The decision not to seek medical treatment for Shannon thus sealed 
her fate.” Peters, When Prayer Fails: Faith Healing, Children and the Law: 147. 
 
180 Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise: 287. 
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of deceased’s health and the effectiveness of the trusted treatment. Let’s now turn 
our attention to the positive evidence that faith healing parents like the Tuttons or 
the Shippys show wanton or reckless disregard in the objective sense.  
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Chapter 7: Faith Healers Culpably Get ‘Reality’ Wrong 
 
 Over the course of the next two chapters we’re going to consider the 
reasonable person in two different forms in an effort to persuade the trier of fact 
that faith healers are liable in criminal negligence causing death. We should recall 
Ken Simons’ claim that triers of fact in negligence-based criminal cases are not being 
asked to apply a specific rule, but rather create in their own minds a personified 
norm of reasonableness against which they will compare the accused.181 There will 
be two levels of discourse in each chapter. One will be more theoretical and, while 
yawningly irrelevant to a juror, should be of interest to philosophers of law, 
litigators, and trial judges considering the relationship between faith healing and 
criminal negligence. The second will be less theoretical and more dialectical, 
intended to be of practical use, certainly to philosophers, but also to prosecutors 
and jurors trying to reason their way through the idiosyncrasies of faith healing and 
the criminal negligence offence. We shall assume, as well, that all the material facts 
of the case have been presented. What is left is for litigators to offer interpretations 
of those material facts and for triers of fact to frame a conception of the reasonable 
person. Each personified standard—indeed, virtually any possible reasonable 
standard—will not have behaved as faith healing parents do. This is not a 
controversial claim. The crucial question is this: by this particular personified 
standard are the faith healing parents who kill their children guilty of the offence? 
                                                        
 
181 Simons, "Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law." 
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The first perspective of reasonableness will derive in a jurisprudential sense 
from the work of American Legal Realist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.182 I will simply 
refer to it as common-sense objectivity or the common sense view. In historical 
perspective, Holmes was critical of what he took to be an outmoded preoccupation 
with abstract morality over and against more practical legal concerns. Unlike 
another famous critic of abstract morality, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), Holmes 
was not interested in finding a better, more scientific moral foundation for criminal 
law. Holmes was interested in justifying criminal law with unvarnished 
observations of the way individuals genuinely relate to one another, absent any 
grand teleological speculations. Holmes wrote, “For the most part, the purpose of 
the criminal law is only to induce external conformity to rule. All law is directed to 
conditions of things manifest to the senses.”183 The function of criminal law is 
simply to prevent certain observably, sensibly negative and unwanted occurrences: 
“if those things are not done,” says Holmes, “the law forbidding them is equally 
satisfied, whatever the motive.”184 Criminal law exists to provide incentives and 
disincentives according to the kinds of behaviours we can all live with and those we 
cannot. Criminal law doesn’t care why we choose not to harm one another; it doesn’t 
care whether we’re afraid of eternal damnation, or some worldly punishment or 
disapproval. Whatever motive (moral or otherwise) a person has not to violate the 
law is perfectly acceptable from a legal perspective. Criminal law functions most 
                                                        
 
182 Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Lecture II: The Criminal Law," in The Common Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009/1881). 
 
183 Ibid., 49. 
 
184 Ibid. 
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efficiently and most justifiably when it refrains from imposing moral motives for 
action or inaction, but seeks, where necessary, to provide sensible motives to 
constrain human interaction.  
Now, let’s consider a longer quotation from Holmes’s work on criminal law 
where we get a distinct flavour of his straightforward approach to fault and the 
simple function that criminal law fulfills. 
Ignorance of a fact and inability to foresee a consequence have the same 
effect on blameworthiness. If a consequence cannot be foreseen, it cannot be 
avoided. But there is this practical difference, that whereas, in most cases, the 
question of knowledge is a question of the actual condition of the defendant's 
consciousness, the question of what he might have foreseen is determined by 
the standard of the prudent man, that is, by general experience. For it is to be 
remembered that the object of the law is to prevent human life being 
endangered or taken; and that, although it so far considers blameworthiness 
in punishing as not to hold a man responsible for consequences which no 
one, or only some exceptional specialist, could have foreseen, still the reason 
for this limitation is simply to make a rule which is not too hard for the 
average member of the community. As the purpose is to compel men to 
abstain from dangerous conduct, and not merely to restrain them from evil 
inclinations, the law requires them at their peril to know the teachings of 
common experience, just as it requires them to know the law. Subject to these 
explanations, it may be said that the test of murder is the degree of danger to 
life attending the act under the known circumstances of the case.185 
(emphasis added) 
 
There is a great deal to be mined from this quotation. In it we see a simple 
pronouncement that criminal law needs no higher rationale or justification than to 
simply prevent and deter the loss of life or its endangerment. Also, from the 
extended quote above, we see a similarly parsimonious justification for criminal 
punishment. If a prudent man, familiar with the teachings of common experience, 
would have foreseen the loss or the endangerment caused by the person’s actions 
                                                        
 
185 Ibid., 56-57. 
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then punishment is justified. More normatively stated, if this “average member of 
the community” could have foreseen the loss or endangerment (a question of fact) 
then the accused ought to have foreseen it and is justly blamed and punished for his 
failure. Holmes has a prototypically “objective” view of fault, which is even more 
evident in the following:   
If the known present state of things is such that the act done will very 
certainly cause death, and the probability is a matter of common knowledge, 
one who does the act, knowing the present state of things, is guilty of murder, 
and the law will not inquire whether he did actually foresee the 
consequences or not. The test of foresight is not what this very criminal 
foresaw, but what a man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen. All 
acts, taken apart from their surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to the 
law.186 
 
Holmes sounds in agreement with much of Fletcher’s rejection of the psychological 
approach to fault attribution and also Fletcher’s preferred ‘moral approach’ to 
attributing fault, inasmuch as Holmes also wants to see the presumed illegal act 
understood in its broader social and legal context. Our legal norms derive from this 
broader context and their attention to ‘surrounding circumstances’. We are all a part 
of society, answerable to common sense, required to know the teachings of common 
experience. These features unite us all and from the virtues of common sense the 
objective reasonable person is, thus, conceived.  
Let’s now return to the prosecution of faith healing deaths. Suppose the trier 
of fact is persuaded to conceive of the reasonable person with these kinds of 
impartial, objective, and ordinary sensibilities. How might faith healers accused of 
criminal negligence manslaughter stand up against the reasonable person obligated 
                                                        
 
186 Ibid., 53-54. 
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by a commitment to common sense objectivity? Perhaps the obvious answer is “not 
very well!” There is a large inventory of objective considerations that impugn the 
‘reasonableness’ of faith healing, making it a great deal easier to describe their 
conduct as wanton or reckless disregard for another’s life or safety. The teachings of 
common experience scarcely incline people to believe in miracles—at least not 
miracles of the sort faith healers hope for. It may well not be just miracles that 
person of common sense would be suspicious of; rather, this reasonable person 
might be suspicious of lots of fanciful, wildly improbable stories.187 The person of 
ordinary intelligence or prudence would find it unimaginable to treat a gravely ill 
child with prayer or trust alone in God—to the exclusion of scientifically reliable 
medical treatment. One can easily envision a time long before the age of medical 
science, when the conventional wisdom meant combining some primitive organic 
remedy with incantations of the local Shaman. To the person of common sense, even 
this makes better sense than doing nothing. Anything physical—known to the 
senses—would be preferable to remaining within the confines of one’s own mind. It 
would hardly matter what one called it: e.g., belief, hope, prayer, or positive 
thinking. In any case, it would have been a choice to do nothing. Someone might 
object and say that lots of religious mental states intended to communicate and 
motivate God to action are accompanied by physicals actions. Christian scripture 
entreats people to anoint the sick with oil, to lay hands on them. Many Catholics 
                                                        
 
187 A good example of a court rejecting a culturally “outlandish story” is the 1897 Ontario case of 
Machekequonabe. A First Nations man is guarding his community at night. He sees vaguely in the 
shadows something that looks like an evil spirit. Frightened, the accused shoots his rifle at the “spirit” 
resulting in the death of a family member. The accused is convicted of manslaughter. "Rex v. 
Machekequonabe, Ontario Court of Appeal (1897) 28 O.R. 309," in Canadian Cases in the Philosophy of 
Law, ed. J.E. Bickenbach (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2007), 245-46. 
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around the world will manipulate rosary beads and light candles. Outside of 
Christendom there is all manner of combining physical actions and rituals with 
religious mental states. The impartial person of common sense could easily reply 
that we don’t blame people a thousand years ago for relying on the conventional 
wisdom that included some ritualistic remedy. If a thousand years ago people 
thought health or life was dependent upon summoning spirits or keeping demons at 
bay by chanting around a fire, who could have blamed them? Conventional wisdom 
today means the same as it did one thousand or ten thousand years ago, namely, 
relying on the best remedies known to the community at the time. A prosecuting 
lawyer might say to the trier of fact, “Rubbing oil on a diabetic child today is not the 
same thing as chanting around a fire a thousand years ago. Every culture at every 
time in history would have known the difference between doing something and 
doing nothing. Our culture, of which the accused is a part, enjoying the indisputable 
benefits of medical science, says the accused did nothing. He might want you to 
think it was something, but common sense says it was nothing.”188 
When faced with an apparently incurable disease, hoping for a miracle is 
perfectly understandable. No one would blame a person in those dire circumstances 
for praying and hoping for a miracle. Indeed, it would be the height of insensitivity 
for a “reasonable person” to remind people in those dire circumstances that, in fact, 
medical miracles rarely happen. In stark contrast, when faced with a condition that 
                                                        
 
188 If the accused chose to testify in his or her own defence, the Crown prosecutor would then have 
opportunity to question the accused and direct this comment to them personally. Of course, the 
accused has a right not to speak at one’s trial. Under s. 11 of the Charter, “Any person charged with an 
offence has the right, (c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in 
respect of the offence.” 
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only became life threatening because available and reliable treatment was neglected 
or ignored, exclusive trust in a metaphysical cure seems the very definition of 
unreasonable. When there’s nothing to do but pray, then prayer becomes a harmless 
and justifiable ‘nothing’. But when something can be done and in favour of prayer it 
is not, this is no longer harmless and it’s not justifiable.  
From an objective point of view it may be astonishingly unreasonable for a 
mature adult (who wants to preserve one’s life) to refuse life-saving medical care 
for oneself in favour of religious trust. But, no one is saying this course of action is 
criminally unreasonable. But when a mature adult makes this decision for a child a 
line is certainly crossed. Now one is being wanton and reckless with the life and 
safety of another—another who is owed a duty of care! While both courses of action 
are astonishingly unreasonable from a common sense perspective, the former is 
certainly not criminal but the latter surely should be. Holmes would no doubt have 
agreed with Prince v. Massachusetts, one of the most frequently quoted US Supreme 
Court rulings on freedom of religion.189 The primary public policy concerns at stake 
                                                        
 
189 Prince V. Massachussets, 321 U.S. 158 (1943).  The details are as follows.  On the night of December 
18, 1941, Sarah Prince, took her nine-year old niece, Betty, of whom she was legal guardian, to an 
urban downtown street corner to assist her missionary work.  Sarah and Betty were both “ministers” 
of the Jehovah’s Witness religion and Betty was, by all accounts, a very willing participant and a 
capable servant in the “the Lord’s work.”  However, Massachusetts State labour laws prohibited boys 
under 12 and girls under 18 from, amongst other things, publicly distributing any kind of literature.  
Section 69 of Massachusetts Comprehensive Child Labour Law read: “No boy under twelve and no 
girl under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any 
other articles of merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or 
any other trade, in any street or public place.”  Section 80 read: “Whoever furnishes or sells to any 
minor any article of any description with the knowledge that the minor intends to sell such article in 
violation of any provision of s. 69… or knowingly procures or encourages any minor to violate any 
provisions of said section, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than two hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two months, or both.”  Cited from Prince, 160-161. 
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in the case were the “economic exploitation” and “potential degradation” of children. 
Justice Rutledge stated famously: 
Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens 
patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, 
regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways. Its 
authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to 
control the child’s course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he 
cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than 
for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable 
disease or the latter to ill health or death.190  …  Parents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves.191 
 
Believing in a religion—even a startlingly radical one—is a matter of personal 
conscience. It may, in fact, define one’s conception of the good life, and certainly the 
state exists, in part, to protect the free pursuit of religious belief. But it protects 
religious belief not because any of it is true or even might be true. The state protects 
religious belief for the same reason it protects freedom of any thought, belief, 
opinion, and expression. Together these things, plus a few others, make life worth 
living, even if none of what we’re committed to is true. Unfortunately, sometimes 
freedom of belief can make life worth dying for as well. But, nobody reliant on the 
deliverances of common sense could think it reasonable for religious freedom of an 
individual to spill over and jeopardize the life and safety of a child who has yet to 
exercise his or her own positive rights and freedoms. Accordingly, the trier of fact 
should, on this account of the reasonable person, see the risk of martyrdom imposed 
                                                        
 
190 Prince, 166-167. 
 
191 Prince, 170. 
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by faith healing as something beyond the pale, as something criminally 
unreasonable. The fact that faith healers like the Tuttons and the Shippys disregard 
common sense in favour of their death-defying supernatural hope is indefensible in 
the world in which we all live. For someone not trying to kill another, it is as marked 
a departure from common sense as one could possibly imagine! 
Objections from the defence could proceed on a variety of fronts. The defence 
would want to remind the trier of fact that he or she need not themselves be 
persuaded about the reasonableness of faith healing. Everyone could agree that 
what the parents did was abnormal to many Canadians, and indeed to many 
Christians.  But ‘abnormal’ is not necessarily the marked and substantial departure 
needed for a criminal conviction. Is it really so unreasonable to consider alternative 
approaches to the medical establishment? Surely, many reasonable people mistrust 
medical science in different ways. And the rejoinder could be that anyone who so 
comprehensively ignores (almost welcomes!) the possibility of death is well beyond 
embracing ‘alternative medicine.’ This isn’t about the freedom to explore 
alternatives to the medical conventions; it’s about being wilfully blind to the 
prospects of death. 
But, is it really so obvious that the common sense objectivist would have 
foreseen the death of his or her child? Can the claim be made that no one with 
common sense relies on faith when science is not in doubt? The trier of fact may 
well be interested in empirical evidence speaking to efficacy of at least some of the 
relevantly similar alternatives to conventional medicine. The ‘alternative’ being 
considered is ‘faith’ or ‘prayer’—or what the person of common sense might not so 
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charitably call ‘nothing’. Is there any evidence for the reasonable person to think of 
prayer or faith as better or more useful than doing nothing? 
Contemporary society acknowledges that that science, as much as law, is a 
discipline in which impartiality and objectivity are cherished values. No one needs 
to ascribe to the fiction that scientists are perfectly objective or perfectly impartial, 
but none the worse for that, the social and public discipline of science is practiced 
with sufficient impartiality and objectivity to promote considerable confidence in its 
findings. If one was going to conceive of the reasonable person to whom a faith 
healer should be compared, one could easily envision a parent committed to 
epistemic norms that favour reliance on the public, empirical world, over and 
against the world of private intuition or superstition. The impartial, objective, 
‘common sense’ person shouldn’t be impartial about evidence; she should be partial 
toward good evidence and discriminatory and prejudiced against bad evidence. 
How might a reasonable person, capable of being persuaded by empirical evidence, 
be expected to act in the Tutton’s circumstances? One of the crucial facts to be 
considered is this: the Tuttons and other faith healers like them are deeply 
committed to the belief that ‘prayer works’.  Again, the reasonable person needn’t 
share this belief, but she does need to make an assessment of the reasonableness of 
that belief. We shouldn’t forget, this belief is directly responsible for the death of a 
human being. How might someone partial toward good evidence think about the 
faith healer’s course of action?  
First, their ‘course of action’ needs careful description, particularly in 
relation to their belief that prayer works. Some might want to point to the 
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sociological facts that billions of people around the world and throughout history 
have lived with something like the belief that ‘prayer works’. In this way, people like 
the Tuttons or the Shippys are indistinguishable from most of world’s population. 
Shouldn’t this be enough to cast sufficient doubt on the crucial claim that they are 
criminally unreasonable? Here again, we do well to consider the distinction between 
the descriptive and the evaluative. It is a simple fact that people from all over the 
globe, belonging to all manner of religious tradition, routinely engage in something 
like prayer or meditation. Prayer is hardly a marked departure from normal human 
behaviour. Even a non-religious trier of fact in a Holmesian mood should concede 
that prayer brings inner tranquility and equanimity to billions. Bertrand Russell 
would agree! This desire for existential solace is, after all, a part of our common 
human experience. As such, there’s nothing wrong with this. But, of course it is not 
prayer as a general human phenomenon that should be of concern to the trier of fact 
in cases like Tutton or Shippy. Rather, the type of prayer—indeed, the type of 
religious practice—should be the sensible unit of investigation. The reasonable 
person in this situation should not be willing to give all prayer the same harmless 
gloss. The Tuttons, after all, engaged in something very few people around the globe 
would endorse. Conversely, faith healers endorse a type of religious orientation they 
know few religious people engage in. The faith healer—to say little of the 
Pentecostal snake handler—would quote the following passage from the Epistle of 
James: 
So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead. But someone will say, “You have 
faith and I have works.” Show me your faith apart from your works, and I by 
my works will show you my faith. (James 2:17-18 NIV). 
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What really distinguishes true believers from the great unwashed is the willingness 
to, rather colloquially, put their money where their mouth is. The evidentiary point 
to be drawn out is that faith healers are prepared to act in ways the rest of the 
religious world will only pay lip service to. This rather more nominal faith 
(explained in the previous chapter) is ‘dead’ because it consists merely in the 
expression of words. The actions that accompany nominal faith are typically ones 
that are not overly onerous or inconvenient to the believer. True believers prove 
their faith by their works and they know their works are extraordinary in 
comparison to their more moderate, more nominal ‘brethren’. Faith healers attempt 
to reify beliefs or concepts other religious believers will only ascent to nominally.192 
Many religious people make propositional claims about their faith, but their lives—
their actions—with minor exceptions, are indistinguishable from those of 
unbelievers.193 And this is precisely the complaint amongst fundamentalists. “Show 
me your faith apart from your works, and I by my works will show you my faith.” 
                                                        
 
192  A particularly vivid example of the claim I’m making can be drawn from John M. Duffey, Lessons 
Learned: The Anneliese Michel Exorcism  (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2011). Michel was a 
twenty-three-year old German woman who died in 1976 from complications related to a series of 
botched exorcisms. She died, apparently, from malnutrition and dehydration. Her parents and the 
officiating priest were convicted of negligent homicide in Germany. Duffy argues in the book that she 
suffered from mental illness and her malady was misidentified as demonic possession when she first 
suffered an epileptic seizure at the age of sixteen. Many North American Christians would claim to 
believe in evil. Some would reify that belief and claim to believe in the existence of a real Satan and 
real demons. Tragically, people are killed in exorcism rituals by people holding the belief that ‘evil’ 
can be extracted as though it were a tumour. They believe in demons the way reasonable people 
believe in viruses.  See also Faith Karimi and Joe Sutton, “Police: Maryland Mom kills two of her 
children during attempted exorcism,” CNN, accessed June 1, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/19/justice/maryland-exorcism-deaths/.  Zakieya  Avery, twenty-
eight years old, stabbed her four children with a knife, claiming to be removing demons. The two 
youngest died, while the two older children survived their injuries. 
 
193 Scripture contains many requirements and prohibitions that most Christians ignore and explain 
away. I Corinthians 6 prohibits lawsuits amongst believers.  St. Paul asks, “Why not rather be 
wronged? Why not rather be cheated?” (1 Cor 6:7) There’s really no evidence that Christians are less 
151 
 
 
This is not, parenthetically, a criticism of moderate or nominally religious 
believers, as if to accuse them of some deep hypocrisy. Of course, fundamentalists 
think moderates or nominalists are hypocrites, but that’s not the point either. Let’s 
accept that all religious belief is prima facie sincere. The fact that there are religious 
hypocrites in the world in no way should impugn the sincerity of all. Religious 
people have sincere beliefs about reality and these beliefs are every bit as sincere as 
those of naturalists, atheists, or agnostics. Everyone who has beliefs about the world 
think their beliefs are in the neighbourhood of true. This isn’t interesting. But, the 
vast majority of religious believers, and of course common sense objectivists, do not 
have de re beliefs about prayer’s ability to heal a deadly disease independent of 
medical science. On the contrary, most non-fundamentalists have de re beliefs about 
medical science. Real medicine has publically observable physical properties and as 
such it is perceived by reasonable people. The fact that people can hold mistaken 
beliefs about particular medications does not count against this claim. It doesn’t 
matter, either, that some people mistake sugar (or placebo) for medicine or one pill 
for another. The point is that medicine is perceivable and impressionable 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
litigious than any other group of people. Divorce in most circumstances is forbidden and re-marriage 
is always forbidden except when a spouse dies (Matthew 19:3-9). Nevertheless, divorce rates and 
remarriage rates within Christendom are not appreciably different from secular benchmarks. This 
distinction is not foreign to the Muslim world either. Take the very controversial issue of Jihad. 
Literally, Jihad means “to struggle” or “to resist”. Many within the Muslim community accept that the 
‘call to Jihad’ is a call to inner, spiritual struggle, to align one’s life with the dictates of Islam and the 
will of Allah. Others believe that Jihad entails actually taking up arms and literally struggling against 
and showing resistance to infidels. Jihad in this instance is reified in ways that alienates many 
Muslims. Moderate Muslims who believe in the ‘inner struggle’ of Jihad alone believe sincerely 
enough in what they think is the real Jihad. The point is that fundamentalists try to reify beliefs in 
ways that moderates will not. This can lead to the criticism that moderates believe only in words, not 
in actions, because their words are indistinguishable from inaction and unbelief. 
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simpliciter.194 The person of common sense thinks faith healers have unwarranted 
de re beliefs. The faith healer might as well believe he or she can consume or ingest 
the number ‘7’. Many religious people ‘have faith’ in prayer in a general, nominal 
sense, but they’re not confused about the distinction between their belief in prayer 
and their belief in medicine. For the vast majority of religious people it is not a 
choice between the ‘red pill’ on the one hand, and the ‘blue pill’ on the other. Most 
religious people would be happy to take both ‘pills’, as it were, believing that one 
doesn’t undermine the other. But faith healers are not ‘most’ religious people. They 
trust prayer and they trust their faith in the way that most others trust a pill—or at 
least they try to. Most people think this approach to health care violates common 
sense. 
But does common sense betray us here? Might there be actual reasons to 
think that the faith healer’s de re beliefs about prayer are justified? Let’s consider 
prayer more closely. Petitionary or intercessory prayer is practiced intentionally in 
the mind of a believer.195 This sort of prayer petitions God for something.196 The 
                                                        
 
194 Someone could go to a psychologist for counselling and have her physical health, not just mental 
health improve as a result. But the patient wouldn’t be confused about what the psychologist offered. 
The counsel may have worked as ‘good’ as medicine, but counsel was not medicine. The psychologist 
offered words, ideas that the patient was able to voluntarily internalize. Perception has nothing to do 
with this process, except trivially in terms of “hearing” or “seeing” the counsellor. Conversely, no 
patient who takes medicine needs to understand anything about how or why this physical property 
interacts with the body for the medicine to be effective. John Locke (1632-1704) famously 
distinguished between “qualities” and “ideas”.  Objects in the physical world have primary and 
secondary qualities, i.e., powers in things that make them real and perceivable. Ideas don’t have these 
‘powers’; ideas are the result of these qualities. 
 
195 There is a technical distinction between petitionary prayer and intercessory prayer. Petitionary 
prayer, in contrast to worship, asks or petitions God for some particular outcome of interest to the 
petitioner. The petitioner might pray for some personal need, say, to be cured of cancer. Intercessory 
prayer also involves petitioners, but the petitioner is asking for God to act on behalf of someone else. 
One does not technically intercede for oneself; one intercedes on behalf of others. 
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words express a desire, a hope, an expectation for some particular thing or outcome. 
Is there any reason to think that people who pray get the thing or the outcome they 
asked for? If empirical research seemed to support the efficacy of intercessory 
prayer then there would be reasonable doubt that medical science was the only 
game in town. Our study so far has assumed that faith healing often ends in disaster, 
primarily because we’re looking at the legal fallout of the fatalities it causes. No one 
doubts though, that there may well be occasions in which very devout people pray—
and maybe only pray—and no one dies. If there was some evidence or some 
empirical studies showing that intercessory prayer actually had some positive 
correlation with desired health outcomes perhaps the reasonable person need not 
take such a dim view of the prayer-only ‘pill’ that faith healers take. Let’s consider 
some of the evidence available.    
A Mayo Clinic study published in 2001, followed 799 coronary surgery 
patients for twenty six weeks following their discharge from hospital.197 The control 
group was not prayed for while each member of the experimental group was prayed 
for at least once a week by five different intercessors. The intercessors didn’t know 
the patients and the patients didn’t know the intercessors. Further, the patients did 
not know they were being prayed for. The operationalized end-points were death, 
cardiac arrest, and rehospitalisation for related symptoms, etc.  No measureable 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
196 The request is analogous to going to a psychologist and looking to improve one’s over-all health. 
The improved health could be discerned de re. The big difference is that petitionary prayer is like 
going to a psychologist and privately asking the professional to improve the health of someone not in 
the room.  
 
197 J.M. Aviles, S.E. Whelan, and D.A. Hernke, "Intercessory prayer and cardiovascular disease 
progression in a coronary care unit population: A randomized controlled trial," Mayo Clinic 
Proceedings 76, no. 12 (2001). 
154 
 
 
difference was found between the control group and the experimental group, 
leading to the obvious conclusion that "intercessory prayer had no significant effect 
on medical outcomes after hospitalization in a coronary care unit.” 
 In 2006, after a larger, more refined study, Harvard researchers, Herbert 
Benson and Jeffrey Dusek, published the results of a multi-year study they led on the 
recovery results in 1,802 heart bypass patients. Their research question asked 
specifically if “intercessory prayer or knowledge of receiving it would influence 
recovery after heart bypass surgery.” The patients were divided roughly into three 
equal sized groups. One group (G1) was told they may or may not receive prayer 
and did receive prayer; the second group (G2) was told they may or may not receive 
prayer but did not receive prayer; the third group (G3) was told they would receive 
prayer and did receive prayer. The prayer participants (i.e., intercessors) were 
solicited from two Roman Catholic groups and one Protestant, and all intercessors 
were asked to commit to the duration of the multi-year study. Intercessors used 
only first names and last initial for patients and no photographs were supplied. In 
terms of the content of the prayer, intercessors were encouraged to pray in their 
own manner but were instructed to explicitly include the following phrase: “for a 
successful surgery with a quick, healthy recovery and no complications.” 
Operationalized end-points included thirty-day mortality, major complications, 
rehospitalisation, etc.  Results that fit the operational descriptors occurred in 52% 
of those who received prayer (G1), 51% of those who did not receive it (G2), and 
59% of patients who knew they would receive prayers (G3). The G3 results were 
given competing explanations. Maybe the patients suffered a kind of ‘performance 
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anxiety’—the additional stress that comes from a sense of being watched. Or, 
perhaps a ‘nocebo effect’ had taken place—the opposite of a placebo effect—
wherein participants suffer negative results from what is, in reality, no active 
stimulus.198 In other words, perhaps the patients found it unnerving to know they 
were being prayed for, as if to infer they must truly be vulnerable to complications. 
While this slightly negative finding captured the delightful attention of vocal atheists 
like Richard Dawkins199 and Michael Shermer200, the more scientific and more banal 
finding shouldn’t be ignored: namely, that intercessory prayer did not seem to have 
any positive influence on physical health. If one advanced the scientific hypothesis 
that taking the religious ‘pill’ was just like taking no pill at all, the study would have 
done nothing to falsify it. 
Two independent meta-analyses of intercessory prayer are also worthy of 
mention. A 2006 meta-analysis looked at fourteen scientific, peer reviewed studies 
of the effects of intercessory prayer in medical settings and this rather blunt 
conclusion was drawn by the three researchers:  
There is no scientifically discernible effect for IP (intercessory prayer) as 
assessed in controlled studies. Given that the IP literature lacks a theoretical 
or theological base and has failed to produce significant findings in controlled 
                                                        
 
198 Herbert  Benson, Jeffrey A. Dusek, and et al, "Study of the Therapeutic Effects of Intercessory 
Prayer (STEP) in cardiac bypass patients: a multicenter randomized trial of uncertainty and certainty 
of receiving intercessory prayer," American Heart Journal 151, no. 4 (2006). 
 
199 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion  (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 87-88. 
 
200 Michael Shermer, "Prayer & Healing: The Verdict is in and the Results are Null,"  ESkeptic(2006). , 
accessed June 1, 2015, http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/06-04-05/ 
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trials, we recommend that further resources not be allocated to this line of 
research. 201 
 
David Hodge in his 2007 meta-analysis is slightly more conciliatory and provisional, 
but no more optimistic that studying prayer will yield positive results. He concludes:  
Thus, at this junction in time, the results might be considered inconclusive. 
Indeed, perhaps the most certain result stemming from this study is the 
following: the findings are unlikely to satisfy either proponents or opponents 
of intercessory prayer.”202 
 
Hodge seems somewhat dubious of the American Psychological Association’s 
designation of intercessory prayer as an experimental intervention. It bespeaks a 
kind of entity that is in no way comparable to other medical and health related 
interventions. Like faith healers, the APA considers faith healing as a kind of “thing” 
too. At any rate, prayer is defined clearly enough for some in the scientific 
community to think it possible to study. But on that account, one would also have to 
include voodoo, witchcraft, astrology, etc. The APA is in no way endorsing any of 
these experimental interventions, but they clearly are saying they’re within the 
realm of scientific investigation.203 
                                                        
 
201 K.S. Masters, G.I. Spielsman, and J.T. Goodson, "Are There Demonstrable Effects of Distant 
Intercessory Prayer? A Meta-analytic Review," Annals of Behaviourial Medicine 32, no. 1 (2006): 26. 
 
202 David R. Hodge, "A Systematic Review of the Empirical Literature on Intercessory Prayer " 
Research on Social Work Practice 17, no. 2 (2007): 185. 
 
203 There are many—and even some atheists—who deny that prayer is amenable to genuine 
scientific investigation, especially with randomized clinical trials.  See Hector Avalos, "Can Science 
Prove that Prayer Works?," Free Inquiry 17(1997). There is simply no way of controlling for the 
‘contaminating’ presence of other prayer. Churches and individual Christians routinely pray for the 
world’s sick in both general and specific ways. In this sense, prayer cannot possibly function as a 
testable experimental intervention. While this objection makes perfectly good sense from a 
methodological perspective, an obvious point shouldn’t be ignored. If prayer is the thing being 
studied, and we assume that prayer has a kind of ubiquitous presence in the world, then entirely 
‘natural’ and science-dependent results should indicate even more clearly that intercessory prayer 
has no observable causal effect on the world. The theistic response to this claim might be that we 
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A prosecuting attorney might present these studies as evidence of what a 
reasonable person could think about the potential utility or efficacy of prayer.  
Obviously faith healers couldn’t be faulted for not knowing the results of scientific 
studies like these, but this is the kind of evidence that might be appealing to certain 
triers of fact who think a reasonable person should care about how the world seems 
to work. These kinds of studies could confirm the intuitions of some triers of fact 
that think an objective person takes an objective view of the world. Again, most 
triers of fact would already be roundly dubious of faith healing for themselves and 
their loved ones, but these kinds of studies can highlight the profound risks of 
trusting in something for which there is not a shred of objectively available  
evidence.204 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
have no idea how much the world benefits from the intercessory prayer that already occurs. Perhaps 
more ominously, neither do we know what evils may await if humans stopped praying. These are 
logical possibilities—and they couldn’t be tested, nor could they be falsified. Nevertheless, this line of 
reasoning falls under the thesis of “sceptical theism” and it is becoming all the rage amongst Christian 
apologists defending the rationality of belief in an omni-benevolent deity against the countervailing 
evidence of presumed suffering. See Michael Bergmann, "Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New 
Evidential Argument from Evil," Nous 35, no. 2 (2001); Ian Wilks, "Skeptical Theism and Empirical 
Unfalsifiability," Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2009). 
 
204 There are many studies indicating positive effects that prayer has on the person praying. When a 
person prays for anything, a person’s own sense of wellbeing improves in psychological and even 
some physical respects. (See Luciano Bernardi et al., "Effect of rosary prayer and yoga mantras on 
autonomic cardiovascular rhythms: Comparative study," British Medical Journal 323, no. 7327 
(2001).; See also, Leslie Francis et al., "Prayer and psychological health: A study among sixth-form 
pupils attending Catholic and Protestant schools in Northern Ireland," Mental Health, Religion and 
Culture 11, no. 1 (2008).) The conclusion that prayer or meditation has some measurable positive 
effect on the person praying is hardly surprising. Few reasonable people today doubt that ‘self-talk’ 
and one’s psychological disposition has some determinative influence on the perceived quality of 
one’s life. It’s easy to see why the overwhelming subjective benefits of first-person prayer 
experienced throughout human history would encourage the general human belief that prayer can 
effect changes to things outside of ourselves as well. A bit of contemporary common sense, partial to 
careful observations about how the world works, could warrant a different conclusion: “knowing that 
I’m talking to myself and perceiving its benefits shouldn’t be confused with believing that I’m talking 
to someone external to me and thinking this person will do as I ask.” Of course, religious people of 
even nominal standing hold out hope that prayer somehow mysteriously goes some distance in 
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 The trier of fact might conclude that holding religious beliefs in one’s mind 
need not be a matter of public consideration, until that is, private beliefs show up in 
the real world with catastrophic results. Then they’re no longer merely private or a 
merely a matter of private interest. When there’s no risk of harm, say, when the 
Catholic participates in the Eucharist, then believing religion to be ‘real’ will be 
perfectly acceptable and constitutionally protected. Indeed, reasonable people 
might all agree, pace Christopher Hitchens, that wide-spread religious belief is 
highly beneficial.205 But, if one has a public duty to protect the life and safety of 
another and there are proven means for doing this then it seems consummately 
unreasonable to rely on something that looks for all the world like “you have done 
nothing.”  
Let’s consider one last time the two studies involving coronary patients.  
While everyone wants the patients to recover well and experience no complications, 
they were not offered a choice between real medicine with pharmaceutical 
properties and real religion consisting only of prayer. Every patient was given the 
best science had to offer. Of course, no reasonable person would consent to a 
randomized clinical trial promising much less than every known medical advantage. 
Some patients were given the religious “advantage” in addition. Researchers—
themselves, reasonable people—would trust that offering prayer would do no harm, 
but neither would withholding it. If patients suffered complications from not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
getting outside the self, making metaphysical contact with the “Other” or the nameless “Ground of 
Being.”  
 
205 Hitchens was not prepared to believe that religion served any good public or private function that 
couldn’t be equally well-secured with sober atheistic reflection. See Christopher Hitchens, God is Not 
Great: How Religion Poisons Everything  (Toronto, ON: McLelland & Stewart, 2007). 
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receiving prayer, no sensible person (e.g., no one in G3) would blame prayer. The 
difficulties arise if people hope and expect to avoid complications and people choose 
‘nothing’ or something as reliable as ‘nothing’. No sensible person would choose 
‘nothing’, and not even the most reckless researcher would encourage it. If the 
medical world would have no business taking these kinds of obscene risks with a 
patient’s life and well-being, it should be difficult for a reasonable person to see why 
it could be any more permissible for a parent to do so with his or her own child.206 If 
the trier of fact thinks the reasonable person has some familiarity with the moral 
obligations of the public healthcare system, then it is rather easy to see that the faith 
healers like the Tuttons or the Shippys quite objectively “show wanton or reckless 
disregard for another’s life or safety.” If a trier of fact says to herself that we should 
get our objective standard of reasonableness from the objective context of public 
health, where no one would ever dream of taking unnecessary death-defying risks 
with people to whom duties of care are owed, then it’s not unreasonable to conclude 
that people who do take these risks depart markedly from what a reasonable parent 
does in similar circumstances. 
                                                        
 
206 In bioethics literature the principle being referred to is “equipoise”. Though there are 
controversies and disagreements about the ethical implications, the central concern is over the 
permissibility of offering to patients in a randomized clinical trial (RCT) an experimental 
intervention that the researcher has reason to believe is less effective or entails higher risk than an 
alternative. Some think that the physician qua researcher has epistemic responsibilities to the 
medical community to promote knowledge and understanding of human well-being and that this 
responsibility must include some minimal risks to individual patient care. On the other hand, those 
who think the physician qua caregiver owes the highest duty to her patient, believe experimentation 
beyond a certain level of equipoise (i.e., clinical uncertainty or doubt) is never justified. Once 
evidence is decisive that a treatment or intervention is less effective or imposes greater risks to 
patients, it is believed that the RCT should be discontinued before harm or less benefit results. See 
Don Marquis, "How to Resolve an Ethical Dilemma Concerning Randomized Clinical Trials," The New 
England Journal of Medicine 341, no. 9 (1999).  Even bioethicists who take opposing views on 
equipoise would agree that there is more than sufficient evidence to disregard faith healing as 
anything resembling a reasonable experimental ‘intervention or treatment’. 
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In this chapter I have argued that a trier of fact could legitimately be 
persuaded to think of the reasonable person along the lines of what I have called the 
common sense objectivist. A prosecutor could encourage the trier of fact to take a 
neutral position on competing conceptions of the good life, but not to be neutral 
with respect to what Holmes called the “teachings of common experience.” The 
reasonable person knows that these are the epistemological commitments that must 
bind people in law. Additionally, evidence was provided that triers of fact could well 
find relevant to cases involving faith healers. While the scientific investigation of the 
efficacy of prayer is a controversial topic, there are really no good publically 
verifiable reasons for reasonable people to believe that intercessory prayer has any 
measurable causal effects in the world outside themselves. Though religious faith and 
prayer may be very useful and existentially meaningful to individual believers, there 
is no good reason for someone to ignore proven methods of healthcare in favour of 
relying on the deliverances of religious commitment—not when a child’s life is at 
stake. Consequently, a trier of fact could regard what the faith healer does as 
showing wanton or reckless disregard for another’s life or safety and that, 
furthermore, the departure from the reasonable person is marked and substantial. 
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Chapter 8: Faith Healers Culpably Get Relationships Wrong 
 
 
 We just finished considering the view of common sense objectivity 
characterized by the concern a trier of fact could have to get the world or reality 
right, or at any rate, less harmfully wrong. On that particular view, a case was 
presented that faith healers show, beyond reasonable doubt, wanton or reckless 
disregard for their children’s life or safety. The fundamental explanation for why 
they show disregard for their children’s lives is that they show reckless, death-
defying disregard for reality and for how the world predictably works. Compared to 
the reasonable person of common sense, faith healers get the world horribly 
wrong—and they get the world wrong by intentionally violating the teachings of 
common experience.  
It’s possible, however, that a trier of fact could think it misleading that faith 
healers are culpable because they get reality wrong. One might agree that faith 
healers seem to get the facts of the world wrong—even horribly wrong—yet 
disagree with the view that proof of criminal negligence follows from this. 
Alternatively, one could argue that being attentive to the teachings of common 
experience means that a reasonable person is obligated to getting one’s relationships 
right and in the right priority. On this view faith healers are not found in violation of 
criminal negligence because they show reckless disregard for objective reality, but 
because they show reckless disregard for human beings. This explanation is, not 
insignificantly, a great deal closer to the actual language of the criminal negligence 
statute; we ought not show wanton or reckless disregard for the lives and safety of 
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others. The Criminal Code provision doesn’t say anything about showing wanton or 
reckless disregard for science or for empiricism or for evidence. On this alternative 
view, then, it isn’t a crime to ‘get reality wrong’, even if getting it wrong results in 
the absurd loss of life. Rather, the criminal wrongdoing is attributable to getting 
one’s moral commitments wrong or failing to order one’s relational priorities in 
such a way that loss of life or risk of loss of life predictably occurs. One could agree 
in some sense with Oliver Wendell Holmes (as discussed in chapter 7) that the 
teachings of common experience are still binding, but say that the teachings of 
common experience should orient us rightly, one to the other. Let’s turn to this 
alternative account of what makes faith healers blameworthy in the deaths of their 
children. As with the previous chapter, we will begin with a theoretical explanation 
relevant from a jurisprudential perspective and then we’ll turn to the practical 
implications for triers of fact.  
Whereas the theoretical basis for common sense objectivity came from the 
now classical work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, I will employ some of the ideas of 
English jurist, Jeremy Horder, to animate this alternative conception of the 
reasonable person. Perhaps of interest to some who still think criminal negligence 
warrants a subjective test or more subjective consideration for fault, Horder’s 
conception of gross negligence, the English equivalent to criminal negligence, 
accommodates both subjectivists and objectivists.207 Horder says, 
… gross negligence has always been a broad enough notion to encompass a 
state of mind that cannot be captured by any simplistic distinction between 
                                                        
 
207 Jeremy Horder, "Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability," University of Toronto Law Journal 
47(1997). 
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advertence or inadvertence. That state of mind is ‘indifference’. Properly 
understood, indifference can be an attractive mens rea term to employ even 
where crimes invovle actions mala in se.208 
 
He goes on: 
…  the very fact that the notion of indifference defies categorization as purely 
advertence or inadvertence-based, means that its use poses a signficant 
challenge to stalwart defenders of unadulterated subjectivism in criminal 
law. . . . Indifference, however, is only one conception of the form gross 
negligence may take…  [A] more clearly inadvertence-based conception, 
focused on a great departure from an acceptable standard of conduct, may 
also be legitimately employed in a narrow range of cases.209 
 
The narrow range of cases that Horder has in mind is, relevant to faith healing 
deaths, where a positive duty has been neglected. Horder elucidates case history 
showing the common law’s longstanding reliance on two forms of penal negligence. 
One illustrative nineteenth-century case tells of a ‘quack’ medical doctor, Markuss, 
charged with gross negligence in the death of a patient.210 Markuss, who ran an 
herbal remedy store, prescribed a little known seed to treat a patient suffering from 
a cold. The presiding trial judge, Willis J, offered to the jury two different ways in 
which a negligent doctor could be criminally liable: 
Every person who dealt with the health of others was dealing with their lives, 
and every person who so dealt was bound to use reasonable care, and not to 
be grossly negligent. Gross negligence might be of two kinds; in one sense, 
where a man, for instance, went hunting and neglected his patient, who dies 
in consequence. Another sort of gross negligence consisted in rashness, 
where a person was not sufficiently skilled in dealing with dangerous 
medicines which should be carefully used, or the properties of which he was 
ignorant, or how to administer a proper dose. A person who with ignorant 
rashness, and without proper skill in his profession, used such a dangerous 
                                                        
 
208 Ibid., 495. 
 
209 Ibid. 
 
210 Reg v. Markuss (1864), 4 F. &F. 358. Cited in ibid., 497. 
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medicine acted with gross negligence…. A person who took a leap in the dark 
in the administration of medicines was guilty of gross negligence.211 
 
Horder agrees that contemporary criminal negligence can still come in two forms 
but disagrees with the way Willis J distinguished them. The first form, with which he 
has no disagreement, is the conception of ‘indifference’—as shown by the doctor 
who culpably neglects his patients when he knowingly owes a duty of care. Willis J 
identifies the second form of criminal negligence as ‘ignorant rashness’ of the sort 
shown by the sincere but otherwise incompetent doctor. Horder argues that Willis J 
confuses a manifestation or instance of a form with a form itself. Ignorant rashness 
is not, contra Willes J, a form of criminal negligence; rather, the form is a marked 
departure from a standard, and the confident incompetence showed by Markuss is 
simply one way of departing substantially from the standard.  
 Horder thinks Canada’s statutory use of “wanton and reckless disregard” is a 
serviceable conceptual analogue to indifference. Conveniently for this current study, 
he even weighs in on Tutton and argues that both forms of fault are legitimate 
routes to criminal liability and that Canada’s Supreme Court could have avoided 
some of its confusion had they interpreted ‘wanton and reckless disregard’ more in 
terms of his conception of indifference—presumably because it widens the scope of 
subjective fault from a positive mental state (presumably like recklessness) to 
something more broadly mindful, and thereby reduces the gap that the Supreme 
Court failed to bridge between a subjective and objective interpretation of the 
criminal negligence statute. Horder writes: 
                                                        
 
211 Ibid., 498. 
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Had the Supreme Court understood ‘wanton and reckless disregard’ in 
accordance with what is submitted is its more natural meaning, indifference, 
then the controversy over its understanding might have been averted. For … 
indifference has a necessary subjective element built into it, even when it is 
inferred from the conduct …  That subjective element is not actual foresight 
of possible harm, but a ‘couldn’t care less’ attitude to the causing of harm.’212  
 
The culpable attitude is not reducible to some specific state of belief; if so, it would 
be the strong version of subjectivism that Horder has elsewhere rejected.213 Rather, 
Horder says 
The subjective element in indifference lies, then, not in any necessary 
advertence to possible harmful consequences, but … in an uncaring attitude 
towards the victim’s relevant protected interests. Indifference is thus 
concerned not with simple (subjective) cognitive state of mind, but with a 
complex (subjective) affective state of mind.214 
 
Obviously enough, the success of Horder’s distinction between simple cognitive 
states and complex affective states is predicated on the distinction between beliefs 
and attitudes. We will want to see if it is at all conceivable that faith healers could 
show this attitude of indifference, but in fidelity to Horder we need first to examine 
how he develops indifference in more standard negative rights violations such as 
rape or sexual assault.   
To begin, he distinguishes between weaker and stronger versions of 
indifference and correlates them with concern for “agent-neutral” and “agent-
relative” values or interests. “The weaker view” says Horder, “centres on the notion 
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213 "Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea." 
 
214 "Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability," 501. 
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of ‘disrespect’ for the victim’s interests.”215 The practically reasonable person is 
always sufficiently attentive to the agent-neutral interests of those around him, 
while not obviously being blind to one’s own perhaps powerful agent-relative 
interests and desires. The weakly indifferent person is practically unreasonable 
insofar as he is not sufficiently attentive to the agent-neutral interests of those with 
whom he is interacting and consequently overrides those interests in pursuit of his 
own agent-relative desires. On the other hand, the strongly indifferent person may 
or may not be aware of the agent-neutral interests of those around him—it makes 
no difference because he is entirely committed to his agent-relative desires.216 In 
terms of rape, Horder presumes the weakly indifferent person might have been and 
could have been alerted to the agent-neutral interests of his victim had her non-
consent been expressed more sharply. The way it was communicated certainly 
would have been obvious enough for anybody with practical reason, leaving no 
doubt that the accused is at fault. The strongly indifferent person, however, could 
not have been distracted from his agent-relative desires because of his complete 
indifference to agent-neutral reasons that ought to have deterred him.217  
                                                        
 
215 Ibid., 502. 
 
216 Horder’s precise descriptions is as follows: “So, the weakly indifferent person displays great 
insensitivity to the existence of agent-neutral values generating reasons against his conduct 
grounded in another’s interest, in circumstances where the practically reasonable person would have 
been more alive to the possibility of harm to those interests. … The strongly indifferent person’s 
deficiency of virtue lies in appearing that he would be simply unmoved by agent-neutral values 
giving rise to reasons not to engage in action he wishes to perform. It follows that the strongly 
indifferent person would not have changed the course of his conduct, even if he had come to 
recognize the existence of reasons for action he knows reasonable people would regard as counting 
against that course of conduct.” Ibid., 504. 
 
217  Horder makes oblique reference to the famous Morgan rape case in the UK in which a husband 
persuaded three of his friends to come to his house and have sex with his ‘consenting’ wife. The 
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 Let’s now apply Horder to a Tutton-like faith healing scenario. That there is a 
closer relationship to liability for “quack” medical doctors is completely obvious and 
as such we will consider how “grossly” faith healing parents depart from the norm. 
For now, let’s consider what possibility of finding in the faith healer a ‘couldn’t care 
less’ attitude. At first blush, it’s entirely implausible that faith healing parents show 
the kind of agent-relative indifference shown by, say, a rapist, but let’s consider 
what scrutiny this comparison might bear. Horder describes the grossly negligent 
qua indifferent person generally as being insufficiently “alive” to the possibility that 
another’s agent-neutral interests will be violated or are being violated by his or her 
agent-relative conduct. More precisely, in terms of practical reason, the indifferent 
person has a complex affective attitude (consisting of an amalgam of beliefs, 
feelings, desires, etc.) that blinds the accused to the agent-neutral reasons for not 
acting according to one’s own interests. Let’s now describe without caricature what 
a faith healer’s complex affective attitude might be in the course of dealing with an 
ailing child.  
The parent’s first priority is certainly different from the attitudinal priority of 
a typical parent. Let’s recall Mistake 1 and Mistake 2 from the chapter 6, with 
Mistake 1 being the typical case of a parent treating an ailing child and Mistake 2 
being the Tutton-like experience, where treating the ailing child is a means to some 
other end. In Mistake 1, the parent’s immediate desire—the reason for her action—
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
friends were told by the husband that her expressed non-consent is part of the charade to which 
everyone is a party. Horder believes that the men all showed weak indifference inasmuch as they 
were not sufficiently attentive to the agent-neutral reasons not to act as they did and consequently 
showed culpable disrespect for the woman’s rights and well-being. 
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is to restore the child’s health and well-being. There really is no other end other 
than the restoration and flourishing of the child. But no one should be naïve here. 
We needn’t ascribe any strong altruistic, agent-neutral motive to that end. The 
desire to protect one’s child from harm or risk of death is unapologetically agent-
relative, too. That is, love for a child might be in every parent, but when one’s child is 
in danger no reasonable parent needs to consult one’s agent-neutral duties or 
otherwise reflect on moral principle.218 We do what comes naturally! In other 
words, we don’t need to see the typical parent caring for an ailing child as a heroic 
altruist. The crucial point is that most parental agent-relative interests and desires 
are completely compatible with the child’s agent-neutral interests. Some, 
unfortunately, are not.219 The rapist’s agent-relative interests are paradigmatically 
incompatible with those of his victim, but the faith healer’s agent-relative interest in 
                                                        
 
218 David Hume discusses parental affection in terms of virtue and duty that is quite relevant here. He 
writes: “A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. An action must be virtuous, 
before we can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that 
regard. Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty; but enters into all our reasonings in common life, 
tho’ perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophical terms. We blame a father 
for neglecting his child. Why? because it shews a want of natural affection, which is the duty of every 
parent. Were not natural affection a duty, the care of children cou’d not be a duty; and ’twere 
impossible we cou’d have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring. In this case, 
therefore, all men suppose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty.” David Hume, A 
Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into 
Moral Subject, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2000/1740), 478. 
 
219 In 1995, the SCC brought down a ruling [ B.(R.) v. Ontario Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315.] that had considerable implications for parental rights and the rights of children 
of religious parents. A premature infant, born to JW parents needed blood transfusions, to which the 
parents would not consent. The infant was lawfully made a temporary ward of the state, saving the 
life of the child. The parents brought suit against the Provincial Government, impugning the legal 
provisions that violated their Charter rights, protecting religious freedom and freedom conscience. 
The SCC disagreed and upheld the constitutionality of such provisions, ultimately protecting the lives 
of vulnerable children everywhere in Canada. Parental religious belief could not justify risking the 
life of a child. 
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pursuing an other-worldly system of moral obligations can also be worrisomely 
anti-social in the broad sense of that term. 
Fundamentalists and radical evangelicals who find themselves wanting to 
rely on God’s healing power more than or rather than medical science have often 
been brought to this “complex attitude” not by direct divine commands or explicit 
doctrinal edicts, as is often the case in Christian Science, Scientology, or the 
Jehovah’s Witness sect. In those religious contexts adherents don’t really have a 
voluntary moral choice; their belief system requires certain approaches to, say, 
medicine or blood transfusions. Christian fundamentalists get to faith healing more 
indirectly, through a commitment to the entire Bible as being the ‘inerrant Word of 
God’.220 When confronted with discrepancies or apparent contradictions in the text 
it is assumed that the difficulties are in fact only apparent; the mature believer with 
spiritual ‘eyes to see and ears to hear’ will be able to reconcile and harmonize what 
may seem like inconsistencies. Passages about slavery, for example, are interpreted 
with contemporary sensibilities to describe how, say, employees are to obey their 
employers. There is always some relevant contemporary application, and often the 
application is literal. One of the passages scandalous to the moderate, liberal mind, 
but would also contribute to that complex attitude related to faith healing can be 
found in the following words attributed to Jesus in the Gospel of Luke. Here Jesus is 
teaching a crowd of would-be followers who are considering discipleship:  
                                                        
 
220  “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in 
righteousness, so that the servant of God may be thoroughly equipped for every good work.” 2 
Timothy 3:16-17 (NIV).  
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If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and 
children, brothers and sisters—yes, even their own life—such a person 
cannot be my disciple. And whoever does not carry their cross and follow me 
cannot be my disciple.221  
 
The way this passage gets interpreted for contemporary sensibilities is to soften 
what Jesus meant by “hate.” Surely, says the careful reader of the text, it does not 
mean ‘hate’ in the way one might hate evil, hate turnips, or even hate one’s 
enemies.222 If one should not hate one’s enemies, it surely makes no sense to think 
one must ‘hate’ one’s family! The true believer remembers the ancient 
commandment, “you shall have no other god’s before me” (Exodus 20:3) and 
interprets Jesus’ requirement to “hate” one’s family in the light of properly ordered 
relational priorities. Jesus is apparently saying that it would be wrong for true 
disciples to let anything—even the love of a family member—supplant their love 
and obligation to him. To ‘hate’ one’s family is simply to ensure that one’s overall 
priorities in life are indexed as they ought to be. One cannot be a true disciple and 
simultaneously love anything or anyone more than God. This interpretation of the 
requirement to “hate” is exemplified no more clearly than in the famous Genesis 22 
story where God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, Isaac—the obedience 
through which God ensures what would become Israel’s legacy.223 
                                                        
 
221 Luke 14:26 (NIV). 
 
222 Of course, Christians are called upon to love their enemies. “You have heard that it was said, ‘Love 
your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who 
persecute you…” Matthew 5:43,44 (NIV). 
 
223 “Then God said, ‘Yes, but your wife Sarah will bear you a son, and you will call him Isaac. I will 
establish my covenant with him as an everlasting covenant for his descendants after him.’” (Genesis 
17:19); “The angel of the Lord called to Abraham from heaven a second time and said, ‘I swear by 
myself, declares the Lord, that because you have done this and have not withheld your son, your only 
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Recall, we are looking at a variety of doctrinal teachings that lead collectively 
to the commitment to faith healing. Let’s combine what we’ve seen so far about 
‘hating’ one’s family, valuing obedience to God’s will at any cost, with St. Paul’s very 
clear teaching about the epistemic priorities of the believer. It is worth reciting this 
passage in full: 
For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to 
us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written: “I will destroy 
the wisdom of the wise; the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.” 
Where is the wise person? Where is the teacher of the law? Where is the 
philosopher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 
For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know 
him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to save 
those who believe. Jews demand signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we 
preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, 
but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of 
God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than human 
wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength. Brothers 
and sisters, think of what you were when you were called. Not many of you 
were wise by human standards; not many were influential; not many were of 
noble birth. But God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the wise; 
God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong. God chose the 
lowly things of this world and the despised things—and the things that are 
not —to nullify the things that are, so that no one may boast before him. It is 
because of him that you are in Christ Jesus, who has become for us wisdom 
from God—that is, our righteousness, holiness and redemption. Therefore, as 
it is written: “Let the one who boasts boast in the Lord.”224  
 
In this passage we get the clearest elucidation of the epistemological principles 
bearing upon the Christian mind. The Christian mind on the conservative reading of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
son, I will surely bless you and make your descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and as the 
sand on the seashore. Your descendants will take possession of the cities of their enemies, and 
through your offspring all nations on earth will be blessed, because you have obeyed me.’” (Genesis 
22:16-18). 
   
224 I Corinthians 1:18-31 (NIV). 
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fundamentalists must be autonomous from the standards of the world. St. Paul 
makes this claim even more succinctly in the following: 
Do not conform to the pattern of this world, but be transformed by the 
renewing of your mind. Then you will be able to test and approve what God’s 
will is—his good, pleasing and perfect will.225 
 
Nowhere will the careful reader of scripture find the explicit commandment to 
ignore medical authorities, but if we think about them as expressing the “wisdom of 
the wise” or announcing the “pattern of this world” we can see why the 
fundamentalist would regard medical authorities as ‘Other’ and not to be trusted. 
Nowhere will the careful reader of scripture find the explicit commandment to 
sacrifice one’s child as Abraham was willing to sacrifice Isaac, but if we know that 
our commitment to God supersedes everything—must supersede everything—then 
we can see why fundamentalists would zealously want to prove to God they have 
their priorities right. If we combine the few explicit passages about physical healing 
with the passages we’ve considers above we see how the “complex attitude” of 
affected indifference to one’s child is nurtured over time.226 We could summarize 
the cluster of beliefs leading to the affected indifference in the following way:  
1) God’s Word is true. 
2) The cost of being a disciple of Christ is absolute. 
                                                        
 
225 Romans 12:2 (NIV). 
 
226 The two clearest passages related to healing and true discipleship are the following (referred to in 
the Introduction): “And these signs will accompany those who believe: In my name they will drive 
out demons; they will speak in new tongues; they will pick up snakes with their hands; and when 
they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at all; they will place their hands on sick people, and 
they will get well. (Mark 16:17,18 NIV); “Is anyone among you sick? Let them call the elders of the 
church to pray over them and anoint them with oil in the name of the Lord.  And the prayer offered in 
faith will make the sick person well; the Lord will raise them up. … The prayer of a righteous person 
is powerful and effective.” (James 5:13-16 NIV). 
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3) Ethical norms must be subordinated to obedience to God. 
4) Rationally understanding God’s will is less important than obeying God’s will. 
5) God’s will cannot be understood by outsiders. 
Given this complex array of beliefs and existential commitments, we have in 
fundamentalist evangelicals a cognitive cocktail for death-defying, anti-social 
behaviour.227 The vast majority of Christians around the world might pay lip service 
to some of these beliefs and values, but each belief would die the death of a 
thousand qualifications.228 And this would be the complaint of fundamentalists—
that everyone else compromises their Christian commitment or their religious 
beliefs, except us. 
The claim that a prosecutor could make to the trier of fact is that faith healers 
show wanton or reckless disregard for their children’s life or safety, because they 
show indifference to the priority their children’s lives and safety ought to possess. 
That is, faith healing parents show profound disregard for the conventional, some 
might say ‘natural’, standards of human relationships. Out of respect for liberty 
Liberal societies are reluctant to place positive duties on citizens. But liberals have 
no difficulty in seeing and enforcing positive duties on parents, precisely because of 
                                                        
 
 
228 One noteworthy example of a popular figure who criticizes secularism but would be no friend of 
fundamentalists is the American anti-liberal polemicist, Ann Coulter. In her book, Godless, she writes, 
“The core of Judeo-Christian tradition says that we are utterly and distinctly apart from other species. 
We have dominion over the plants and the animals on Earth. God gave it to us, it’s ours—as stated 
succinctly in the book of Genesis. … Everything liberals believe is in elegant opposition to basic 
Biblical precepts.” Ann Coulter, Godless: The Church of Liberalism  (New York, NY: Crown Forum, 
2006), 4.  If you asked Coulter and millions of other Christians if people should trust in God, they 
would say ‘yes’. Carol and Arthur Tutton would say Coulter and millions of other Christians do not 
truly or sincerely trust in God; they trust in themselves and in their own intellect—something “basic 
Biblical precepts” teach true believers not to do. 
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two closely related considerations. First, liberals would agree that children are 
often—though certainly not always—and integral part of any conception of a good 
life, and if people elect to have children they must also care for them. This is not an 
onerous duty for most reasonable qua ordinary parents. Second, liberals would 
quickly acknowledge that children are both positive and negative rights holders. 
That is, they are owed duties of care, typically from their parents, and they are owed 
negative duties of non-interference from everyone including their parents. When 
parents choose to ignore social and natural convention and put religious values 
above the lives of their children, the rights of children are displaced. The political 
and moral conventions of society serve to maintain, perhaps amongst other things, 
the place of children within the family unit. Now it’s an open question even amongst 
philosophers whether or not children have a positive right to the love and affection 
of their parents. It’s an open question because it’s not obvious anyone has a right to 
love or affection and, more importantly, rights should be enforceable and who on 
earth could enforce the duty of love? What can be enforced, though, is the duty a 
parent has not to show wanton or reckless disregard for a child’s life and safety. 
When a child dies and this death can be traced back to a complex attitude of affected 
indifference on the part of the parent then criminal negligence is certainly 
discernible. Faith healing practices recklessly undermine relationships that are 
intended to insure that children’s lives and safety are, in fact, not threatened. I’m not 
here suggesting that faith healers intend the death of their children, but from a more 
objective perspective we could agree with the Kantian dictum that ‘to will the end is 
to will the means’. The end that motivates faith healing parents more than anything 
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else is absolute obedience and commitment to God. Adopting this end can result, 
obviously enough, in one’s wilful blindness towards lawful, but also natural duties. 
In most instances, the law can be indifferent to these completely sectarian 
commitments. But when dependent minors die as a result, law enforcement should 
take notice. No reasonable person—indeed, no reasonable parent—so wilfully 
blinds oneself to the duties owed to one’s most precious and vulnerable 
relationship.  
It is very important to hear precisely the criminal complaint being made 
against the faith healer in this regard. One might object that faith healers are being 
impugned on this account for simply being socially unconventional, idiosyncratic or, 
to use the language of the great liberal defender, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), for 
engaging in a rather odd “experiment in living.” I am not saying that every 
philosophical orientation that rejects majoritarian values, or even somehow 
undermines or critiques conventional social values is delusional or susceptible to 
criminal anti-social behaviour. This, after all, is the view that is famously held up for 
criticism whenever first-year philosophy students read Plato’s famous Apology. I’m 
certainly not promoting censure of the next Socrates who wants to question 
convention or tradition. The history of philosophy is replete with thinkers who 
called into question canonical understandings of reason, reality, and social life, and 
were inspirational to a wide variety of revolutionaries. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778) was deeply critical of ‘civilization’ in his famous Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality (1755) and yearned for people to return to a simpler, more ‘natural’ 
way of life. Some might interpret St. Paul and Rousseau as simply offering differing 
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accounts of a similar rejection of ‘civilization’. Certainly, some interesting 
comparisons could be drawn between St. Paul’s rejection of worldly wisdom and 
similar philosophical critiques from thinkers as diverse as Marx, Nietzsche, 
Foucault, and Derrida. The point being drawn out is that liberal democracies have 
reason to be concerned with anyone who combines a critique or suspicion of norms 
that give shape to law, morality, and even social epistemology, with a belief that 
God’s will is, on the contrary, not to be questioned but only obeyed. This orientation 
was not shared by Rousseau, Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault, or Derrida. It certainly was 
not shared by Socrates, the great founder of our critical discipline. 
Admittedly, one philosopher who does explicitly resonate with the Pauline 
rejection of worldly wisdom is nineteenth-century century Danish writer, Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855). In his pseudonymous work, Fear and Trembling(1843), 
Kierkegaard explores, with literary genius, Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac 
in obedience to God’s will. The general interpretation of the work, seen in the 
context of Kierkegaard’s overall literary project, is to criticize the Danish State 
Church (Lutheran ‘in name only’) for its spiritual complacency. Christian faith, 
according to Kierkegaard, requires a “teleological suspension of the ethical.”229 Very 
roughly, this entails transcending the conventional, the orderly, the rational, to 
embrace and believe that which on religious grounds is paradoxically unbelievable. 
Abraham’s angst-filled journey to Mt. Moriah, the place where he would sacrifice the 
symbol of both civility and God’s promise, is the paradigmatic journey toward 
                                                        
 
229 Søren Kierkegaard, "Fear and Trembling," ed. C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006/1843). 
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becoming the true disciple—Kierkegaard’s “Knight of faith.” There is no whistling in 
the dark here. There is no triumphant recitation of Psalm 23. There is only the 
dread, the anxiety, the discomfort of embracing something little rational sense can 
be made of. For Kierkegaard, ease or convenience of belief is a luxury of a leisured 
intellectual class, someone with time to rationalize and compromise. No true 
Christian, he claims, contents oneself with such a stale existence. 
Now, no careful interpreter of Kierkegaard would read him literally. Reading 
Kierkegaard literally and didactically makes as much sense as reading Nietzsche 
literally and didactically. It ought not be done. Kierkegaard simply—if anything he 
ever wrote could be taken ‘simply’—wants the Christian to ask, “how committed am 
I to being a genuine disciple of Christ?”230 Vast numbers of Christian philosophers of 
religion, to say nothing of critical literary theorists, adore the work of Søren 
Kierkegaard. Today, being a radical existentialist Christian means possibly 
sacrificing a life of suburban, middle-class comforts and adopting a life of willing 
simplicity and ascetic values. In all the literature on Christian faith healing, not one 
faith healer ever reported being inspired by the work of Soren Kierkegaard. And I’m 
confident in saying no so-called Christian existentialist would endorse child sacrifice 
or encourage, say, the Tuttons in the course of action they tragically took. It’s one 
thing to live ‘radically’, with a counter-cultural attitude toward the putative evils of 
                                                        
 
230 For a balanced but sympathetic evangelical interpretation of Kierkegaard’s orientation to 
Christian faith see  C. Stephen Evans, "Faith Against Reason: Kierkegaard," in The Phenomenon of 
Religious Faith, ed. Terrence Reynolds (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2005). 
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technological, industrial, and capitalist society. It’s quite another to adopt a view 
whereby all earthly commitments become necessarily supplanted by heavenly ones.  
But, let’s suppose vocal support for faith healing could be found from 
existentialist philosophers, and not just from reading the story of Abraham. Should 
this persuade the trier of fact to agree that reasonable people could actually 
envision this? Of course not! The point is not that somehow faith healers like the 
Tuttons should be looked at differently if we could understand them to be 
venerating a radical Christian philosophical tradition. Just because there have been 
storied historical and literary heroes of the radical Christian faith is no good reason 
to celebrate Christians who try to animate or reanimate those presumed heroes in 
the present day. Just because a thief can say he was inspired by the story of Robin 
Hood is no good reason to excuse his crimes. Just because a freedom-fighting 
terrorist can say he was inspired by the actual life of Che Guevara is no good reason 
to excuse his crimes. The big picture is that on liberal grounds we can defend the 
rights of people to take some radical risks with experiments in living. If people want 
to fantasize about being a modern day Robin Hood, or modern day Che Guevara, or 
even a modern day Abraham, that’s entirely their business—until their fantasies 
encroach upon lives and safety of real people. And if the criminal law were brought 
to bear upon such individuals, no one could accuse the state of heavy-handed 
censorship of the unconventional. 
 So, we see that a commitment to faith healing in this disordered moral and 
epistemic context does not necessarily emerge from a singular doctrinal 
requirement. Nor is it in compliance with one simple commandment. Rather, the 
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propositional belief “I should trust God with my child’s life” is nested within a more 
general and basic belief that “my trust in God should be absolute.” Drawing the 
deductive inference to trust God with one’s child is a mere application of logic.231 My 
child is not different from my finances, and my job, and my relationships. Given the 
internal logic of the fundamentalist, it is perfectly understandable that the true 
believer, such as Carol Tutton, would come to believe she was given a vision and 
that God spoke to her about Christopher’s ailment. If confronted with doubt or 
psychological dissonance, it would not be surprising that the parents would reject 
worldly convention and persist in their beliefs. They knew from scripture that ‘real 
wisdom’ looks, literally, for all the world like foolishness. It is entirely predictable 
that they would have regarded their own doubt as a reason to persist in their chosen 
course of action. Doubt is to be banished and the only way to do this is to act as 
though one believes.232 And so a child dies. 
 Does this represent a criminal attitude of affected indifference? When this 
‘other-worldly’ orientation to life results in death do we have the grounds for a 
                                                        
 
231 The syllogistic argument would go as follows:  1) I should trust God with all aspects of my life. 2) 
My child’s life is an aspect of my life. 3) Therefore, I should trust God with my child’s life. 
 
232 This is a form of religious praxis, made famous by Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) in his famous 
‘Wager’. After all the calculations about costs and benefits of belief and unbelief, the prospective 
believer may still find himself unable to believe as he desires. Pascal said famously: “But understand 
at least your incapacity to believe, since your reason leads you to belief and yet you cannot believe. 
Labour then to convince yourself, not by increase of the proofs of God, but by the diminution of your 
passions. You would fain arrive at faith, but know not the way; you wold heal yourself of unbelief, 
and you ask remedies for it. Learn of those who have been bound as you are, but who now stake all 
that they possess; these are they who know the way you would follow, who are cured of a disease of 
which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began, by making believe that they 
believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Thus you will naturally be brought to believe, 
and will lose your acuteness.—But that is just what I fear.—Why? what have you to lose?”  Blaise 
Pascal, "The Wager -- Selection from Pensees," in The Phenomenon of Religious Faith, ed. Terence 
Reynolds (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 1660/2005), 143. 
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criminal negligence conviction? From an objective perspective, it should count for 
little that faith healers would claim to have the very best intentions towards their 
children. No doubt JW parents refusing blood transfusion for their children also 
having nothing less than the best intentions for their children. Those best intentions 
are nowhere near ‘best’ from the perspective of the reasonable person. As 
committed fundamentalists would concede, their beliefs, their general world-view is 
not a matter of negotiation with secular people. They have no obligations to make 
themselves understandable to ‘Jews or Greeks’ (i.e., to those who want signs or to 
those who want reason). By their own biblical principles, they would acknowledge 
an obligation to set God’s will above the ‘worldly’ interests of their children. 
Furthermore, they would concede that their course of action will look to the world as 
though they disregard the life and safety of their children. That’s the way it would 
appear to foolish secular society and, as St. Paul says, to the “teachers of the law.” If 
the question is, do faith healers show the same kind of indisputably criminal 
disregard for another’s rights as, say Daniel Tschetter or any other common 
criminal, the answer is unequivocally no. But we’re not dealing here with a common 
crime either. There are reasons—reasons we’ve considered at great length—the 
offence of criminal negligence receives the sort of hand-wringing it does, and it has 
everything to do with the enigmatic nature of the fault that is required. If the 
question is, can certain agent-relative religious values blind a parent to his or her 
child’s agent-neutral interests, and thereby show indifferent disregard for the child’s 
life and safety, then the answer is yes. The Tuttons and the Shippys are not unique in 
this; in virtually all faith healing deaths it is obvious to medical staff and coroners 
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that there was overwhelmingly obvious evidence that the deceased child was in 
grave physical peril and in need of medical assistance, but the peril was ignored. 
Again, in the abstract, this sounds for all the world as though an accused’s agent-
relative commitments would not be over-ridden by anything including their own 
child’s agent-neutral interest in physical survival. Is this a marked and substantial 
departure from the kind of attitude expected of reasonable, ordinary parents in 
Canadian society? The answer should be ‘yes.’  
This chapter considered the plausibility of a charge of criminal negligence 
from an alternative conception of the reasonable person. Some triers of fact might 
be less persuaded by the idea (considered in the previous chapter) of a common 
sense objectivist—someone who thinks people have epistemic responsibilities to 
avoid getting  the world catastrophically wrong—and think that a reasonable 
person is someone who orders his or her moral commitments in ways that are 
socially responsible. A prosecutor could well try to persuade the trier of fact to see 
the deceased child as someone whose basic legal and moral rights were ignored 
with culpable indifference. A reasonable parent would know and, indeed, care for a 
child differently.  A reasonable parent does not intentionally disorder one’s natural 
affections and conventional duties in the way that faith healers do. Further to this, 
the prosecutor could argue that faith healers wilfully disorder the rightful place of a 
child in a family’s home by wilfully embracing a perverse ‘Abraham-complex’ that 
wilfully blinds the parent to the dangers being created. Consequently, a trier of fact 
could rightly conclude that the faith healer shows wanton or reckless disregard for 
182 
 
 
another’s life or safety and that, furthermore, the departure from the reasonable 
person is marked and substantial. 
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Chapter 9: Faith Healing and Guilt Reconsidered 
 
“Mistrust all in whom the urge to punish is powerful.”   
Friedrich Nietzsche - Thus Spake Zarathustra 
 
The two previous chapters considered arguments that a prosecutor could 
offer and a trier of fact could consider favouring the conviction of faith healers on 
charges of criminal negligence causing death. The lawfully delegated task of the trier 
of fact is to construct a conception of a reasonable person and ask oneself where 
faith healers (whose actions resulted in death) stand in relation to this norm. To 
avoid conviction faith healers need not perfectly conform to any reasonable person 
standard. Indeed, the defence could concede faith healers don’t conform to any 
plausible standard conceived by the trier of fact. Now, the defence may not want to 
make even that concession. Perhaps they would ambitiously prefer to contest the 
conceptions of reasonableness and argue that the faith healer’s actions are not only 
not unreasonable, but plausibly reasonable. Nevertheless, to negate the charge the 
defence need only generate reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact that the 
accused’s departure is as substantial as the Crown argues.  
Triers of fact have three options available to them in terms of justifying an 
acquittal. Perhaps in response to ambitious arguments from the defence, they may 
be persuaded that the faith healer is within the realm of a reasonable person or, 
contrary to chapter 6, that the accused made an honest but sufficiently reasonable 
mistake. Perhaps in response to more conciliatory arguments from the defence, they 
may be persuaded that the accused has not met the standard but does not depart 
sufficiently to warrant liability. Lastly, and most controversially, the trier of fact 
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could refuse to convict even while being persuaded that the faith healer has 
departed markedly from all conceivable standards of reasonableness. That is, the 
trier of fact could hold that the offence is rightly attributable to the accused but for 
some reason or other decide not to assign guilt. In this array of options lies the trier 
of fact’s interesting and controversial authority with respect to criminal negligence. 
Again, the basic “facts” are beyond dispute: faith healers choose to discharge the 
duty of care owed to their children by trusting in their objectively untrustworthy 
religious beliefs. From the point of view of the trier of fact this misplaced trust can 
be regarded not simply as neglect of a positive duty but as a profound failure of 
common sense, practical judgment, and natural affection. It could be well thought of 
as an endangerment of the highest order—the highest order because it is an 
absurdly avoidable evil wrapped in the innocence of a hopeful religious belief. The 
trier of fact could agree to all this, and nevertheless decide to acquit the accused.  
In part, what makes this third alternative controversial is that no triers of 
fact would need to admit to it. They wouldn’t need to admit to their belief that, in 
exclusive considerations of law, faith healers are guilty, but as a matter of personal  
conscience they cannot hold them liable. They could simply rationalize their verdict 
in the second alternative that the faith healer’s departure, while indisputably 
unreasonable, was not after all criminally unreasonable. Given the vagaries of 
applying the objective test in cases of criminal negligence there is simply no way of 
discerning from the outside (nor possibly from the inside) whether a trier of fact 
believes the accused is genuinely not guilty of the offence or just not guilty enough. 
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This penultimate chapter will consider a variety of arguments and perspectives that 
could explain why a trier of fact could choose to acquit the faith healer.  
The unstated assumption throughout this entire dissertation has been that 
criminal liability must be grounded in an accused’s choice or something akin to  
choice, such as a person’s will or one’s authorization of a course of action. Let’s call 
this view choice theory. Now, the contention might be that choice theory begs the 
question against other legitimate theoretical grounds of criminal liability, grounds 
that might be more conducive to explaining a faith healer’s acquittal. To get a clearer 
sense of the alternatives, let’s first get a clearer picture of the view I’ve so far 
assumed. Choice theory can bear upon both fault and excuses.233 For example, 
criminal liability could be grounded in the choices an accused has relevantly made. 
We have assumed, for example, that Daniel Tschettter is at fault and Justin Beatty is 
not by reference to the crucial role that choice played in the commission of the 
alleged offences. But liability can be considered from another way around. In terms 
of excuse, Michael Moore states, “one is excused for the doing of a wrongful action 
because and only because at the moment of such action's performance, one did not 
have sufficient capacity or opportunity to make the choice to do otherwise.”234 
Clearly the choice theory of criminal liability and the more narrow choice theory of 
excuse are intimately linked.235 We can, I think, weave fault and excuse together to 
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say that choice theory endorses the view that a necessary condition of criminal 
liability is sufficient evidence that a culpable choice is attributable to the accused 
somewhere in the direct causal chain leading to the offending harm. H.L.A. Hart can 
be understood as a strong proponent of choice theory in his defence of penal 
negligence. To hold someone criminally liable for a harm done ‘negligently’ (i.e, 
without care) it need only be proven that the accused had fair opportunity to have 
chosen otherwise and unreasonably failed to do so.236 The central thesis is that we 
can’t blame people morally or criminally for things over which they had no capacity 
to control by their choices.237 We can, for example, hold someone liable for a sexual 
assault he committed while intoxicated if he knowingly made a choice to initiate the 
process by which he lost his capacity to control himself.238 Following the line of 
argument offered by both Hart and Moore, no excuse is available to him in virtue of 
the fact that, knowing intoxication impairs self-control, he could have chosen not to 
become intoxicated in the first place. So, on this view we see choice theory and 
control-conditions fitting hand in glove.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
or justification (i.e., “liability-negaters”). Duff, Answering for Crime:Responsibility and Liability in the 
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236 See Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility."   
 
237 This “control” view is well developed by Duff in Answering for Crime, 57-72. There may be many 
things over which control is difficult to discern: e.g., thoughts, beliefs, outcomes, risks, etc. 
 
238 There is a long and unfortunate story in Canadian jurisprudence to be told in this regard following 
the remarkable ruling, R v Daviault [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63. The law at the time was such that self-induced 
intoxication could negate mens rea in the offence of sexual assault. Subsequent to Daviault, 
Parliament changed the law ensuring that if an accused knew he was consuming intoxicants, mens 
rea would not be negated if, later on, his self-induced intoxication rendered him incapable of 
controlling his behaviour. 
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In case this is not already obvious, no one should understand choice theory 
to be in any way wedded to subjectivism.239 It may be a tempting association given 
that choices occur in minds and subjectivism seeks to limit fault to those harms 
triggered by something correspondingly mindful. While some subjectivists may 
endorse choice theory, it need not be the exclusive domain of subjectivists or people 
who favour what Fletcher called a “psychological approach” to fault attribution. 
Recall from chapter 3, Fletcher himself rejects the psychological approach, but 
nevertheless agreed that the harm needed to be “attributed to the suspect as a 
culpable or blameworthy action.”240 I have been referring to the wrong as being 
properly authorized, i.e., somewhere in the attribution of fault the accused needed 
to have sufficiently authorized the offending harm. My claim is that we ‘authorize’ 
harmful actions by making choices and willing certain actions. In chapter 4 we 
examined the developments in judicial reasoning on objective standards in 
negligence-based offences which made minimally authorizing choice a necessary 
condition of fault. Though fault depended on objective tests, authorizing choices 
were discernible in Waite, Hundal, Naglik, and Creighton. Authorizing choices were 
also evident in Tschetter, and most recently in Czornobaj. Because they acted in the 
ways they did, namely, substantially out of step with the reasonable person, they 
also authorized the results of their actions. Culpability is attributable to them, 
though the fault is not necessarily in their choices. Without that authorizing feature, 
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though, no blame could be attributed to them. By contrast, no choice (and nothing 
voluntary) could be discerned in Dominic Martin, in Leslie MacDonald, nor in Justin 
Beatty.241 Because they authorized nothing sufficiently related to the harm, no guilt 
can be attributed to them. 
Authorizing choices are far more evidently found in faith healing cases like 
Tutton and Shippy than any other of the accidental harms we’ve considered. The 
bulk of argumentation presented so far advocating fault for faith healers is premised 
by the claim that reasonable people don’t make those kinds of choices: e.g., choices 
to disregard reliable medical treatment in favour of an alternative that appears to be 
nothing, or choices to subordinate the interests of an offspring to the presumed 
interests of a deity. But none of this, including the inventory of cases we’ve 
considered, necessarily means that choice theory related to fault or excuse is the 
only game in town. The theoretical alternatives to choice theory are action theory 
and character theory. Antony Duff, claims that, “criminal law should focus on 
wrongful action; it is primarily our actions (rather than for our choices or character 
traits, for instance) that we should be criminally responsible.”242 Duff is quick to 
concede that there is nothing about “action” per se that is hastily apprehensible. 
Action, he says, is “too wide: many kinds of wrongful action are not even in principle 
apt candidates for criminalization.”243Jurists and philosophers of law have long 
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puzzled over the concept of action and whether it, in the context of other important 
considerations, is key to criminal liability.244 According to Duff, what we do includes 
at least some of the consequences of our actions and these may well be at odds with 
our choices. For this and a variety of other reasons Duff elects for action theory 
against the alternatives. I’ve opted for choice theory over action or character theory 
for the simple pragmatic reason that it seems most implicitly endorsed by the SCC. 
By way of illustration, recall the Court concluded in Beatty that momentary lapses of 
care and attention can happen to any normal driver. We conclude from this, not that 
the action didn’t belong to the driver, but that both the action and the results were 
no not sufficiently authorized by choice, will, or decision.245  
Character theory stands as the more plausible alternative to choice theory, 
but only because it is more easily distinguishable from choice and action. Michael 
Moore says of character theory as it relates to excuse that, “one is excused for the 
doing of a wrongful action because and only because such action is not determined 
by (or in some other way expressive of) those enduring attributes of ourselves we 
                                                        
 
244 See for example, Douglas Husak, "Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?," in Philosophy and the 
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call our characters.”246 As with choice theory, we can see once again that both 
liability and excuse fit hand in glove. Character theory can explain everything we’ve 
taken for granted in terms of choice theory. For example, nothing about Daniel 
Tschetter’s driving resulting in the deaths could be negated by his character. He had 
been an alcoholic for eighteen years and his driving record was not impeccable. Or 
similarly, nothing about the character of Daniel Tschetter’s driving was defensible. 
Numerous witnesses testified to his dangerous driving and excessive speed long 
before Tschetter made his way to the outskirts of Calgary where the fatal collision 
occurred. His driving expressed culpable character and nothing about his known 
character could negate his actions. The driving of Justin Beatty, in contrast, did not 
express sufficiently culpable character. Nothing about Justin Beatty’s character 
could be used as evidence to prove culpability. With Tschetter, no one would have 
needed to die for the law to have impugned his driving—so uniformly dangerous 
was the entire episode his character authorized. Conversely, with Beatty, had three 
people not died nothing authorized by Beatty’s character would have been of 
interest to criminal law. 
Might character theory be used to negate the charges of criminal negligence 
in faith healing cases? Certainly an argument can be made that character theory can 
take the accused farther in the direction of acquittal than the presumed choice 
theory but it would be wrong to say that character considerations have been 
completely absent in making the case against faith healers in the first place. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, faith healers like the Tuttons can be impugned for the 
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presumed choices they make in terms of disordering their relational priorities in 
ways a reasonable person would not. But, someone unimpressed by choice theory 
could make a different claim about the same set of facts. Indeed, the character claim 
is very easy to see in Jeremy Horder’s conception of culpable indifference—that 
“complex attitude” that is causally connected to the offending harm. The character 
theorist could argue that the complex attitude of, what I called, affected indifference 
results less from choice and more from something like the formation and expression 
of character. Critics of choice theory may not fully deny that choices can be culpable, 
but without a context of character a choice is a mere atomic unit of authorized 
decision making. To explain a choice’s culpability it must be seen as expression or an 
extension of a person’s character. If a generally culpable character cannot be found 
then fault ought not be attributed, and similarly if culpable character is discernible 
then fault is attributable whether or not a full-throated ‘choice’ exists. And of course 
in cases of criminal negligence where there’s an obvious absence of subjective-type 
choices corresponding to the harm, it can be very useful to find something even 
‘choice-lite’ to which fault can be attributed. This is what Horder has done, the 
character theorist could argue, namely, turn criminal negligence into a ‘choice-lite’ 
offence where the character evaluations ground fault.  
To fold character theory into the objective standard—as we’ve done with 
choice theory—we could say that faith healers violate a standard of good character 
expected of good parents. It’s not that reasonable people don’t make the kinds of 
choices faith healers make; rather, it’s that reasonable people don’t show the kind of 
failures of character that faith healers show. When we consider the previous 
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inventory of cases, it appears that character theory is up to the same challenge as 
choice theory of both impugning and excusing. Whatever choice theory can do, 
character theory can do better—or at any rate, just as well.  
The case of Emma Czornobaj appears, though, a bit of an outlier. It would 
seem that choice theory is better used to explain her culpability, but that character 
theory would apply better in her defence. After all, she made a deliberate choice to 
stop her vehicle in the middle of a busy high-speed road way. A reasonable person 
doesn’t make that choice! So, when someone does and people die, culpability does 
not unfairly follow. On the other hand, she did something that put her own life and 
safety in some degree of peril and attempted to do something that showed 
commendable moral character. The world is a better place with people like Emma 
Czornobaj in it! No one is disputing that her choices and her actions caused needless 
loss of life, but the character theorist could argue that her wrongdoing is mitigated 
by the character her actions and choices expressed. Good character, in the end, 
should mitigate bad choices. 
A very similar kind of character argument could be used in the faith healing 
cases. The defence could concede quickly that, yes, it looks for all the world that 
faith healers make indefensible, inexcusable choices that no reasonable person 
should ever make. But, the defence could interject, these choices must be 
understood in an overall context of exemplary character. The trier of fact from the 
previous chapter, conceiving of the reasonable person as one who rightly orders 
one’s relational priorities, made the faith healer look like a psychopath with an 
Abraham-complex. But the defence could argue that is a caricature made of choices 
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and particular beliefs. There is nothing culpably self-serving or agent-relative in a 
faith healer’s genuine character. Faith healing parents, on the contrary, are 
extremely selfless, sacrificial, loving, and dutiful. Yes, their greatest love and highest 
duty is to their religion, but this expresses a capacity for indisputable virtue and it 
extends to the care for their children. In every other respect, it could be argued, that 
faith healing parents are exemplary in the care for their children. While so many 
permissive ‘liberal’ parents neglect the serious moral training of children, faith 
healing parents show the greatest care for moral education. Again, the defence need 
not pretend that somehow these parents made a good choice with respect to one 
aspect of a child’s health care—they did not! But, no trier of fact thinking about the 
reasonable person of good character should be able to detect the marked departure 
necessary for a conviction.  
This all sounds plausible, but the trier of fact need not be too quick to acquit 
based on character theory. As noted just prior, Horder’s conception of culpable 
indifference is obviously not devoid of character considerations, and there’s much 
about faith healing character to remain critical. Resolute and tenacious theological 
commitments that seem to ignore what is obvious to the rest of the world could 
easily be interpreted as an expression of less than good character. Nor, of course, is 
it unproblematic to exculpate someone simply because there are certain aspects of 
the accused’s character the trier of fact is either fond of or sympathetic to. 
Christopher Tutton’s death resulted from the parents’ failure to heed unequivocal 
professional medical advice, not once but twice. To be sure, character theorists look 
for more than atomic bits of decision making, but surely risking Christopher’s life 
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not once but twice says something less than praiseworthy about the parents’ overall 
character. Persistence and strength of will may be in general more praiseworthy 
than intemperance and weakness of will, but there are instances in which strength 
of will can have very blameworthy results.247No one would debate that the Tuttons, 
indeed most all faith healers, are very good people—law abiding in all respects—but 
why should a person’s criminal liability for an undeniable harm be vitiated by a 
positive balance of good character? This makes as much sense is holding an accused 
liable for an undeniable result, not because the trier of fact was confident he was 
culpable, but only because one was confident he was a bad guy. Let’s substitute, say, 
someone like Marc Creighton for Dominic Martin—someone with a known history 
of illegal drug use for a presumed upstanding middle class family man. Now, let’s 
suppose it’s Marc Creighton, not Dominic Martin, who forgets his child in a hot car. 
Will the history of the accused have some bearing upon the criminal charge, and the 
likelihood of a successful prosecution? Quite possibly. Should though, as a matter of 
law, a person’s background (i.e., a presumed expression of his or her character) 
determine or even influence fault in an unrelated offence? Choice theorists have a 
way of supplying the response protective of an accused’s right to a presumption of 
innocence prior to being proven guilty. The character theorist, on the other hand, 
may play to the descriptive strength of the legal realist, conceding that ‘is’ 
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determines ‘ought’ in this situation.248 Perhaps it doesn’t scandalize the character 
theorist that, say, Marc Creighton could receive different legal treatment than, say, 
Dominic Martin. 
It should be clear that application of character theory yields mixed results for 
the defence, but there’s something about the general approach of character theory 
that has more potential to rebut the charge and rebut the claim that faith healing 
parents depart markedly from a reasonable person. Character theory encourages 
the trier of fact to broaden one’s focus from the atomic time slices of presumed 
decision making, bringing other considerations into view. In short, character theory 
can support a wider, more contextual analysis of what the accused allegedly did. 
This strategy may bode well for the faith healer—better, it would seem, than if sharp 
focus remains on the unreasonable choices faith healers undeniably make. The 
defence could reason as follows: if wider scope provides an explanation of the 
evidence more conducive to acquittal, why stop with the broader view of character 
theory? Why not bring other considerations into view that provide even better 
explanations not just of what the faith healer has done, but why, in fact, society 
would be less inclined to condemn these actions? In short, the defence could benefit 
significantly by considering the historical context by which triers of fact can 
understand their delegated responsibility to construct the reasonable person. This 
more historical approach does not so much offer an alternative view of the 
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reasonable person, as it encourages the trier of fact to think more reflectively about 
what one is doing in the process.  
The justification for this longer more historical view is found in the 
previously mentioned work, Rethinking the Reasonable Person, by Mayo Moran.249 
Recall, when Oliver Wendell Holmes introduced his conception of the reasonable 
man in the late 1800s, “he” was thought to be a more practical antidote and a more 
functional heuristic guide to the unworkable moralizing that prevailed, Holmes 
thought, in much of criminal law and legal reasoning. Holmes, and other legal 
realists, sought to shorten the gap between the “is” and the “ought” of criminal 
prohibitions by requiring of people not more (and not less) than could justifiably be 
seen as normal contours of ordinary people in ordinary social interactions. To steer 
clear of criminal sanction, Holmes thought, minimal attention to common sense and 
common human experience was sufficient. What was sidestepped in chapter 7’s 
discussion of Holmes was his principled indifference to the unequal burdens of 
criminal prohibition. The person with less education, less intelligence, less physical 
coordination, less self-control, and conversely, more resentment, more envy, more 
unlawful desires, etc., might find himself on the wrong end of the law more often 
than an the otherwise “ordinary” person—and according to Holmes, so be it.  
Holmes wrote in The Common Law: 
The true explanation of the rule [that punishment aims only to prevent 
crime] is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a 
man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public policy sacrifices 
the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the burden of all should 
be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder. It 
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is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not 
have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all 
would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to 
make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed 
by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.250 
 
The criminal law, on Holmes’s account, puts everyone, without prejudice, on fair 
warning, but not exactly on equal footing. One can easily see why this approach to 
the justification of punishment can raise doubts about the fairness of objective 
standards and the possibility of absolute or unconditional liability for causing 
certain results. These, if we recall, were the exact concerns of the SCC in Tutton and 
Waite in 1989. The impartial trier of fact, functioning in the twenty-first century and 
possessing something of a historical view of the evolution fault in our country, could 
well be suspicious of objective standards that are insufficiently sensitive both to 
genuine moral innocence and to the unequal distributions of harm and wrong 
amongst certain classes of victims; e.g., women, children, the disabled, etc.251 While 
Holmes’s conception of the reasonable person or the “man of ordinary prudence” 
may have been an egalitarian improvement in nineteenth century jurisprudence, 
Moran claims legal reasoning about the reasonable person has not kept pace with 
increasing egalitarian social concerns.  “The result”, she claims of years of legal 
stagnation,  
… is a deeply conventional account of what is reasonable—it is what people 
ordinarily or customarily do. But so understood, a reasonable person 
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251 Moran does not explicitly address the challenges of multiculturalism, but certainly growing 
diversity of immigrants to liberal democracies generates unique problems for applying “reasonable 
person standards”. See Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense  (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
 
198 
 
 
standard will rarely assist an equality seeker. To the extent that people 
commonly treat others in ways that are discriminatory or disrespectful, 
reading reasonableness as ordinariness will do nothing but replicate—with 
the force of law—existing inequalities. The question then is whether it is 
possible to realize the egalitarian promise of the objective standard by 
somehow disentangling the reasonable person from the ordinary person.252 
 
From the subtitle of her book it should be obvious what Moran has in mind: An 
Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard. Ultimately what is most crucial 
about an objective standard is that it be fair and just in its application. Horder’s 
conception of penal negligence was used in the previous chapter to complain that 
faith healers show disordered priorities with a peculiarly religious form of culpable 
indifference. But, a reasonable person with egalitarian scruples could turn the 
tables, saying that punishing (or more seriously punishing) faith healers for an 
entirely accidental death also disorders social relations in a heavy-handed sort of 
way. The trier of fact need not agree with the course of action chosen by the faith 
healer. Indeed, she could agree with common sense and complain that faith healers 
get the world wrong. But a trier of fact with egalitarian concerns could well be 
critical of the hegemony of ‘common sense’ shared by a secular majority. Running 
afoul of this shouldn’t be punishable under criminal negligence.   
 The defence could encourage the trier of fact to employ a bit of that historical 
consciousness that can give rise to society’s more egalitarian impulses. Whatever 
might be said about the Holmesian version of the reasonable man, he didn’t possess 
a historical consciousness except perhaps in the scientific sense. For example, the 
common sense objectivist developed in chapter 7 was used to convict faith healers 
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on the basis of the following principle: “Because we all know more today about 
medical science and health, you ought to have known much better than to do what 
you did.” In other words, because medical science has provided us with more 
reliable means for treating diseases and saving and prolonging life, there is no 
excuse for letting children die in needless sorts of ways. We can simplify further: 
“Because we all know more, you too ought to have known better.” But the trier of 
fact, motivated by Moran’s concern for fairness for all, could take a wider, more 
reflexive approach that encompasses both science and morality: “Because we know 
more, we too ought to know better.” In other words, because we have seen through 
the long lens of history our all-too-human capacity to be inhumane to each other in 
the name of principle, we ought to show some caution when this impulse tempts us 
in the present. This is not to say that reasonable egalitarians would completely 
reject the role that punishment as public condemnation can play in a just society, 
but clearly impartial triers of fact can be more intentionally political in their legal 
duty to assess the ‘facts’. 
Let’s now, on behalf of the defence, carry forward this egalitarian correction 
to ordinary ‘reasonableness’. Recall that George Fletcher described his moral 
approach to attribution as primarily evaluative, not descriptive: “Attribution of a 
wrongful act is not posited solely on the basis of particular facts but on the basis of a 
social and legal evaluation of all the facts bearing on whether the actor can be 
properly blamed for a crime.”253 A big part of the social and legal evaluation of faith 
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healing deaths today must certainly include an awareness of the acrimonious, often 
quite toxic relationship that exists between religious groups and secular society. No 
one can be blind or deaf to the rather vocal anti-religious climate in which we’ve 
lived since 9-11. This study has made a smattering of references to the influence of 
the so-called “new atheists”, but there has also been, in both academic culture and 
society generally, a measurable backlash against what might be described as ‘piling 
on’ or ‘unnecessary roughness’ by atheists.254 The concern is that atheists have 
become so venomous in their criticisms of religion and theism generally that 
otherwise educated, intelligent, but privately religious people have been excluded 
from serious intellectual endeavours just because they maintain faith commitments. 
In spite of the efforts of new atheists, of course, religion and supernatural belief isn’t 
being obliterated.255 Far from a great secular, atheistic awakening, liberal 
democracies are arguably seeing a resurgence of fundamentalism, religiosity, and 
spirituality.256 What might all this mean for faith healers on trial for criminal 
negligence?  
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Impartial triers of fact, even equipped with Holmesian common sense, could 
find themselves more sympathetic to the legal and political criticism of religious 
people—even people as radically religious as faith healers. The defence could argue, 
contrary to the prosecutorial arguments of the preceding chapters, that faith healers 
are not dangerously anti-social. They are not psychopaths with an Abraham-
complex. And they certainly ought not be associated with truly dangerous zealots 
like jihadists, honour killers, or violent anti-abortion radicals. Furthermore, defence 
attorneys could attempt to persuade triers of fact of the broader context of criminal 
negligence convictions. Convicting faith healers with a charge of criminal negligence 
puts them on equal footing with people like Daniel Tschetter and Marc Creighton. 
This, the defence could argue, is patently unfair and unjust. In spite of efforts to pre-
empt and foreclose on the mistake of fact defence, faith healers could insist, in a 
quasi-confessional mood, that in the final analysis, they made a mistake—a colossal 
mistake. A mistake that, in some possible world in which a more present deity 
answers prayers more exactly, would not have resulted in a child’s death. Since no 
proof is ever forthcoming that atheists have got the world right, political and legal 
space for holding religious beliefs must remain permissible and intellectually 
legitimate. Again, the contextual focus could be on the utter ubiquity of religious 
belief and religious practice, and not on the apparent failure of one particular sort of 
religious belief. If the defence can succeed in getting the trier of fact to consider the 
facts of the case in this more capacious context then the overall reasonableness of 
faith healers might not be so obviously out of step with conceivable norms. The 
defence may not so much try to persuade the trier of fact that the parents didn’t 
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commit the offence, but that there are more charitable, more humane, less 
stigmatizing alternatives available to them—like a summary conviction of s. 215, 
“failing to provide the necessaries of life.”  
As discussed briefly at the end of chapter 5, it is open to the trier of fact in 
cases like these to render verdicts in keeping with one’s values. While this may 
sound scandalous, as though the trier of fact gets to ironically ignore the facts of the 
case, it’s important to acknowledge the surprising paucity of ‘brute facts’: parents 
did the highly unexpected and a child died. The question is simple: is this highly 
unexpected behaviour ‘wanton or reckless disregard for another’s life or safety’? 
These facts about the parents’ actions and the child’s death do not speak for 
themselves. This leaves a profound degree of latitude for triers of fact to rule in 
accordance with their own perceived sense of fairness and justice. There is a 
potential analogue here to the phenomenon known as “jury nullification”; i.e., the 
collective refusal of a jury to pronounce guilt upon an accused in spite of a 
consensus that the individual committed the charged offence. The phenomenon of 
jury nullification typically occurs in the litigation of more serious offences wherein 
an accused has for some reason garnered a substantial degree of principled 
sympathy from jurors.257 Perhaps the sentence is unduly harsh or, in the larger 
                                                        
 
257 Jury nullification can occur not only when triers of fact become sensitive to characteristics in the 
accused. A jury may take issue with a particular offence as a matter of law and agree the offence is 
unfair or that its application in this instance is unfair. Additionally, no one should think that jury 
nullification is always on the side of justice in the broadest sense. For example, a jury consisting of 
white supremacists might be “principally sympathetic” to one of their own and refuse to hold a 
confederate accountable for his racially motivated crime.  See Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification: The 
Evolution of a Doctrine  (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998).;  Simon Stern, "Between Local 
Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification after Bushell’s Case," Yale 
Law Journal 111(2002). 
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context, the sentence is regarded as morally or legally undeserved. Often there is 
little or no dispute that the accused actually authorized the crime from a choice-
theoretical perspective, but equally as often there is some characteristic (e.g., race, 
socioeconomic status, or community affiliation) to which jurors are sensitive and 
this factor or consideration takes overriding importance in their verdict.  
A similar moral phenomenon could be at work in the mind of the trier of fact 
as he or she considers the prosecution of religious parents who bear no 
resemblance to stereotypical criminal offenders. It could well be obvious from an 
objective perspective that faith healers are wilfully blind and reckless in the mortal 
endangerment of their children, but nevertheless, the trier of fact could decide to 
acquit regardless of the clarity of the evidence and against them. Admittedly, there is 
dis-analogy here with genuine ‘gold standard’ jury nullification. In cases of criminal 
negligence there are frequently lesser offences that can be sought still satisfying the 
legal interests of both the prosecutor and the trier of fact—and perhaps criminal 
justice generally. Finding Michael Waite guilty of dangerous driving but acquitting 
him of criminal negligence causing death is still pronouncing him criminally guilty 
for something. Accepting a guilty plea from Leslie MacDonald for failing to provide 
the necessaries is not, obviously, a conviction for criminal negligence manslaughter 
but it’s something that registers some degree of public disapprobation for carelessly 
causing a death. Nevertheless, because criminal negligence is norm-dependent and 
the creation of the norm is a lawfully delegated task, a jury can’t really been seen to 
be ‘nullifying’ anything as clearly as, say, a law against intentionally attacking or 
killing another person. But what the trier of fact can do in terms of the offence of 
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criminal negligence is less subversively disregard certain norms of public rationality 
that are instrumental in protecting lives and promoting public safety. It is open to 
the trier of fact to set aside or override the norm requiring, for the protection of 
others, people to be attentive to common sense, or the norm to be especially careful 
with the lives of our vulnerable children, or the norm not to engage in death-defying 
wishful thinking. It is open to the trier of fact to acquit people who, for all the world  
show reckless disregard for another’s life, and thereby refuse to condemn people for 
whom some degree of principled sympathy is felt. This could entail showing greater 
lenience toward alleged criminal wrongdoing in an effort to negatively stigmatize 
fewer people in society. This does not entail turning a blind eye to genuine criminal 
wrongdoing that unambiguously threatens social wellbeing; rather, it means taking 
more humane approaches to profoundly idiosyncratic harms—harms that while 
tragic, do not threaten social well-being.  
In this chapter we have attempted to offset the arguments favouring criminal 
negligence convictions in cases involving faith healing deaths with arguments and 
considerations favouring acquittals. The preferred strategy here has not been to 
generate competing or alternative conceptions of a reasonable person against whom 
the faith healer benefits by relative comparison. Rather, we granted that a genuine 
reasonable person understood by public law would necessarily need to be someone 
generally attentive to the teachings of common experience. The sober admission 
needs to be made that there is virtually no publically available objective standard 
whereby the faith healer’s conformity could be established. Nevertheless, acquittal 
is not dependent upon conformity with any norm. Rather, the defence need only cast 
205 
 
 
reasonable doubt on the evidence and argument that the faith healer’s departure 
from the norm is marked and substantial. One useful strategy open to the defence 
would be try to shift the focus of evaluation away from the choices or actions of the 
accused and more towards the accused’s general character. The character of the 
reasonable person may be sufficiently vague as to restrict the degree of departure 
discerned from it. Whether or not a faith healer’s departure from any norm is 
marked and substantial is an open question of evaluation. Quite independently of 
what the defence even attempts to argue, the trier of fact may withhold guilty 
verdicts even if the faith healer’s departure from the norm is decidedly marked. 
There may be any number of social and legal considerations related to the facts 
impinging on the attribution of fault. We considered the historical trajectory 
towards a more egalitarian impulse in the application of the objective standards in 
law. Triers of fact are more aware of the potentially harmful impositions of abstract 
standards on both themselves and others. They’re also aware of the religious and 
political disagreements that threaten social solidarity and social cohesion. How the 
trier of fact reconciles some of these public tensions will clearly play some role in 
his or her assessment of liability in these religiously volatile and emotionally 
charged homicide cases. In the final analysis, there is nothing about the facts of a 
criminal negligence case that in any way speak for themselves. Showing wanton or 
reckless disregard for another’s life or safety is dependent on the principled (or not 
so principled) social and legal evaluations of the trier of fact. It is open to triers of 
fact to either override or uphold with their verdict certain norms of public 
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rationality considered lawfully instrumental in protecting lives and promoting 
public safety.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 
Christians from all denominational and cultural stripes should be willing to 
acknowledge the general Christian tenet that faith is a powerful resource in the life 
of the believer. The Christian religion has historically been considered a 
transformative, wonder-working, even supernatural belief system. No Christian 
needs to be a fundamentalist to affirm this! As far as revealed religions go, perhaps 
Christianity is not odd in offering supernatural explanations of otherwise ‘natural’ 
realities. But certainly the New Testament accounts of Jesus’s ministry places 
extraordinary emphasis on the power of faith to achieve miraculous results. Most 
Christians would be quick to affirm the ‘miraculous’ power of both faith and God. 
Unfortunately, many would not be careful to disambiguate the power of belief from 
the power of belief in God. Whether it is faith simpliciter or faith in God per se that 
moves mountains is not a question that attracts a great deal of attention from the 
rank and file. Christians have been taught to expect the extraordinary and hope for 
the miraculous. Christians have also been taught to qualify what is meant by 
‘miracle’. The Christian could prosaically say that the cosmos is a miracle, or that life 
is a miracle, or that love is a miracle. Daffodils and puppies become candidates for 
miracles! And, of course, so does medical science—as though God specially paved 
the way for its discovery. Conservative defenders of the Christian tradition—indeed 
most traditional theists—want to affirm that prayer connects believers to a divine 
power outside themselves. The belief is that God longs to interact with the world 
and the humans he created. He can be counted on to assist with all manner of life’s 
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difficulties from cradle to the grave. ‘God’ provides comfort in times of trouble and 
he gets credit, too, for guiding the believer to lost cell phones and to helping football 
teams win Super Bowls. Religious faith is a ubiquitous presence in the world, and it 
has profound instrumental value because many people detect in it a causal power to 
alter people and events. This doesn’t seem to be a misguided religious belief at all. It 
just sounds like reasonable, ordinary religious belief. 
In cases of faith healing deaths, though, something seems to go terribly 
wrong with this ubiquitous religious impulse. If God is so useful from cradle to 
grave, why in these instances does the grave follow the cradle so quickly? We should 
be reminded that belief in the causal efficacy of prayer is almost always harmless. 
Whatever it may or may not ‘cause’, prayer should not cause harm! No one really 
tries to walk on water or to move mountains—certainly not literally, and not very 
figuratively either. While scripture gives believers every reason to expect the 
impossible, not many Christians attempt it. And when faith healers do this, even the 
religiously sympathetic are inclined to say, ‘no reasonable person does this!’ Most 
reasonable Christians know the difference between the otherwise strange beliefs 
one can harmlessly be obliged to affirm and the actions no amount of faith should 
ever justify. In other words, it’s one thing to give voluntary assent to, say, the virgin 
birth, the sacramental power of the Eucharist, the eternal damnation of the 
unrepentant, or the penal substitution of Christ’s death; it’s quite another to believe 
things that obligate unreasonable, death-defying actions. But, faith healers are not 
‘most Christians’. They feel justified in taking beliefs that millions of others assent to 
in a formal, nominal, and doctrinal sense and reifying them and trusting in them in 
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terrifyingly dangerous ways. What for most Christians are harmless generalities and 
metaphorical affirmations (e.g., that faith can move mountains!), become for faith 
healers dogmatic assertions to be relied on like skydivers rely on parachutes.  
As we try to determine what if anything faith healers do wrong, it is not, to be 
clear, the reification of beliefs that is their legal difficulty. That is arguably an 
epistemic failing, but that’s not criminally blameworthy—at any rate, not without 
more qualification. For example, there’s nothing criminal going on if and when, a 
devout Roman Catholic, whose mind is awash with thoughts of transubstantiation, 
imagines himself really consuming Christ’s flesh in the Eucharist. No one is calling 
the police because a believer thinks he is really engaging in cannibalism. No one is 
saying it’s permissible to believe in transubstantiation provided the belief is not 
very strong and not too vividly imagined. No! Liberal democracies should protect 
the freedom of conscience, and if one’s conscience wants to vividly imagine things 
that don’t otherwise comport with rather more public accounts of rationality or 
even morality, so be it. Criminal law should not restrict such liberty, even if liberal 
public education might try to persuade people in a different direction. Religious 
people should be free to believe and imagine what they want for themselves. They 
can believe about reality whatever they like. But, when conscience motivates actions 
that results in needless harm and death of others, then the motivating beliefs and 
values rightly become the focus of criminal scrutiny and evaluation. The evidence 
shows, and in turn allows ‘common sense’ to predict, that persistent application of 
faith healing results in harm and hastens death. From a public, human perspective—
which must be the perspective of law—faith healing is as risky and as reckless as 
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anything possibly could be. It does not merely appear this way; it is this way. So, 
surely, faith healing deaths warrant thorough criminal investigation, not just to 
reassure society that children aren’t being artfully murdered by nefarious parents, 
but to reassure society that the homicide is not culpable in any criminal sense. 
In search of criminal culpability in non-murderous homicides we considered 
the potential analogue of ‘hot-car’ deaths. Finding, after all, a religiously motivated 
parallel is difficult. Faith healers don’t seemingly belong in a conversation alongside 
talk of radical jihadists, honour killers, or violent anti-abortionists. Faith healers 
certainly have more in common with parents or care-givers who tragically and very 
accidentally leave infants and toddlers unattended in a sweltering vehicle than they 
do with homicidal fanatics. So, how does the criminal law respond to a careless 
caregiver like Dominic Martin or Leslie MacDonald? There’s been no uniform 
response. We certainly hope that an accused in this situation will be dealt with justly 
and humanely. But what does this look like? What criminal response if any is called 
for when dealing with achingly bereaved parents? Surely, faith healing parents are 
achingly bereaved as well. 
 Asking whether the criminal law is rightly brought to bear upon these kinds 
of deaths turns quickly into a question of how the criminal law could and should find 
fault with an accused in these kinds of cases. The two Canadian criminal options are 
“failing to provide the necessaries of life” and “criminal negligence.” Failing to 
provide the necessaries is the less serious of the two offences, and while faith 
healers quite literally fail to provide what is necessary for their children to survive, 
the explanation of the failure seems to go beyond culpable ignorance or careless 
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neglect. The death itself seems wrongfully and culpably caused. From the outside, 
the parents seem to deliberately endanger their loved ones and this looks and 
sounds a great deal like showing wanton or reckless disregard to one who is, quite 
to the contrary, owed a considerable duty of care. So, faith healing deaths could 
justifiably warrant the more serious public censure provided for in the criminal 
negligence offence. But, if prosecutors elect this route, they face the challenge of 
persuading the trier of fact of the heightened fault element of the offence. And this, it 
turns out, is far more difficult and more contentious than it appears. As we saw, it’s 
not just difficult in relation to faith healing deaths. Criminal negligence in virtually 
all instances has been and continues to be a vexing offence for lawyers, judges, and 
jurors—and society generally.  
There is a morally and socially praiseworthy reason for the ongoing 
handwringing and ambivalence inspired by criminal negligence. We sensibly want 
criminal wrongs to be somehow obviously wrongful. As a society we want our 
convicted criminals to wear black hats, as it were, and to be guilty of virtually self-
evident wrongs. Unfortunately, not every action that the state sees fit to prohibit is 
palpably wrong or immoral. Some things are prohibited because the state says 
they’re wrong and provided they promote a justifiable public interest, their 
prohibition is morally and politically justified. But having a justification for wrongs 
that mediate between deep moral wrongs and thinner social policy concerns does 
little to make their fault element easier for judges or triers of fact to discern. In other 
words, we can know that we’d like to prohibit and deter certain outcomes without 
knowing precisely what makes an accused guilty or not guilty when he or she causes 
212 
 
 
one of those unfortunate outcomes. Punishing people for less than genuinely 
wrongful behaviour is something to be laudably avoided. Unfortunately, criminal 
negligence seldom reveals offenders who are obvious wrong-doers—apart from the 
harms they cause. Almost invariably, the prosecution of the criminal negligence 
offence yields a certain degree of unease and disagreement because serious criminal 
liability is being considered for someone whom triers of fact may not agree clearly 
deserves it. We might regret the results—as the accused surely does—but that’s a 
different story. The trier of fact may not be fully convinced, may not be morally 
satisfied, that the accused really authorized or really owns the harm he or she 
caused. It may not be very obvious what a reasonable person does under the 
circumstances, other than apparently not causing the harm that was caused; nor is it 
obvious whether the accused’s departure from the norm is marked and substantial. 
We can’t find faith healers liable for simply failing to be reasonable; they must be 
criminally unreasonable. This is not an easy gap to measure. 
Furnished with the necessary moral and legal constraints against punishing 
the innocent, what should we think about the criminal condemnation of faith 
healers for the deaths they cause? The bottom line I have advanced is this: children 
ought not die this way and that in spite of religious freedom, religious proponents 
should be deterred from considering this course of action for their children. Parents 
in liberal democracies need to appreciate they are stewards, not owners, of their 
children’s lives. Parents are deputized, as it were, by the state to raise children and 
carefully hand off autonomy to them. Parents have a great deal of freedom to pass 
on their own values and beliefs, but those values and beliefs cannot jeopardize or 
213 
 
 
endanger a child’s life. My goal, therefore, has been to identify the strongest and 
fairest arguments with which to prosecute faith healers when their actions result in 
the deaths of their children. Canadian society can rest assured that Charter-era 
jurisprudence is scrupulous in its protection of moral innocence. With these 
concerns in full view, I argue that there is a positive criminal case to be made against 
faith healers—at least some faith healers, like the Tuttons and the Shippys.  
First, I have argued that we need to better understand what faith healers 
actually believe with respect to the presumed medical care they are providing. 
While it may be very tempting for a fair minded person to think faith healing deaths 
obviously result from a mistake of fact, the analysis I’ve provided should show that 
there is nothing mitigating or exculpatory in their presumed mistake. Without even 
considering the potential reasonableness of their course of action, it should be clear 
that faith healers do not actually believe, as a matter of fact, that their child has been 
healed. They want to believe their child is healed. They hope their child is being 
healed. They believe God has promised to heal their child. But, comparing faith 
healing parents to parents who sincerely but mistakenly believe their child is cured 
yields a vivid contrast. If the faith healer sought to press the mistake of fact defence, 
the more accurate conclusion to be drawn is that faith healing parents willfully blind 
themselves to the natural and predictable fate of their children.  
Secondly, in terms of the positive case against faith healers, I argued they 
depart markedly from the actions of a reasonable person inasmuch as parents have 
responsibilities to be attentive to the actual risks their children face with the 
proposed course of action. A reasonable parent knows roughly how the world 
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works; action is one thing and inaction is another. Reasonable people regardless of 
culture or era have known the difference between doing something and doing 
nothing to slow the advance of disease and prolong life. When something can be 
done to meaningfully preserve a child’s life it is unreasonable not to do so. When 
literally nothing can be done to save the life of a loved one it is then acceptable to 
simply hope, and perhaps pray, for the best. Virtually all faith healing deaths result 
from parents choosing to pray or have faith, but from a public and scientific, let’s call 
it objective, perspective these actions are today indistinguishable from doing 
nothing. Even people who promote alternative medicine in supposed opposition to 
the hegemony of medical science and the pharmaceutical industry still do something 
that would resemble treatment. This study is not intended to impugn all forms of 
alternative medicine; but it does take a critical view of doing nothing from an 
objective point of view. Both law and science are concerned with facts as they are 
publically available and not how private idiosyncratic groups want to observe them 
with privileged ‘eyes to see’. If a trier of fact takes common sense to be the guiding 
norm of the reasonable person then criminal negligence is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Thirdly, and lastly, I considered an objection that might leave some 
unpersuaded by the common sense objectivist. One might think that, in point of fact, 
the preceding argument only proves that faith healers show reckless or wanton 
disregard for reality or secular wisdom. But, getting the world wrong or denying 
common sense is not a criminal wrong. If closer fidelity to the actual statute is 
demanded the prosecution can shift the focus to meet the objection. This argument 
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concludes that faith healers show wanton or reckless disregard directly for their 
children’s lives by clearly disordering their natural affections and the way they 
conceive of and discharge their rightful duties. Their children’s lives are gravely 
endangered by being subordinated to a dubious metaphysical narrative about 
‘higher’ priorities. The ancient figure of Abraham, considered in Christian and 
Jewish lore as the archetype of faithfulness, is the central character in arguably one 
of the most famous and most chilling stories in the entire Bible. In Genesis 22, 
Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice his cherished son, Isaac, on an altar atop 
Mount Moriah. Abraham obediently followed God’s commands and at the crucial 
moment, with Isaac poised for slaughter, Yahweh intervenes to say, “Now I know …”  
Of course, what God knows is that anyone willing to sacrifice his son can be trusted 
to do anything, like be the father of a great nation. Most religious people gloss over 
the grim details of this story to celebrate the value of human obedience in the face of 
unthinkable internal conflict. From an outsider’s perspective, the Abraham story 
depicts not a hero, but a delusional psychopath. Any reasonable father today who 
hears a voice commanding him to kill his child surely seeks medical assistance! 
Unfortunately, faith healing parents value all too well the example set by Abraham. 
Rather than reinterpret the story or seek medical assistance, the challenge before 
them is to place their own children on the figurative altar of God’s will and simply 
trust the biblical promises. No reasonable religious parent reading Genesis 22 
should be inspired to place his or her child on any figurative altar that needlessly 
risks death. 
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In stark relief to the Abraham story, the trier of fact should be encouraged to 
consider another famous perspective—famous to philosophers at least. The children 
are being used merely as means to the other-worldly ends of their parents. These 
children are not being respected as ends-in-themselves. As one might object that it’s 
not a crime to show wanton or reckless disregard for secular wisdom, neither is it a 
crime to violate a formulation of the Kantian Categorical Imperative. Fair enough. 
But it is a crime to show reckless disregard for another’s life and safety. By using 
children as means to enact and thereby prove one’s absolute commitment to God, 
faith healers prove to themselves—and to a court of law—there are no lengths to 
which they will not go to show their devotion to their religious ideals. This, the trier 
of fact must conclude, is reckless disregard for the life and safety of our most 
vulnerable and most treasured possession—our children. Faith healers ought to be 
found liable for criminal negligence not for getting the world wrong—though they 
do—but for causing such predictable harm in their death-defying human 
relationships.  
In summary, we have taken a thorny legal and moral problem and given it a 
thorny legal and moral solution. Though a positive case can be made for the liability 
of faith healers, there is no tidy or satisfying bow for this study. I want to insist that 
each faith healing death needs to be assessed carefully; each will have its own set of 
circumstances and each case should be assessed on its merits. Though certain 
generalizations can be made about faith healers and faith healing deaths, there is 
much to consider when trying to discern and attribute fault. Canada is very 
fortunate—more fortunate than the United States—in that faith healing deaths 
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occur very infrequently in our country. We have far fewer snake handlers, too! We 
could hope that Canada has seen the last Tutton or the last Shippy. Perhaps as many 
hopes go, this one too may be unrealistic. But even if we don’t see another faith 
healing death, we’ve certainly not seen the last careless and accidental death in this 
country. No doubt, people will continue to act in ways that tragically result in 
serious harm or the loss of life, and criminal negligence may be brought to bear. I 
hope through this study more clarity has been brought to the vexing nature of the 
criminal negligence offence, clarity that will not go to waste if no child ever dies 
again from faith gone awry. “Hot car” deaths continue to capture headlines.  At the 
time of writing, Emma Czornobaj—the Quebec woman whose decision to help some 
ducklings on a busy highway resulted in two human deaths—is still awaiting her 
final legal fate. A jury has found her guilty of criminal negligence causing death and 
dangerous driving and she has been sentenced to ninety days in jail and a ten-year 
driving ban. She is currently appealing her sentence. And if another faith healing 
death occurs tomorrow, the study should prove useful to lawyers, judges, and jurors 
tasked with considering both the facts and values surrounding the case.  
I’m confident, as well, that the study will contribute to the ongoing 
ruminations of philosophers of law, philosophers of science, and philosophers of 
religion. A great many Christian apologists are today going to great lengths to stem 
the tide of ‘new atheism’ and arguing strongly for the basic rationality of religious 
belief. Religious belief, they contend, deserves epistemic respect in the market place 
of other presumably warranted and justified beliefs. Even some atheists are coming 
to the defence of religious belief generally, cautioning their fellow secularists against 
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any form of dogmatic fundamentalism—including their own. Again, my hope is not 
to cast unnecessary aspersion on religious belief or religious epistemology 
generally.  Where religious belief mimics ordinary morality and results in the 
protection of human rights and the promotion of social well-being, no grievance 
should be found with the free exercise of conscience and religious belief. But, when 
religious belief departs so markedly from anything recognizably human—that is, 
when morality becomes exclusively ‘other-worldly’—then religious faith can be 
neither celebrated nor protected. When religious people behave in ways that society 
accurately predicts will threaten rights and endanger lives, they attract the scrutiny 
and censure of the criminal law. Whatever else might be said of the virtues of 
religious faith, society is right in saying religious people trust to a fault when faith 
results in a child’s death.  
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